Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

71. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 13, 1983

SUBJECT

• View from Moscow—Red Team Redux

This memorandum updates the December 13 paper on the same subject.² It was drafted by the same “Red Team,” chaired by Jeremy Azrael and composed of specialists from S/P, P, EUR, and INR.

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the “Red Team” of the Department of State³

Washington, July 13, 1983

RED TEAM REDUX

The View from Moscow, Mid-1983

Introduction

The eight months that have passed since Brezhnev’s death have confirmed our judgment that the first phase of the Soviet succession would be marked by policy continuity.⁴ If anything, there has been even less tactical dynamism and innovation than we foresaw. The persistence of this pattern cannot, however, be taken for granted. The record of Soviet foreign policy during the past eight months, while containing a few pluses from Moscow’s perspective, has been decidedly negative overall. The setbacks of this period—taken together with a changing Soviet perception of the Reagan Administration’s staying power and willingness to do business with Moscow—have likely prompted the Soviet leadership to reassess its approach to a number of international issues, including the US-Soviet relationship itself.

In the view of some members of the “Red Team,” moreover, there are signs that established Soviet policies and priorities are being subjected to unusually systematic scrutiny, most obviously in the realm of internal development but in foreign affairs as well. These analysts interpret a number of recent leadership statements as reflecting a wide-ranging reassessment of established Soviet tactics in East-West relations, Eastern Europe, and the Third World. If such a comprehensive review is, in fact, underway, it could suggest that we are entering a period of fluidity in Moscow’s foreign policy, one in which US actions and the state of US-Soviet relations could play a greater role than in recent years in affecting Soviet policy choices.

Other “Red Team” members believe that any reevaluation of Soviet positions on international questions is likely to take place on an issue-by-issue basis, rather than in a comprehensive review. This appears to have been the general practice of the past two decades, and Andropov, Gromyko and Ustinov, who have helped to frame Soviet policy throughout that period, may feel less inclined toward a wide-ranging review than would a team of newcomers. They probably do not regard recent negative trends as so adverse as to require a comprehensive reassessment of Soviet strategy. If so, changes in Soviet foreign policy are likely to be ad hoc, and US actions and the state of US-Soviet relations will affect Soviet behavior to a more limited extent.

In any event, policy reassessment—be it comprehensive or ad hoc—does not necessarily imply policy redirection. In fact, we do not expect Moscow to undertake any radical foreign policy departures over the next year and a half, even though significant shifts in several specific areas could well occur.

I. The Domestic Context

Yuri Andropov stimulated high expectations on becoming General Secretary, for many different reasons including his personal style and Leonid Brezhnev’s ossified rule. The picture of a dynamic and resourceful leader, which was so useful in the West, also had its impact at home. He was expected by many to begin an early assault on the more problematic elements of Brezhnev’s legacy, especially the stalled economy.

In the event, as should have been expected, he was guided primarily by any new Soviet leader or leadership team’s imperative—to consolidate power—and expectations of change have as a result been largely disappointed. To be sure, Andropov has strengthened his position, gaining increased public deference from his peers, and rounding out the full set of titles held by Brezhnev. But despite the lack of a major challenge to his position, it appears that the leadership turnover will be very gradual, with considerable jockeying and few policy departures. To date, Andropov does not appear to have gained control over local and regional party appointments. Lacking the ability to create an independent base of supporters, he will tend to remain in debt to—and in policy matters, constrained by—the senior colleagues whose backing gained him the top position in the first place. Gromyko and Ustinov are the most important of these; together with Andropov, their dominance is marked by military promotions to the Central Committee, the key positions held by KGB officials, and Gromyko’s acquisition of a First Deputy Premiership.

Whether or not because of limits on his power (as well as his uncertain health), Andropov has shown circumspection in approaching major policy questions. In particular, he appears to have no well-developed set of programs for dealing with the economy’s ailments. To date, his most conspicuous break with the past has been a style of frank recognition of the magnitude and structural nature of the difficulties faced, and an implication that responses are being canvassed in every quarter. Few major policy initiatives have appeared. If anything, what the Soviet public has been told most clearly is that economic reforms are to be introduced slowly, only after a long review and search for solutions.

This combination of candor and delay was one of the most pronounced aspects of the recent Central Committee plenum;⁵ particularly characteristic was Andropov’s admission that the Soviet system is weakest at making use of new technology, the very factor on which modern economies depend for growth. On this evidence, few dramatic departures over the next two years should be expected, despite increasing public attention to (and the leadership’s own insistence on) the need to do something. The leadership will probably make do for some time with what have until now been used as substitutes for reform—its campaign against corruption, and appeals for discipline and vigilance against foreign enemies and influence. In the latter, traditional Russian xenophobia has been given an overlay of ideological rhetoric to support stricter educational, intellectual and cultural policies. (Cultural exchanges with the West have been singled out for suspicion.) These policies may be the harbingers of more sustained and systematic repression, something that the leadership may regard as the political and social requisite of economic reform.

Overall, unresolved policy and personnel issues have, since Brezhnev’s passing, demanded a high priority for domestic concerns; they will continue to do so, although not to the exclusion of issues on the foreign policy agenda. Nor will they require retrenchment where the Soviet Union otherwise has the means to sustain its diplomacy.

II. Foreign Policy Balance Sheet Since November 1982

The achievements of the Brezhnev era leave the Soviet Union with the military might of a superpower and a strong desire to compete with the United States on the basis of an asserted equality. The past eight months have seen small improvements in some areas, but on balance the record of Soviet foreign policy has left much to be desired. It has failed to capitalize on important opportunities, has witnessed better relations among adversaries who had appeared to be at odds with each other, and has been unable to resolve major outstanding problems. Although some of the Soviets’ setbacks may well prove transitory, the Soviet leadership probably feels more on the defensive than immediately upon Andropov’s accession.

Assessment of the US. Events since the end of last year have done nothing to alter fundamentally Moscow’s view of the Reagan Administration, whose hostility to the Soviet Union and disposition to compete actively with it around the world are not doubted. Although domestic US and other constraints put certain limits on this competition, the Administration’s commitment to compete has introduced added caution into Soviet decisionmaking.

Until this year, however, the Soviet leadership probably lacked a settled view of how long this stance might endure: whether the President had any interest in even limited accommodation with the Soviet Union, or (failing that) whether internal pressures might force him into it. Both points are somewhat clearer now. The President’s political strength has plainly impressed Moscow: he is seen as highly likely to be re-elected, and still able to dominate domestic debate over military spending and arms control. He has salvaged weapons systems that last year seemed in jeopardy, and may even—thanks to the Scowcroft Commission—have established the basis of a broadening consensus about strategic issues.

At the same time, the Soviets have not missed the markedly greater Administration commitment to negotiation. Moscow surely suspects US statements of interest in “dialogue” as a necessary ploy to maintain domestic and allied support, and will remain suspicious. Some Soviet commentators have expressed the conviction, or hope, that the presidential campaign will further increase pressure on the President to conclude arms control agreements. Yet in combination with his stronger political position, the President’s more open bargaining posture has made a Soviet strategy of waiting out Reaganism less tenable. In fact, it may have led the Soviet leadership to consider whether the coming year may not offer a better basis for bargaining with the US than a second Reagan Administration.

Western Europe. Last year Western Europe appeared to be the area where Soviet policy was making greatest headway, aided by nuclear issues, above all INF; alliance disagreement over East-West economic policy was a further Soviet plus. Since then, however, political trends have been almost uniformly adverse (above all, the setback of the West German elections),⁶ Soviet propaganda has been ineffectual and the peace movement markedly weakened; the result has been a revival of Alliance cohesion both on INF and on other issues. Moscow has had to take stock of successive shows of unity at Williamsburg, at Madrid, and at a series of ministerials. As a result, Soviet spokesmen increasingly speak of INF deployments as a fait accompli.

Despite this resignation, Soviet efforts to make use of the European peace movement and anti-nuclear sentiment will continue, and conceivably increase. The Soviets may still believe that an intensified peace campaign in the final run-up to INF deployments could be effective in straining Atlantic ties, even if blocking deployments no longer seems achievable. Moreover, Soviet policy of the past six months, in absorbing these setbacks in Europe, has already begun to display greater effort in exploiting West European interest in other East-West forums, including MBFR, CSCE, and in preparations for a CDE. The anticipated pay-off of such efforts, of course, is sharply less than the hoped-for Soviet returns from a full-blown INF crisis.

Eastern Europe. At Brezhnev’s death, the Soviet leadership probably believed the worst was past in Poland. While still impressed by Jaruzelski’s ability to prevent its recurrence, they have also been reminded that the internal security situation is still volatile and potentially dangerous. Above all, the Pope’s visit was a dramatic demonstration that the Polish people remain alienated from the regime.⁷ In this setting, Moscow is no doubt uneasy about Jaruzelski’s plans to follow up the visit by developing his relation with the Church, ending martial law and freeing political prisoners.

Perhaps because of his experience as ambassador to Hungary and Party Secretary for bloc relations, Andropov’s speeches have stressed themes of economic integration, political coordination and ideological orthodoxy. He may have pressed the Hungarians to be firmer with dissidents and has proposed measures to improve Warsaw Pact and CEMA machinery. Clearly his efforts are meeting resistance. The East European summit did not issue as strong a statement on INF as Moscow wanted.⁸ Divided over increasingly difficult economic problems, CEMA has repeatedly had to put off the economic summit. Meanwhile, the costs of maintaining this empire remain high, and the economic troubles of the region, together with East European reliance on Western trade and financing, are complicating Soviet influence.

China and Japan. Before Brezhnev’s death, the Soviets had achieved an atmospheric breakthrough in relations with the PRC; some also saw his passing as a Soviet opportunity to review and improve ties with Japan. Since then, however, the Soviets have shown little inclination to take major steps toward better relations with either state.

With the Chinese, they have held another round of bilateral talks, have agreed to increase trade and have opened a remote border crossing point. Moscow has not, however, acted on the issues that China has asserted are central to a genuine improvement in relations: Kampuchea, Afghanistan, or—most importantly—Soviet troops in Mongolia and on their border. Despite the apparent opportunity afforded by the downturn in US-China relations last year, the Soviets made no concrete gestures; they did not draw down or draw back their forces. They have in fact continued to strengthen their force posture throughout the region; Soviet Far East INF deployments are an area of increasing friction in Sino-Soviet relations. For their part, the Chinese have continued to criticize Soviet “hegemonism,” while making small but significant moves to rebuild their damaged US connection.

Toward Japan, the Soviets have reacted with harsh criticism of Nakasone’s bolder leadership style and his closer identification with the US on defense issues. Rather than trying to woo Nakasone or Japanese public opinion, the Soviets have sharpened their threats, raised historical antagonisms, and rejected any suggestion that the northern territories issue can even be discussed.

The past six months have shown Moscow that measurably improved relations with both China and Japan require a higher price than they might have envisioned, demanding concessions that they are unwilling to make. As a result, the Soviets regard East Asia as posing a series of problems rather than opportunities. They remain cautious and distrustful of their major Asian neighbors, and see their range of choices as very narrow.

Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf. Since last year any Soviet hopes that Islamabad would readily acquiesce in a pro-Soviet settlement—or cut its aid to the rebels—have been largely disappointed. The UN-sponsored talks continue (and may eventually aid the Soviets in gaining de facto recognition of the DRA), but, on the core question, the Pakistanis show no signs of weakening, at least under present pressure, while the Mujahadeen more than hold their own. Even while experiencing intermittent defeats—as in the Panjshir Valley, for example—Soviet forces are in no danger of being driven out; they cannot, however, make significantly greater progress, at least for the foreseeable future, without incurring significantly greater costs.

While relations have been deteriorating for some time, Soviet-Iranian friction increased sharply this year, exemplified by Iran’s effort to crush the Tudeh party outright, and by its militancy concerning Afghanistan. Earlier Soviet attempts to mediate an Iran-Iraq settlement have come to nothing, reflecting in part the Soviets’ sacrifice of a broker’s role by resuming arms deliveries to Iraq. Moscow may be consoled that US relations with both parties also remain extremely poor, although the formation of the new Central Command may be seen as evidence that American ability to protect its interests in the region is slowly recovering from the fall of the Shah.

Middle East. Following the setback they suffered in Lebanon last year, the Soviets have made a determined effort to restore relations with their principal regional clients, to frustrate progress on US initiatives, and to achieve an enhanced role for themselves in any subsequent peace negotiations. Their minimum objective has been achieved: to consolidate their relationship with Syria through the SA–5 deployments and other arms supplies, to bolster Syrian intransigence in negotiations on Lebanon and thereby to block the Reagan initiative.

From the Soviet perspective, these developments at least partially recoup the ground lost last year—albeit by running a much greater risk of direct involvement in a future Israeli-Syrian conflict. With the current impasse in the US negotiating effort in Lebanon, as well as Jordanian unwillingness to enter the peace process, they likely believe that the gains have justified the risks taken, and that they are in a stronger position to frustrate US diplomatic efforts in which they are not involved. The Soviets also recognize, however, that they are not well positioned to take the diplomatic lead (which may account for Andropov’s reluctance thus far to put on the record his own views regarding a Middle East settlement). With this in mind, they may also doubt the long-term congruence of their own and Syrian interests and fear that Damascus will eventually participate in US-sponsored diplomatic initiatives, thereby isolating them in the region.

Central America. Central America’s instability may look like one of Moscow’s most useful levers against the US. The affairs of the region obviously could compel increased US attention, probably at the price of involvements and commitments elsewhere, and—unlike many other areas—at little risk of producing a dangerous Soviet-American confrontation. Without exaggerating its own ability to affect, much less govern these events, Moscow has probably calculated that proxy escalation serves its interests. Yet while the Soviets may still hope that domestic opinion will constrain US policy, recent Administration statements and actions have likely made the Soviets more wary. Not only might increased Soviet involvement come at the expense of improved Soviet-US relations, but the prospect of an outright reverse—the downfall of the Sandinistas—has probably been taken seriously for the first time in Moscow; for this reason, and to counter US moves throughout the region, Cuba appears to be increasing its involvement in Nicaragua.

Southern Africa. The Soviet perspective on southern Africa has lost the strategic optimism and dynamism that was so pronounced in the late 1970s. Moscow now seems preoccupied with maintaining, and if possible consolidating, its large long-term stake in key southern African countries such as Angola and Mozambique. Yet both of these Soviet clients are threatened by increasingly effective insurgencies that enjoy the overwhelming regional military and economic backing of South Africa. The Soviets cannot be certain that the beleaguered Angolan and Mozambican leaderships will not seek relief from these pressures by cooperating with US diplomacy—thereby freezing Moscow out of the regional role it seeks, with no credit for contributing to the process. Recent developments have increased these worries, but the Soviets are probably still not convinced that the US can bring off a Namibia settlement involving withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola. Moscow retains considerable leverage over the regimes in Luanda and Maputo, primarily by manipulating the flow of Soviet and Cuban security assistance on which these regimes depend.

III. Soviet Policy Decisions and Options

The Soviet leadership’s assessment of foreign policy trends since Brezhnev’s death is, on balance, almost certainly negative. This will no more ensure a redirection of policy than declining growth rates ensure economic reform. Moreover, cyclical downturns will not be mistaken for secular trends, nor failures to advance for outright defeats.

Nonetheless, in the next 18 months, many particular issues will approach unavoidable decision points, at which existing policy lines will have to be either changed or reinforced. In responding to each of these, the leadership will face choices between becoming more cost-conscious and risk-averse on the one hand, and, on the other, accepting increased costs and risks, whether in exploiting new opportunities that appear or in making a concerted effort to resolve existing difficulties.

Relations with the US. The onset of the presidential election year forces the Soviets to decide how to respond to apparently increased US receptivity to bargaining. The meager content of discussions proposed thus far (consulates, etc.) may suggest to Moscow a US reluctance to address more important arms issues; the leadership may also be skeptical that the interval between the cooling-off after INF deployments and the heating-up of the electoral campaign will be long enough for serious bargaining.

Given this uncertainty about US purposes, and about what the calendar will allow, the Soviets will be cautious in probing for US flexibility. They are unlikely to invest more than token capital in their own initiatives, to avoid wasting unreciprocated concessions. The same wary hesitation will also limit Soviet responses to American probes. Small unilateral steps are likely, however, on the model of changes recently made in the Soviet START position. Under time pressure, and witnessing the progress of new US systems, the Soviets will also feel obliged to be responsive to US initiatives; an American summit offer, for example, is more likely than not to be accepted. Recalling the fragility of this entire process, they also may be more cautious about provoking the US on second-order issues.

In START, the Administration’s success in winning support for new strategic systems will not by itself induce Soviet acceptance of our offers. The Soviets will not accept proposals that require early and costly restructuring of their forces so as to make them resemble those of the US. But if the period of adjustment is further stretched out, they may become more receptive. This is, moreover, one area where the political strength of the Soviet military is not necessarily an obstacle but perhaps an asset: the Soviet military have looked to arms control as a technological equalizer, and in addition to this incentive they now have a stronger budgetary motive as well.

Western Europe. The Soviets appear increasingly resigned to the failure of their efforts to halt deployment. They will understand that overreacting could be counterproductive, but this need not foreclose a tough response; for they will also want to make good on their threats and avoid defusing the issue by appearing to acquiesce in deployments. These considerations will argue for prompt military counterdeployments at a minimum, and could point to political actions designed to heighten tensions. The options to be considered probably include a break-off of talks and, as Andropov implied to Kohl, an array of pressures directed at Germany. At the same time, despite the failure of their peace offensive to date, the Soviets will make further use of diplomatic initiatives aimed specifically at European opinion and at generating Allied pressure on Washington. In particular, greater Soviet activism in all arms forums that treat European issues should be expected.

After demonstratively reacting to US deployments, and insisting that deployments as such will not make them more flexible, the Soviets will nevertheless need to weigh the value of limiting these new systems short of the full 572. Accepting the “legitimacy” of these systems, almost unthinkable now, may prove significantly less sticky for the Soviets after the first tranche or two are already in place, particularly if a new negotiating framework serves as cover. Even in 1984, the value of a satisfactory INF agreement will probably be judged chiefly by how much it contributes to other Soviet interests, especially to an agreement in the more important START categories.

Eastern Europe. The Soviets have no expectation of an early alleviation of their problems in managing the East European bloc, but absent a major blow-up in Poland they probably have greater confidence that none of these difficulties will be an impediment to improved relations with the United States. They probably believe that the West is slowly climbing down from its program of pressures against Poland; this may offer some slight incentive to keep the situation there cool, perhaps even allowing Jaruzelski increased flexibility. But on balance the leadership probably expects Polish developments to have little importance one way or the other and this will limit the pressure they feel to allow significant liberalization.

China and Japan. The past six months suggest to the Soviets that outbidding the US for Chinese favor would be difficult; Sino-Soviet improvements could stimulate more intense courtship of Beijing by the US, and Moscow has no wish to be used as such a lever. For this and other reasons, the Soviet purpose toward China is more to stabilize than improve relations, while preserving what it can of last year’s atmospheric gains. The conduct of this effort will not be greatly affected by Soviet policy toward the US. Unlike the US, the Soviets probably do not expect progress in relations with Washington to affect relations with China, for better or worse.

Japan is expected to be a growing threat to Soviet security interests, separately and in concert with the US. The Soviets have not yet decided the question of whether or how to adjust their security policy toward Japan in response; they may doubt that Japan can be wooed very far from the US, and appear to believe that inducements are not the best means for dealing with Japan in any event. They will continue to expand economic ties, while seeking to insulate these from their poor political/security relationship, and from the continuing policy of intimidation that accompanies it.

Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf. Like Poland, the status quo in Afghanistan is probably seen by the Soviets as a declining impediment to other East-West business. They do not (in contrast to policy toward Poland) expect Western and other pressures on their position in Afghanistan to ease up appreciably, even in the context of improved Soviet-American relations. Were such an improvement to materialize, however, Moscow’s principal hope would be to play on Pakistani anxiety about a superpower deal. Keeping the UN negotiating process alive may be helpful, in the long term, as an instrument for gaining Pakistani acquiescence in a pro-Soviet outcome in Afghanistan.

The current visit of the Soviet Deputy Defense Minister to Kabul could contribute to a limited increase in Soviet forces in Afghanistan or possibly to larger-scale escalation.⁹ That the latter could set back East-West relations is well understood; this consideration might deter Moscow as long as the situation on the ground had not worsened; it would not by itself deter escalation if the military outlook began to deteriorate or if a military breakthrough seemed achievable.

Iran commands growing Soviet attention and even worry; while Moscow desires to position itself to exploit opportunities, it sees no openings at present.

Middle East. Soviet policy has played a larger role in damaging ongoing US diplomatic efforts in the Middle East than in any other region. In so doing, they have kept regional tensions high, even at the risk of direct confrontation with either the US or Israel. Despite this, Soviet-American rivalry in this region has not significantly complicated relations overall, and is probably not seen in Moscow as an obstacle to movement on arms control. Reassured by this separation between Middle East tension and the superpower relationship as a whole, the Soviets will not believe that improved relations with Washington will require more constructive policies in the region. They would, of course, make a stronger effort than in recent years to gain US support for a Soviet role in the Arab-Israeli negotiating process. Having abetted Syria’s obstructionist policy, they may feel their claim to such a role is better than in some time. Their hope of involvement will, however, be complicated by the likely medium-term immobility of the Arab-Israeli processes (owing in part to the state of the PLO, whose patron Moscow had hoped to appear). It will be further weakened by the very limited leverage that the Soviets can demonstrate in moving the parties toward constructive bargaining positions.

Southern Africa. As in the Middle East, the Soviets have no direct role in the principal diplomatic peacemaking process in southern Africa, despite regular exchanges of information on the process with the US, and retain enough leverage to pose a credible threat to Western peacemaking efforts. In the near term they probably doubt that they will face the choice of using or losing this leverage. If, however, the Namibia process comes to a head—and particularly if it appeared that Cuban troops were about to be ousted unceremoniously, with no credit to Moscow for having produced a good result—Soviet leverage could be used in a number of ways. At a minimum, it might help the Soviets to parlay their position into some formal role in the process. Even this, however, would seem a Soviet defeat, if it required the sacrifice of a military presence and geopolitical position from which to influence the unfolding Black African struggle against apartheid. Therefore, the Soviets are likely to increase where necessary their assistance to, and involvement in, Angola and Mozambique and to seek to demonstrate that South Africa and indirectly the US are responsible if the Namibia process breaks down. In view of their relatively low investment in the area, however, it is also possible that the Soviets would consider a less obstructive role if they conclude that this would put them in a more favorable position for dealing with the core issues of East-West relations.

Central America. Recent US policy toward Central America may have increased Soviet sensitivity to possible linkage between the events of the region and Soviet-American ties. For this reason, if a more active phase of superpower negotiation opens, the Soviets will at a minimum endeavor to keep their Central American activities separate from it. They will dissociate themselves from regional flare-ups while the process is in train, and if favorable results are at hand in Washington, they may avoid contributing to escalation in the region. Although some reduction in arms supplies might be used as a signal, the Soviets prefer not to make such side-payments. The most difficult policy dilemma would arise for Moscow if, at the same time that arms agreements came within reach, pressure on the Nicaraguan regime threatened to topple the Sandinistas. Soviet assistance would of course be rendered through Cuba, but even this would certainly increase the danger of a confrontation with the US and—if Cuban involvement were provocative enough—might force the Soviets to consider how to protect their ally against direct US pressure.

IV. Summary Judgment

Soviet policy has been less activist than our projection of last year, and has not been notably successful, even in areas where new initiatives have been pursued. Whether or not as part of a comprehensive reassessment of its priorities, Moscow may undertake certain policy shifts in the next 18 months, particularly in its approach to the Reagan Administration.

In dealing with the US, the Soviet leadership is likely to conclude that their “wait-them-out” strategy is no longer adequate. Such an approach will appear both less effective and less attuned to emergent possibilities for doing business with the Reagan Administration. As a result, Moscow may be ready for small steps that probe US intentions, while moving slowly so as to avoid helping the US to appear flexible or to confirm that the Administration’s tough line has worked. Soviet diplomacy will aim, for the most part, to gain advantages by depicting US policy as inflexible.

The Soviets may also conclude that more confrontational or costly policies are needed in particular areas—to keep the INF controversy alive in Europe, to consolidate in Afghanistan, to exploit US vulnerability in Central America, and preserve a Soviet role in the Middle East. Certain of these decisions, and especially their timing, may be affected by whether the Soviets detect a short-term opportunity to make progress in Soviet-American relations. Even if this progress materializes, however, Soviet policy will not be diverted by it from the pursuit of long-term objectives. Instead, Moscow will in some instances see improved East-West relations as an opportunity to pursue a broadened policy role for itself and to gain Washington’s cooperation, particularly in unstable regions where US policy has complicated Soviet efforts.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 7/1–15/83. Secret; Nodis. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Hill’s initials are stamped on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.
2. A copy of the December 13, 1982, paper is attached but not printed.
3. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Sestanovich; cleared by Azrael, Baraz, Johnson, and Vershbow. Sestanovich initialed for the clearing officers.
4. Brezhnev died on November 10, 1982.
5. See footnote 4, Document 65.
6. On October 1, 1982, Helmut Schmidt’s government in West Germany collapsed. Helmut Kohl, leader of the Christian Democratic Union, became the new Chancellor of West Germany. His party’s coalition won a majority in the federal election on March 6, 1983.
7. Pope John Paul II visited his native Poland in June 1983.
8. The joint statement issued on June 28 after a meeting in Moscow of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries is printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1983, pp. 507–511.
9. Soviet Deputy Defense Minister General Valentin Varennikov.