Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

73. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 15, 1983, 8–9 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Secretary’s Meeting with Dobrynin, July 15

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • George P. Shultz, Secretary of State

• USSR

  • Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador, Washington

The Secretary met for one hour with Ambassador Dobrynin on July 15 prior to the Ambassador’s return to Moscow that day for summer leave. The session was businesslike throughout, focussing on the Madrid wrap-up and Shcharanskiy, but included discussion of U.S.-Soviet agenda across-the-board.

The Secretary led off the discussion by emphasizing the importance we attached to the Soviet commitments on human rights as part of the conclusion of the Madrid meeting. He particularly stressed the Shcharanskiy case, quoting the commitment the Soviets made to us (in Madrid) that he would be released from jail and allowed to leave the country shortly after January 1984. He also urged that they release Shcharanskiy on September 15 or earlier because of the latter’s ill health. Having set the context, the Secretary informed him we intend to join the consensus at Madrid.

Dobrynin took these points without reacting and then gave the Secretary a long “oral statement” (translation attached). The statement predictably begins with arms control and makes points supporting their freeze proposal, complaining about our negative reaction. Otherwise, it includes the following:

—On INF and START, the statement contains standard criticisms of our positions and calls on us to respond to their move to limit rather than ban ALCMs. But it also conveys their agreement to discuss our CBM ideas at Geneva in a special working group, an approach they had resisted until now.

—On MBFR, the Soviets agree to continue exploratory discussions with Ambassador Abramowitz in Vienna and state their willingness to consider further verification measures beyond what they have tabled. They are not, however, otherwise helpful on substance.

—On BMD, the statement turns aside our proposal to discuss ballistic missile defense on an official basis in START and the SCC, reaffirming the propagandistic Soviet proposal for open discussion among scientists.² At this point in the conversation, the Secretary told Dobrynin that he thought existing official channels were sufficient to discuss this issue. If necessary, of course, our delegations could be augmented by appropriate scientists, but a confidential official setting was necessary. The Secretary and Dobrynin concluded by urging each other to reconsider positions.

—On bilateral issues, Dobrynin stated Soviet agreement to hold negotiations in Washington on the opening of Consulates General in Kiev and New York and on a new cultural exchange agreement. He also gave consent to extension of the transportation and atomic energy agreements. The cultural agreement portion does, however, lay down a marker on the defection issue, and appears to represent return to a position that we believed was becoming more flexible; however, the test will come in the negotiations. To Dobrynin’s query as to whether we were thinking in terms of a more narrowly-defined cultural agreement, the Secretary responded that we are prepared to have a broader agreement similar to the last one.

There was some talk on how the talks on the two agreements would proceed. Dobrynin said he was instructed to conduct the discussions in Washington with participants coming from Moscow, but it was left to Burt and Sokolov to work this out.

Dobrynin also asked about the Secretary’s plans at the UNGA this year. When the Secretary said he thought his participation would be much the same as last year, Dobrynin responded that Gromyko’s plans would also be similar to the past. (We take this comment as indication that Andropov does not plan to come to the UNGA.)

The possibility of a Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Madrid was also discussed, but in non-committal terms. Dobrynin noted that Gromyko was planning to begin his vacation on July 25. The Secretary commented that we were not pushing for a Foreign Ministers’ meeting to conclude Madrid, but that we would look at the issue as it arose.

Summit prospects were also discussed briefly. Both agreed that a summit is desirable in principle but that it should be well prepared and offer a good prospect of substantive results.

In conclusion, the Secretary emphasized once again that although arms control is important to us, as it is to the Soviets, Soviet conduct on regional issues has caused tremendous damage to the relationship in the past, and no issue is more central than human rights. The Secretary noted that we welcome progress on the Pentecostalists, but reiterated once again that progress is necessary on Shcharanskiy. In general, he stressed that we have to address the issues before us across-the-board if we wish to get anywhere. Dobrynin did not disagree.

Attachment

Soviet Oral Statement³

July 15, 1983

Soviet Oral Statement of July 15, 1983
Translated from the Russian

1. It has been noted in Moscow that the Secretary of State in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador spoke of the wish of the U.S. leadership to see Soviet-American relations somewhat more improved.

As is known, we, for our part, have already expressed the view as to the basis on which Soviet-American relations can and should be built, if one is guided by the goal of their improvement, which would undoubtedly be of great significance both in itself and from the standpoint of the positive impact it would have on the entire international situation.

Unfortunately, frankly speaking, we see no signs of readiness on the part of the U.S. to move jointly in this direction and to introduce substantive corrective changes into its policy with regard to the Soviet Union. In fact, the Secretary of State himself did not deny that we may have reasons to draw such a conclusion.

Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that it would be possible realistically to count on the normalization of Soviet-American relations in the absence of a mutual desire to seek points of contiguity or to take into account one another’s interests on the central issues determining the nature of those relations and, above all, on questions concerning the security interests of our two countries—in other words, questions of war and peace.

But it is precisely in searching for a common language on questions of safeguarding and consolidating peace and strengthening international security that lies the key both to the rectification of the abnormal situation that has developed in our relations and to the improvement of the general political atmosphere in the world.

In this connection we would like to draw attention, in particular, to the necessity in the present situation—as has been emphasized at the recent meeting in Moscow of the leaders of a number of Socialist countries⁴—of taking immediate steps capable of pushing back the danger of war and turning the course of world events in the direction of detente, toward healthier relations among states.

Guided by these objectives, the Soviet Union has put forward a program of far-reaching measures aimed at putting an end to the perilous development of events and ensuring a decisive turn for the better in the international situation. It would seem there is no need to enumerate all of those measures once again. They are well known. We would like only to recall our recent proposal that all the nuclear powers freeze their nuclear arsenals.

It is regrettable that the U.S. side hastened to express a negative reaction to this proposal. The arguments advanced in this regard can in no way be considered convincing. Such a position can only reinforce the view that the U.S. is not interested in taking practical steps to curb the nuclear arms race.

We would like to hope that the American side will consider this question further. A positive answer to the nuclear arms freeze proposal would demonstrate U.S. readiness, together with the Soviet Union, to set a good example in the cause of peace.

2. Of great importance, without a doubt, are the negotiations now being conducted between our two countries on nuclear arms. The state of affairs taking shape at the Geneva negotiations on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe is, to be frank, totally unsatisfactory.

If one asks the question what the reasons are, there can only be one and the same answer: the explanation lies in the absolutely unconstructive position of the American side, one that is, indeed, totally divorced from reality.

It is impossible, after all, seriously to count on reaching agreement when the objective of the negotiations is posed not as the reduction of European nuclear arms, but as the deployment in Europe of new American missiles, whose numbers we are called upon now to discuss. Such an approach can in no way be regarded as constructive.

We would also like to express the hope that the American leadership will once again weigh from all angles all the consequences of such a course.

3. What is also taking place in Geneva at the negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms looks no better. Here too there is no evidence whatsoever of a desire on the part of the U.S. side to seek mutually acceptable solutions.

References to the fact that some flexibility has appeared in the U.S. position are not substantiated by reality. All this “flexibility” is designed to achieve the same purpose: to destroy the existing structure of the Soviet strategic forces while leaving the U.S. a free hand to build up its own nuclear arms.

Of course, we will not accept this, and no prospect of reaching agreement on the problem of strategic arms will emerge, until the U.S. approach to this problem is brought into line with the principle of equality and equal security.

For our part we have proposed solutions which do not prejudice anyone’s security. Guided by a desire to seek mutually acceptable outcomes on specific issues, the Soviet side has taken a substantial step to meet the U.S. position: it expressed readiness to agree not to a total ban on air-launched cruise missiles but to their limitation to a specified level in the context of the resolution of other questions. So far, no adequate reciprocal step on the part of the American side has followed.

As to the confidence-building measures being discussed in Geneva, we remain convinced that such measures should be an integral part of the general agreement on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. Proceeding on this basis and taking into account the expressed readiness of the U.S. side to consider not only its own confidence measures but also the ones proposed by the Soviet side, we do not object to continuing the discussion of such measures at the Geneva negotiations, including in a special working group.

Overall, we would like to hope that the U.S. government will weigh carefully the situation that now obtains, and that it will take steps which would open up the possibilities for reaching a mutually acceptable agreement on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. It is our deep conviction that the U.S. should be interested in this no less than the Soviet Union.

4. We are bewildered by the reaction of the U.S. side to our proposal concerning a discussion of the consequences of the creation of a large-scale ABM system.

The U.S. idea of creating a comprehensive ABM system not only is in direct contradiction with the 1972 treaty of unlimited duration between the USSR and the U.S. on the renunciation of wide-area ABM systems, but also does not correspond to the aims of the current negotiations on strategic arms. The creation of such a system would, in effect, result in discarding the very principle on which negotiations on strategic arms—both offensive and defensive—have thus far been based.

The rationale for our proposal to convene a meeting of authoritative scientists of our two countries is to form a clearer perception of the nature and scale of the consequences for the entire strategic situation that could result from the development of a comprehensive ABM system. The American side alters the subject of the exchange of views that we are proposing: it, in essence, proposes to give the discussions such a form and content as if the advisability of developing comprehensive ABM systems were a given, and as if the only thing to do were to discuss practical questions connected with it.

We can in no way agree with such an approach. And we confirm our proposal that Soviet and American scientists meet and assess in an authoritative way a problem which, in the long run, could have very serious and dangerous consequences.

5. On the part of the American side there appears to be a readiness to make an effort to overcome the impasse at the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, and to forego the fruitless data discussion. Such an intention would be welcome. However, an examination of those preconditions which are set forth and the way the verification issue is posed does not confirm such a conclusion. In this case, too, the negotiations would be deadlocked, albeit by a different method.

The socialist countries have recently put forward at the Vienna negotiations a draft agreement designed to bring those obviously protracted negotiations to a speedy and successful conclusion. This draft also provides for verification measures corresponding to the task posed and adequate to the scale of the reductions. In this regard, we do not rule out the possibility of also considering certain additional measures, if the need arises for them in the process of practical reductions. What is necessary, however, is that the verification measures not be an end in themselves, inasmuch as the purpose of the negotiations is different.

If the American side is actually prepared to conduct constructive discussions, the head of the Soviet delegation in Vienna will be ready to listen to the considerations of the U.S. representative.

6. Concerning the Madrid meeting: We are working actively and constructively in favor of its successful conclusion. It is also from this perspective that we approach the well-known initiative of the government of Spain. The Soviet delegation in Madrid is maintaining appropriate contacts with the U.S. delegation. What is important is that no new and fresh obstacles be raised to a positive conclusion to this meeting.

7. On the set of questions on bilateral relations, our position was presented concretely and thoroughly in February to the Secretary of State.⁵ At that time and subsequently, the U.S. side on more than one occasion confirmed that it owed us an answer. Since the June 18 conversation between the Secretary of State and the Soviet Ambassador touched upon only some of those questions, we proceed on the assumption that the American side is continuing to consider the views that we have expressed.

In regard to what was said by the Secretary of State in that conversation, we would like, first of all, to stress the need not to mix questions of mutual interest with questions concerning only one side—let alone those strictly in its own internal competence. It is simply not proper to raise such questions.

With respect to the few specific proposals made by the Secretary of State, we would like to say the following.

a) We have no objections to the extension of the agreements on cooperation in the field of transportation as well as on peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

b) Taking into account the readiness of the U.S. side to do so, we agree to hold negotiations on the opening of Consulates General in New York and Kiev.

c) In principle, we have no objections to holding negotiations on the conclusion of a new agreement on exchanges in the field of culture. However, it is not clear what is meant here by the U.S. side, since the previously existing agreement dealt with contacts, exchanges and cooperation not only in the cultural area, but also in a number of other fields. In any case the conclusion of such an agreement—and it is important that the American side know this beforehand—can be considered possible only given readiness on the part of the U.S. to provide official guarantees of security for Soviet participants in such exchanges.

Second Soviet Oral Statement, July 15, 1983

As to the practical discussion of the questions of Consulates General and a cultural exchanges agreement, the Soviet Embassy in Washington has been instructed to conduct such a discussion with the participation, as necessary, of appropriate representatives from Moscow.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, July 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt; cleared by Seitz. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office. Shultz summarized the meeting in a memorandum to the President on July 15. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (07/08/83–07/19/83)) On July 22 in a covering memorandum to Seitz requesting approval of this memorandum of conversation, McKinley wrote: “The second question is tricky. Rick Burt wants to send to the members of the START IG the pertinent extract of the Dobrynin conversation, as well as the START portion of the ‘oral statement.’ The START IG will appreciate this gesture. It could head off disputes and disagreements. It also makes Burt look good. On balance, however, I would recommend against letting the memo go. Despite the fact that Rowny has the START related portion of the conversation already by cable, we have in the past gotten away with not circulating Dobrynin memcons in Washington. This partial break with that precedent could whet the appetites of other agencies for full disclosure or lead to charges that we were manipulating information. Please give me your guidance.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, July 1983)
2. On April 27, telegram 5443 from Moscow April 27, reported: “The Soviet Academy of Sciences announced today the convening of a public meeting of scientists on May 17–19 to discuss nuclear weapons issues. The main purpose of this propaganda ploy appears to be to attack new U.S. strategic programs, particularly ballistic missile defense (BMD). In this connection, IMEMO’s Oleg Bykov tells us that Andropov’s proposal for U.S. and Soviet scientists to discuss BMD envisages participation by ‘official’ U.S. scientists; unofficial U.S. scientists, he said already agree that large-scale BMD is technologically infeasible.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830248–0954)
3. Secret; Sensitive.
4. See footnote 8, Document 71.
5. See Document 11.