Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

353. Memorandum From President Reagan to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

Washington, January 5, 1985

SUBJECT

• JCS Views on NSDD–153 (U)

Bud McFarlane has provided me with General Vessey’s memorandum to you concerning NSDD–153.² Throughout the preparations for Geneva, I have paid particular attention to the views of General Vessey and the Joint Chiefs. I continue to place great value in their opinions. And, for that reason, I thought it would be valuable to share with you my reactions to their memorandum. (U)

The original version of the NSDD which we initially discussed in California on December 31 did not contain the two examples in question.³ It was in the context of our follow-on discussion, that we reached the conclusion that we may need to be able to go a bit further than simply restating our current positions in START and INF. Only after discussing these additions with George, Bud, and you, did I approve that addition of the authorization to present the material cited by the JCS as examples of where the U.S. might be willing to go in the context of formal negotiations. (S)

The START example selected is an option that was suggested by Ed Rowny and that has been a part of our ongoing review since March 1984. Ed’s proposal would have had us specifically propose limits on ALCM carrying aircraft as a means of limiting ALCMs. The JCS support limits on ALCM carrying aircraft, others oppose. When we included this example, we intentionally generalized the idea a bit to talk about asymmetrical limits on ALCMs, without specifying how these limits would be imposed, so that we would not unnecessarily prejudge this issue.⁴ (S)

With respect to the INF example, the JCS express concern that the decision to use this example may not have been made with a full awareness of the potential risks involved. We discussed the idea of equal percentage reductions at the last NSPG on Geneva held prior to Christmas.⁵ I was able to draw upon this fully in understanding the disadvantages, as well as the advantages, of this approach.⁶ (S)

Would you please assure General Vessey and the Joint Chiefs that I am aware of the concerns expressed to you. I am confident that our delegation is also extremely mindful of the pitfalls we must avoid. Nevertheless, I am willing to modify my earlier guidance (as below) to take their concerns into account. But I must say that in so doing, I believe we have substantially increased the risk of an unsatisfactory outcome. (S)

The following instructions substitute for guidance contained in NSDD–153.⁷ (S)

—Delete the penultimate paragraph in subsection “a. START” on page 14 and replace with the following:

“Tradeoffs would involve an exchange between the area in which we hold an advantage (i.e., bomber systems) and the area in which they hold an advantage (i.e., ICBM systems). We can imagine a number of possibilities for specific tradeoffs between these areas and will be prepared to discuss them when formal negotiations convene.”

—Delete the balance of subsection “b. INF” after the last sentence which begins at the bottom of page 14 and replace with the following:

“We can imagine a number of ways through which we could arrive at equal global limits. We have considered equal percentage reductions applied to launchers, adoption of various absolute equal limits, asymmetrical reductions, and many others. Each of these have problems associated with them. But drawing on the work we have conducted in the past year, we believe a solution can be found, and we will be prepared to discuss the possibilities when formal talks are convened.” (S)

Ronald Reagan

1. Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, December Chron File. Top Secret; King. A copy was sent to Shultz. In a January 5 covering memorandum to Reagan, McFarlane wrote: “Mr. President, the plain facts are these. You, I, George and others have stated publicly that we will be going to Geneva with new ideas; that we will be flexible and constructive. If we arrive and simply restate our existing position without even an explanation of what we are talking about, we face the high likelihood that the Soviets will make that public, charge us with bad faith, and we will be held responsible for the impasse.” Additional passages from McFarlane’s memorandum are provided in footnotes below.
2. For NSDD 153, see Document 348. In a January 4 memorandum to Weinberger, Vessey wrote that the Joint Chiefs “believe that the section in the negotiating instructions entitled ‘Substantive Presentations’ should not authorize the delegation to provide examples of US flexibility in either START or INF discussions.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 153, [Shultz-Gromyko Meeting in Geneva, 01/01/1985]. In his memoir, Shultz recalled: on “January 5, we were on board USAF 972 on the way to Geneva. The press dubbed us ‘the ship of feuds.’ Just before takeoff, Cap had given me a memo from the Joint Chiefs saying I should not draw upon any material from our agreed START and INF negotiating positions with Gromyko. That was absolutely contrary to my instructions from the president, to which Cap had agreed. Cap was trying to use the chiefs as a way to narrow my authorized running room. It was too late.” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 512)
3. See Documents 347 and 348.
4. In his memorandum to Reagan (see footnote 1, above), McFarlane wrote: “Concerning START, the idea of our willingness to discuss ‘tradeoffs’ is not new. Ed Rowny made that offer before they walked out. Since the walk-out, we have stated many times publicly that we are willing to discuss tradeoffs. You told Gromyko that we would be ready to discuss tradeoffs. Our objective, then, is to be able to explain in general terms what we mean by tradeoffs without giving anything away or rewarding the Soviets for walking out.” He then agreed to new guidance on START (see footnote 7, below) and commented: “Anything less than an expression like this—which gives absolutely nothing away—will leave us wide open to a charge of bad faith and give the Soviets an enormous propaganda advantage.”
5. See Document 334.
6. In his memorandum to Reagan (see footnote 1, above), McFarlane wrote: “With regard to the INF example, again, we are very mindful of the pitfalls of choosing a particular path toward ‘equal global entitlements.’ The NSDD explains those pitfalls in great detail so that no one on the delegation could have any illusions about it. But if we only restate our current position, without even explaining how we might make it work, we will be terribly vulnerable. I believe that the instructions you approved which mention ‘equal percentage reductions’ as an example of how to reach equality, provide the best course. But I am willing to accept a more general formula.” (See footnote 7, below.) He continued: “Again, this gives absolutely nothing away—indeed; there is a possibility that they may get up and leave at hearing such a thin explanation of the results of a year’s work which we have characterized as ‘new ideas’ and ‘flexibility.’ Consequently, I recommend reluctantly that you approve the modified instructions to incorporate these formulations.” Reagan agreed with McFarlane’s recommendations, as he initialed his agreement to send the “short note to Cap” that “provides modified guidance” based on the JCS recommendations.
7. The changes are verbatim from Vessey’s January 4 memorandum to Weinberger. See footnote 2, above.