75. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz1
SUBJECT
- Soviet Response on Shcharanskiy
Soviet Chargé Sokolov called me today in response to Larry’s and my comments to him on Shcharanskiy on the fringes of your July 29 meeting.2 Sokolov read the following statement:
“Our position on the matter, which is totally in the internal competence of the Soviet state, has been stated to the U.S. side more than once, including to the Secretary of State personally. That position remains unchanged.”
I pressed Sokolov hard to state just what their position is. Sokolov refused to restate it, but he did refer to your meeting with Dobrynin on July 15.3 As you know, our record of that meeting shows no response by Dobrynin to your points on Shcharanskiy.
We are not sure how to read this response. It may mean:
1) The Soviets do not want this sensitive subject discussed outside the KGB channels. An innocuous response keeps their paper trail essentially clean;
2) The message is merely a stall and does not convey either a positive or negative signal at this point;
[Page 262]3) They believe that Shcharanskiy has yet to fulfill their conditions for the agreement (i.e. his refusal to sign an appeal for early release on health grounds); or
4) It is a polite brushoff.
You should also be aware that our discussions with the Poles on a Zacharski/Shcharanskiy deal have been a dry well thus far.4
We will soon have another chance to test the Soviet response. Max is due to meet with Kondrashev on August 25, and he will raise the Shcharanskiy issue then.5 The response then may clear up whether or not the Soviets have qualms over a discussion of the deal in formal diplomatic channels (You will recall in this regard that Kondrashev told Max “It so happens that it is in our interest to allow certain people to depart. If it happens that these are the same names brought to our attention by the U.S., this is purely coincidental. We will deny any deal.”)
We have now made our position and that of the President on Shcharanskiy unmistakably clear for Soviet policymakers. At this point, I believe we should wait to see what comes of Max’s talk.
- Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive August 1–15 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons and Palmer. Hill’s handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on August 3.↩
- In a July 29 memorandum to Reagan, Shultz wrote: “I called in the Soviet Chargé today to deliver demarches on two serious arms control compliance issues,” and that “at the conclusion of the meeting Larry Eagleburger pressed Sokolov once again on Shcharanskiy.” Shultz wrote: “On Shcharanskiy, Larry Eagleburger noted that we had not received a response to the points I had raised with Dobrynin on July 15. He told Sokolov that you [Reagan] have taken a personal interest in this matter, and have requested that we convey on your behalf to Andropov our expectation that Shcharanskiy’s release will go forward as discussed with Ambassador Kampelman in Madrid. [See footnote 2, Document 104.] Larry added that there was a new element in the case with the recent appeal by Shcharanskiy’s mother that he be released now due to his declining health. He told Sokolov that we were prepared to make a humanitarian gesture of our own, and to do so now. He urged Moscow to do so as well. Sokolov said he would have to stand on what the Soviets have said previously on Shcharanskiy, but would pass our latest message to Moscow.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (07/23/83–07/29/83))↩
- See Document 73.↩
- On June 29, 1981, Marian W. Zacharski was arrested by the FBI in California on espionage charges. Zacharski was a Polish citizen, working in the United States for the Polish American Machinery Company.↩
- Kampelman and Kondrashev were scheduled to meet at the CSCE meetings in Madrid.↩