Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

348. National Security Decision Directive 153¹

Palm Springs, California, January 1, 1985

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO
MEETING IN GENEVA

The Situation Today. We find ourselves at a unique point in the history of U.S.-Soviet relations. In 1981, we embarked on two major efforts. First, we initiated a military modernization program determined to reverse a long period of decline and apparent unwillingness in this country to invest in our own security in the face of the unprecedented Soviet military buildup of the last decade or more. This modernization program was specifically designed to garner sufficient strength to ensure Western security through deterrence and to provide the incentives necessary to cause the Soviet Union to join us in negotiating significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. Second, we committed ourselves to seeking equitable and verifiable agreements which would increase stability and security, reduce the risk of war, and lead to significant reductions in nuclear arsenals. (C)

Over the past four years, the United States has been able to sustain support for its strategic modernization program. With continued resolve, this program promises to restore the nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States by the end of the decade. During this same period, with a firmness of purpose, the NATO Alliance stood solidly with us. Despite an unprecedented Soviet propaganda campaign, NATO began the deployments of Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles necessary to modernize NATO’s LRINF missile force and redress the balance in this area also. At the same time, we offered a range of concrete proposals to the Soviet Union aimed at permitting each government to move to much lower levels of both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces. (C)

In response, the Soviet Union has focused primarily on intimidation to move us off our sound course, including implied threats, blatant attempts to drive wedges between ourselves and our allies, and the abandonment of ongoing negotiations. However, it is now clear that these efforts have failed. This has been an important factor in influencing the Soviet Union to alter its approach and agree to join us, once again, in negotiations aimed at reducing nuclear arms. While the Soviet Union can be expected to continue its extensive propaganda efforts, we must hope that the opportunity for real movement is better today than in previous years. (C)

The Soviet Union and SDI. Another important factor influencing Soviet behavior, especially in returning to nuclear arms reduction negotiations, is the Soviet desire to block our Strategic Defense Initiative as soon as possible. The Soviet Union knows that the SDI represents a major U.S. resurgence of interest in strategic defense. The USSR has long had a vigorous research, development and deployment program in defensive systems of all kinds. In fact, over the last two decades the Soviet Union has invested as much overall in its strategic defenses as it has in its massive strategic offensive buildup. As a result, today it enjoys certain relative advantages in the area of defenses. The Soviet Union will certainly attempt to protect this massive, long-term investment. (C)

The Soviet Union fully recognizes that the SDI program—and most especially, that portion of the program which holds out the promise of destroying missiles in the boost, post-boost, and mid-course portions of their flight—offers the prospect of permitting the U.S. technologically to flank years of Soviet defensive investment and to shift the “state-of-the-art” in defenses into areas of comparative U.S. advantage. This is one of the reasons that the primary Soviet focus has not been on attacking the idea of the increased contribution of defenses to deterrence, which lies at the heart of the SDI program; but rather, on “preventing the militarization of space.” While the Soviet Union may also be concerned about other potential “space weapons” programs, in large part, its focus on space reflects an attempt to confine future U.S. defensive activity within more traditional areas which are consistent with the long-term pattern of Soviet investment and where the Soviet Union now holds a competitive advantage. (C)

The U.S. Rationale for SDI. For our part, we approach SDI from a different perspective. (C)

For the past twenty years, we have based our assumptions on how deterrence can best be assured on the basic idea that if each side were able to maintain the ability to threaten retaliation against any attack and impose on an aggressor costs that were clearly out of balance with any potential gains, this would suffice to prevent conflict. The notion of the costs needed to deter aggression have changed over time. For example, we have moved away from simply holding at risk significant portions of Soviet industry and population. Today, we don’t target population. Instead, our current strategy focuses on being able to deny basic Soviet war aims by destroying the forces and leadership needed to exploit aggression. Nevertheless, our basic reliance on nuclear retaliation, provided by offensive nuclear forces, to deter aggression has not changed over this period. (C)

This basic idea—that if each side maintained roughly equal forces and equal capability to retaliate against attack, stability and deterrence would be maintained—also served as the foundation for the U.S. approach to the SALT process. At the time that process began, the U.S. concluded that offensive deterrence was not only sensible, but necessary, since we anticipated that neither side could develop the technology for a defensive system which could effectively deter the other side. The ground-based, terminal, anti-ballistic missile systems then under consideration were both expensive and uncertain, and attacking ballistic missiles during any other phase of their flight was technically infeasible. Further, we lacked the basic computational capability to process the information needed quickly enough to manage a defense against a large number of inbound warheads. (C)

Today, however, the situation is different. Emerging technologies offer the possibility of defenses that did not exist before. Of equal importance, the trends in the development of Soviet strategic forces, as well as the problems of Soviet deception and non-compliance with existing agreements, will, over the long-term, call into question the fundamental assumptions upon which our current strategy is based. (S)

The Soviet Union’s relentless improvement of its ballistic missile force, providing increased prompt, hard target kill capability, steadily attacks the fundamental survivability of our land-based retaliatory forces and the leadership structure that commands them. At the same time, the Soviet Union has continued to pursue strategic advantage through the development of active defenses with increased capability to counter surviving U.S. retaliatory forces. Further, it is spending significant resources on passive defensive measures aimed at improving the survivability of its own forces, military command structure, and national leadership—ranging from providing mobility for its latest generation of ICBMs, to constructing a network of super-hard bunkers to protect its leadership—thus further eroding the effectiveness of our offensive deterrent. (S)

These trends indicate that continued long-term U.S. dependence on offensive forces alone for deterrence will likely lead to a steady erosion of stability to the strategic disadvantage of the United States and its allies. In fact, should these trends be permitted to continue and the Soviet investment in both offensive and defensive capability proceed unrestrained and unanswered, the resultant condition will destroy the foundation on which deterrence has rested for several decades. (C)

In the near term, the SDI program directly responds to the ongoing and extensive Soviet anti-ballistic missile effort, which includes all the actual deployments permitted under the ABM Treaty. It provides a powerful deterrent to any Soviet decision to rapidly expand its ballistic missile capability beyond that contemplated by the ABM Treaty. This, in itself, is a critical task. (U)

However, the overriding importance of SDI to the United States is that it offers the possibility of radically altering the dangerous trends cited above by moving to a better, more stable basis of deterrence, and by providing new and compelling incentives to the Soviet Union for seriously negotiating reductions in existing nuclear arsenals. The Soviet Union is correct in recognizing the potential of advanced defense concepts—especially those involving boost, post-boost, and mid-course defenses—to change existing, and increasingly destabilizing, aspects of the strategic competition. This need not lead to a decisive U.S. unilateral advantage—and that is certainly not our goal. However, if the promise of SDI is achieved, the Soviet advantage accumulated over the past twenty years at great cost will be largely neutralized. And, in the process, we will have enhanced deterrence significantly by turning to a greater reliance upon defensive systems—systems which do not threaten anyone. (C)

The Expected Soviet Approach. Over the next year, the Soviet Union may wish to shift its tactics and offer the prospect of a better U.S.-Soviet relationship in return for constraints on specific U.S. programs. However, no matter how the rhetoric may soften as the prospect of renewed negotiations looms, we should expect to be tested in different, more subtle, but just as serious ways. As a minimum, the Soviet Union will certainly continue to attempt to exploit any vulnerabilities they perceive to undermine public, allied and Congressional support for the general U.S. approach and for specific U.S. positions. (S)

The Soviet Union will likely continue to emphasize its theme of desiring to “prevent the militarization of space.” In doing so, it will attempt to block advanced technologies associated with SDI in an attempt to confine defensive developments to areas of Soviet advantage and, thus, to slow the entire thrust of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Soviet Union will also propose restraints on U.S. anti-satellite capability to inhibit or block related SDI technologies. Finally, it will likely continue to resist U.S. attempts to negotiate deep reductions in existing offensive forces, especially ballistic missiles and warheads. (S)

Expected Soviet Approach in Geneva. At the upcoming meeting in Geneva, there is a possibility that the Soviet Union will seek to be very reasonable and will take the opportunity offered by the meeting to lay the groundwork for serious negotiations in a range of areas. The U.S. delegation will be prepared to encourage the Soviet delegation to do so. On the other hand, we should anticipate that the Soviet Union desires, at that meeting, to get an agreement on modalities and the procedures for subsequent negotiations, as well as on the subject and objectives of those negotiations, that protects existing Soviet areas of advantage and, consequently, prejudices U.S. long-term interests. The Soviet Union has already launched a sophisticated propaganda campaign designed to support this goal. (S)

The U.S. Approach. For our part, the thrust of the U.S. effort for the foreseeable future will be as follows.

1. We will continue to pursue the negotiation of equitable and verifiable agreements leading to reduction of existing nuclear arsenals, and to seek other complementary means (including cooperative and confidence-building measures) of enhancing stability and reducing the risk of war. (S)

2. As we do so, we will protect the promise offered by the ASAT/SDI program to alter the adverse, long-term prospects we now face and to provide a basis for a more stable deterrent at some future time. This specifically involves protecting those SDI technologies that may permit a layered defense, including boost, post-boost, and mid-course elements. (S)

3. Complementing this, we will also protect the U.S. strategic modernization program which is needed to maintain existing deterrence, to restore the balance of offensive forces, and to provide incentives for negotiating real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals. (S)

Characterizing the U.S. Approach. To support this approach publicly, the following paragraph can be used to characterize to the Soviet Union, the Congress, our Allies, and Western publics the basic, central concept that the U.S. is pursuing at the Geneva meetings and in subsequent negotiations. (C)

“During the next ten years, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between offensive and defense nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon an increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.” (U)

Specific U.S. Goals for the January Meeting in Geneva. The following are the specific U.S. goals for the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva in January.² (C)

1. Establish, without concessions or pre-conditions, a sustained, formal negotiating process with the Soviet Union on offensive nuclear arms which would permit us to pursue our goal of achieving deep reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. (S)

2. Keep START and INF issues substantively separate, and preferably procedurally separate if possible. (S)

3. Shape the nature of future discussions or negotiations in other areas to support U.S. interests by:

a. proposing negotiations on nuclear defensive forces, which complement those on offensive nuclear forces, with space weapons being included in both forums as appropriate;

b. avoiding a “space only” forum;

c. specifically protecting the SDI program and, thus, the promise offered by SDI; and

d. providing for future discussions about the long-term maintenance of stability and the transition to deterrence based on the contribution of defenses. (S)

4. Keep the Soviet Union on the defensive at both the private and public levels with special attention to:

a. keeping the onus on Moscow to resume serious negotiations; and

b. denying the Soviet Union a sustainable basis for charging that a “failure” of the Geneva meeting was the responsibility of the U.S. (C)

5. Avoid public negotiation with the Soviet Union. (C)

6. Lay the groundwork necessary in the discussions with the Soviet delegation to provide the basis for later garnering public and Congressional support for the U.S. position. (S)

Addressing the Offense/Defense Relationship. Early in the discussions, the U.S. delegation will provide to the Soviet delegation our conceptual thinking about the offense/defense relationship. This presentation is critically important since it sets the stage for the U.S. proposals about format, object and substance which follow. It also should permit the U.S. to preempt Soviet charges about the U.S. SDI program by citing the record of Soviet actions which have called into question the fundamental assumptions underlying the ABM Treaty and which have contributed to the growing instability in the current situation. (S)

This presentation should make the following points:

—The United States has no territorial ambitions. It is inconceivable that the U.S. would initiate military action against the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact unless it or its allies were to be directly attacked. The U.S. hopes the Soviet Union comparably has no intention of initiating an attack on the United States or its allies.

—The United States is determined to assure itself and its allies of a high-quality deterrent to an attack by anyone on our vital security interests. The U.S. expects that the Soviet Union intends to maintain a similar capability.

—It is hard to understand why the Soviet Union places so much emphasis upon massive expansion and modernization of its nuclear forces, both offensive and defensive. The U.S. is forced thereby not to neglect its own offensive and defensive capabilities.

—Perhaps the explanation is to be found in the fact that each side looks at the nuclear strategic situation primarily from the viewpoint of its own security. Each must assume that at some time a situation may arise in which the risk of war in the immediate future cannot be dismissed. In that situation each side will carefully analyze what it must do to deny the other side a meaningful military victory.

—Under today’s conditions and those of the foreseeable future, both sides have certain incentives to act quickly and decisively with their military power, both nuclear and conventional. This creates an unstable situation which could make crises more difficult to manage and, if conflict breaks out, makes rapid, perhaps immediate, escalation to high levels of destruction more likely.

—This is a dangerous situation. It is one the U.S. and the Soviet Union must address both together and unilaterally. The political and military measures necessary to do so will be difficult for both sides. But we must tackle this problem; the danger must be defused.

—In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the U.S. hoped that both sides would be able to agree on measures which would be helpful to the security of each nation. It was accepted that each side should have rough equality in the aggregate power of its nuclear weapons systems, that if defensive capabilities were to be limited, there should be comparable limitations on offensive capabilities, and that limitations should preclude break-out, circumvention or failure to adhere to the letter and spirit of the limitations agreed upon.

—For a time it appeared that we had made some progress in that direction. As one looks at the situation today, it appears that U.S. anticipation of such progress may have been illusory.

—Since that time, your building program—in both offensive and defensive systems—has violated any reasonable sense of strategic balance.

—And on the defensive side, the Soviet Union at least has also continued to improve its capabilities. It has done everything permitted by the ABM Treaty, and it has also taken steps we believe are almost certainly not consistent with it.

—The ABM Treaty rested importantly on the limitation of large Phased-Array Radars; these radars took five to ten years to build and were easily identifiable. The limits on such radars would assure each side against break-out or circumvention in less time than would be required for the other side to take offsetting actions.

—Allowance was made for early warning radars, but these were to be on the periphery, outward looking and should not be defended, and for radars required for space track and for national technical means of verification.

—It was also agreed that ABM interceptors, launchers, and radars should be non-mobile, non-transportable, i.e., fixed to the ground.

—It was further agreed that other systems, such as air defenses, should not be given ABM capabilities, i.e., that the line between air defenses and ABM defenses should be kept clear and unambiguous.

—Finally, it was agreed that the ABM Treaty should be accompanied by a comprehensive treaty on offensive nuclear forces of indefinite duration to parallel the ABM Treaty; it was hoped that such a treaty could be agreed in two years, and certainly within five years.

—Today all of those assumptions appear invalid.

—The five Soviet early warning radars and the Krasnoyarsk radar (which appears to be identical in physical characteristics to those for detecting and tracking ballistic missile RVs) can, if interconnected, provide a base for a nationwide defense.

—The SH–08 ABM system with its Flat Twin radar seems to be transportable. The United States has seen it erected and made operational in a relatively short period of time.

—The SA–10 and SA–X–12 anti-aircraft systems seem to have a capability against certain ballistic reentry vehicles in an intercontinental trajectory, thus blurring the distinction between air defense systems and ABM systems.

—The Soviet Union is pursuing active research programs on more advanced technologies, which have a direct application to future ballistic missile defense capabilities.

—And, most importantly, there has been no treaty of indefinite duration on offensive arms to parallel the ABM Treaty.

—For the immediate future the United States wishes to work with the Soviet Union to restore and strengthen the regime for stability which, in 1972, was thought by both sides to be our common objective. We must negotiate the follow-on effective limitations on offensive systems called for when we signed the ABM Agreement in 1972, in order to remove the inherent instability in the present and projected array of offensive systems on both sides, and we must reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty which has taken place.

—The research, development, and deployment programs of both sides must be consistent with the ABM Treaty. The U.S. SDI program is. The Soviet program should be.

—If either side ever wishes to amend the Treaty, then there are provisions for discussing that. In the U.S. view, such discussions should precede action by sufficient time so that stability is guaranteed.

—The U.S. SDI research program is fully consistent with the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union has had a large SDI program of its own for some years. We do not believe that either country wants at this time to ban the research and concept development permitted by that Treaty. We doubt an effective ban on such activities could be designed, even if desired.

—For the long run we should have bolder and more radical objectives. Both sides seem to be agreed that with respect to nuclear weapons as a whole, the objective should be their total elimination. This should be worldwide and agreed to by all nations.

—Whenever research validates that a defensive technology can make a contribution to strengthening deterrence, the United States would expect to discuss with the Soviet Union the basis on which it would be integrated into force structures.

—At the same time, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union recognize that we must find a safe path down the road of reductions toward disarmament. The U.S. believes that during the transition from reliance on the retaliatory capability of massive forces of offensive arms it could be extremely useful to move toward a more and more effective defense on both sides.

—It appears that new technologies may open possibilities of assuring the security of both sides through a substantial improvement in our respective defenses. To the U.S., high-confidence defenses would appear to be a sounder approach to peace and security than equal and high-confidence vulnerability to every manner of nuclear strike by the other side, and could produce a more stable offense-defense relationship.

—The United States recognizes that arms control and other forms of cooperation could play an important role in creating and sustaining such a more stable, less threatening environment. We believe that the security interests of both sides could be served by such an evolution.

—The United States also recognizes that, as Mr. Chernenko recently noted, there is an organic relationship between offensive and defensive forces. While the possibilities of a development as I have just described could be realized in the fairly distant future, U.S. is prepared to initiate a continuing discussion with the Soviet Union now, not only on future roles for strategic defense, but also on other steps we can take to enhance strategic stability while reducing nuclear arms. (S)

The Issue of Negotiating Fora. While we should seek that negotiating approach which gives the United States the best possible negotiating leverage, in order to reduce pressure for concessions and agreement to preconditions, the immediate tactical objective of the U.S. is to obtain from the session in Geneva an agreement to begin formal negotiations on terms which do not prejudice the United States and its allies and key defense initiatives such as SDI and INF deployments. To achieve this objective, we should characterize agreement on basic negotiating structure(s), title(s), short statements describing the subject of the negotiations/discussions, starting date(s), and location(s) as a basic and necessary first step and measure of the seriousness of our mutual purpose. (S)

a. Structure. With respect to negotiating structure, basic U.S. objectives are: (1) to enter negotiations on nuclear offensive forces while keeping START and INF issues substantively separate, and, preferably procedurely separate as well; (2) to propose corresponding negotiations on nuclear defensive forces, which complement those on offensive nuclear forces, with space weapons being included in both forums, as appropriate; (3) to avoid a “space only” forum; and, (4) to provide a forum for future discussions about the long-term maintenance of stability and the transition to deterrence based on the contribution of defenses. (S)

The preferred U.S. negotiating structure would consist of three formal fora: separate START negotiations and INF negotiations (with these two negotiations addressing nuclear offensive forces); and negotiations on nuclear defensive forces. In addition, the U.S. would also prefer to supplement this negotiating structure with agreement to begin ongoing discussions about the long-term maintenance of stability, the offense/defense relationship, and the transition to deterrence based on the contribution of defenses. This structure would permit us to build upon the work previously accomplished at START and INF as quickly as possible while establishing a new negotiating forum to deal with nuclear defenses and a new discussion forum to deal with related issues of concern to both sides. (S)

Should the Soviet Union not agree to this approach, the U.S. Delegation is authorized to alter the U.S. proposal along the following lines and in the following order of U.S. preference:

1. Separate negotiations on START, on INF, and on defensive forces with the latter to include nuclear and non-nuclear defenses. In this latter category of negotiations, the U.S. would continue to focus its efforts to constrain nuclear defenses.

2. Separate negotiations on nuclear offensive forces and nuclear defensive forces. Under this structure, the U.S. would seek separate START and INF subgroups to keep START and INF issues substantively separate,

3. Separate negotiations on nuclear offensive forces and on defensive forces.

4. A single negotiation on nuclear forces including nuclear offensive and defensive forces and related issues. (S)

Each of the above should also protect the U.S. desire for a forum for continued discussions about the long-term maintenance of stability, the offense/defense relationship, and the transition to deterrence based on the contribution of defenses. (C)

b. Titles. The preferred titles for such negotiations are implicit in the descriptions provided of the preferred negotiating structures. (C)

The Soviet Union will desire to include “space” in the title of one of the established fora. The word “space” should not appear in the description of any negotiations or discussions in a manner prejudicial to the U.S. For example, negotiations entitled Offensive and Defensive/Space Arms would be unacceptable. The title “Nuclear and Space Arms” for a single negotiation would be undesirable, but acceptable as a last resort if the Soviet Union insists on the word “space”. (S)

Difficulty with respect to titles could be resolved by avoiding agreement on specific titles, referring only to the locale such as “Geneva Talks.” (C)

c. Describing the Negotiations/Discussions. The preferred U.S. short descriptions of the negotiations are also implied in the discussion of structure. In descriptions of agreed fora, the delegation is authorized to include reference to space in a manner which does not single out space and which makes clear that space issues apply to both offensive and defensive systems. For example, descriptions of separate negotiations on offensive forces and on defensive forces which described as subjects of the separate negotiations “nuclear offensive forces” and “strategic defenses and space arms”, respectively, should be avoided in favor of formulations such as “strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms, whether based on earth or in space” and “defensive arms, whether based on earth or in space.” (S)

Other formulations which are not acceptable include the following:

—formulations which accept the Soviet definition of strategic arms, i.e. weapons capable of hitting Soviet territory by virtue of their location rather than their range, including third-country as well as intermediate-range systems;

—formulations which accept Soviet demands for compensation for third-country forces;³

—formulations which exclude non-European based INF systems from limitation, which accept limitations on our carrier-based aircraft or other dual-capable aircraft with a radius of action less than that of the F–111, or which remove shorter-range INF ballistic missiles from at least collateral constraints;

—formulations which accept a substantive merger of START and INF;

—formulations which would imply that the relationship between offensive and defensive systems can only be addressed in the defensive forum or that space can only be addressed in the defensive negotiations;

—formulations which accept the Soviet objective of “preventing the militarization of space”, which restrict the subject matter to just the space issues of SDI and ASAT, which imply the necessity of additional restrictions beyond those in existing treaties and agreements on US activities in outer space, or which prejudice U.S. freedom to pursue SDI and ASAT; and,

—formulations which use the SALT II phrase “equality and equal security.” In recent weeks, some Soviet statements have used a different formulation, “equality with due account taken of the legitimate interests of parties.” While not preferred, this formulation is acceptable in the context of a general agreement which meets other primary U.S. objectives. (S)

d. Starting Dates. The US should seek the opening of formal negotiations during the month of March, preferably between March 5 and March 19. Selection of these dates is not essential, but is useful to permit preparation, delegation selection, and consultations with allies and the Congress. (C)

e. Location. The US should seek a common location for all formal negotiations, preferably in Geneva. Separate locations could be acceptable in the context of an overall package which meets primary U.S. objectives. (C)

Substantive Presentations. We are on record as being prepared to engage in substantive discussions during the Geneva meetings, and to have concrete new ideas to present at that time. Our intended presentation on the U.S. concept of the offense/defense relationship certainly provides the basis for substantive discussion; and our proposal to open negotiations on nuclear defensive systems and to continue discussions on stability are specific, concrete new ideas worthy of note. (C)

During the discussion of negotiating fora, the Soviets may attempt to initiate discussion on the substance of the negotiating approaches the U.S. would intend to use in various fora or they may present substantive proposals of their own. In general, discussion of the substantive aspect of future U.S. negotiating positions should await the beginning of formal negotiations. Agreement to pre-conditions or substantive concessions for the purpose of reaching agreement to begin formal negotiations is not authorized. To the extent possible, we should attempt to maintain the best possible climate for entry into the formal negotiations or, if agreement is not reached on formal negotiations, to protect our leverage for continued discussions. In addition, we must be prepared to protect ourselves against Soviet accusations that the Geneva talks failed because the U.S. had nothing new to offer. (S)

The following guidance is provided on the treatment of the substantive detail associated with various issues. (C)

a. START. On START, the delegation should stress the basic flexibility and reasonableness of the elements of the current U.S. START position—flexibility which could not be implemented in the face of the Soviet departure from Geneva. In addition, the delegation should indicate U.S. readiness to move beyond where the last round of START talks were left in Geneva and to explore trade-offs between relative U.S. and Soviet advantages. (S)

With respect to START trade-offs, the delegation is authorized to indicate to the Soviet Union that we have extensive flexibility with respect to both structure and content of the trade-offs, so long as the outcome meets our basic standards with respect to equality, verifiability, stability, significance, and alliance security. In the context of formal negotiations, the U.S. is prepared to propose trade-offs and, in doing so, consider the use of asymmetrical limits and/or different aggregations of the elements of an agreement in an effort to reach a satisfactory outcome. (S)

As an example of the above, the delegation is authorized to suggest that, recognizing the Soviet Union’s preference for certain types of forces, the U.S. is prepared to consider a trade-off between their areas of advantage and ours. The delegation can explain that one way this could be achieved is by adding to the current U.S. proposal a specific limit on the number of air launched cruise missiles permitted to each side. The U.S. limit would be well below the number of such missiles that could be deployed on the U.S. bomber force if the Soviet Union were to agree to commensurate reductions in the destructive capability of their ballistic missiles. However, in recognition of the Soviet preference for ballistic missiles, the corresponding limit on Soviet air launched cruise missiles would be lower than that permitted the U.S. (S)

The delegation should stress that this is one example, that the U.S. has additional ideas, and that the U.S. is prepared to use these ideas to meet both Soviet and U.S. concerns in the context of formal negotiations. The delegation should again reemphasize the point that, in the context of such negotiations, the U.S. is prepared to consider the use of asymmetrical limits and different aggregations of the elements of an agreement in an effort to reach a satisfactory outcome. (S)

b. INF. The delegation should stress to the Soviet Union that major progress in negotiations across the board and in areas of interest to both sides would prove easier if an early breakthrough were possible in the area of INF. The delegation should also stress that we and our allies remain committed to our basic standards for evaluating an INF agreement:

—equal rights and limits expressed globally, with no export of the SS–20 threat from Europe to Asia;

—no compensation for British and French nuclear forces;

—no reduction in NATO conventional force capability; and

—effective verification. (S)

At the same time, the delegation should point out that we have demonstrated flexibility and have sought to address Soviet concerns. We believe that an agreement is possible on the basis of the September, 1983, U.S. proposals which would have provided for an equal global limit under which the United States would have considered not deploying its full global allotment in Europe.⁴ At that time, the United States also indicated its willingness to consider reductions in Pershing II missile deployments and limitations on aircraft, two major concerns of the Soviet Union. The delegation should stress that within these basic principles, and in the context of formal negotiations, the U.S. is prepared to show considerable flexibility with respect to formulation and trade-offs. For example, the U.S. can imagine an approach through which equal warhead levels could be reached through equal percentage reductions on both sides (i.e., the U.S. reducing from its planned levels of deployment—224 GLCM and Pershing II launchers carrying 572 missiles/warheads). (S)

In introducing the equal percentage reductions example, the delegation should take care not to indicate to the Soviets any acceptance of the principle of equal reductions or equal percentage reductions per se. When used in situations where there is not a beginning balance, or where there is not agreement that the reductions will ultimately lead to equal levels of forces (as is the case in the U.S. START build-down proposal), equal percentage reductions do not lead to equal force levels. If applied in different contexts, the principle of equal reductions or equal percentage reductions could damage U.S. interests. If pressed for an endorsement of the general principle of equal reductions or equal percentage reductions, the delegation should note that while the U.S. cannot endorse the general principle, the LRINF missile issue has some unique features that, in the interest of making progress on this important issue, may make the use of the certain specific equal percentage reduction approaches acceptable to the United States and its Allies within the limited context of the LRINF missile agreement under discussion. (S)

c. Space Arms Control. In response to initiatives from the Soviet Union involving space arms control, the U.S. delegation should remind the Soviet delegation that an extensive body of international law and treaties exists with respect to space, including the Outer Space Treaty and the ABM Treaty. Further, the delegation should point out that it is the Soviet Union which has the largest number of warheads which would transit space; it is the Soviet Union which has an existing ASAT system, and it is the Soviet Union which has a deployed ABM system which can attack objects in space. The delegation should explain that the United States is prepared to consider Soviet proposals related to space during the course of formal negotiations. However, because issues involving space cannot logically be separated from the major areas to which they relate, we are only prepared to deal with these proposals in the context of nuclear offensive and defensive negotiations as appropriate to each. (S)

d. ASAT Limitations. The U.S. will not propose substantive ASAT initiatives at this time. If pressed by the Soviet Union for agreement to an immediate ASAT moratorium, the delegation should point out that, as the U.S. has consistently made clear, while the U.S. will not agree to such a proposal as a precondition for negotiations, in formal negotiations on the full range of nuclear arms control issues, the United States is prepared to consider areas of mutual restraint which might be negotiated in the context of a broader range of agreements which would provide for stabilizing reductions in nuclear arms. (S)

e. Other Areas. In other arms control areas (e.g., nuclear testing, MBFR, CBW, CDE, CD, and the full range of U.S.-proposed confidence building measures), the delegation is authorized to restate, reaffirm and explain the U.S. positions in each of these areas as appropriate. The delegation should stress the need and the U.S. desire to make progress, where possible, across this full spectrum of issues. (S)

f. Verification and Compliance. The delegation should stress the importance the United States attaches to effective verification of, and compliance with, arms control agreements. Further, the delegation should note that, for this reason, we have proposed specific verification, inspection and confidence building measures and have sought to have the Soviet Union resolve our very serious concerns about Soviet non-compliance. (S)

In addition, the U.S. delegation is authorized to draw upon current guidance on arms control related issues, as supplemented by this directive, to respond as necessary and appropriate, within the terms of such guidance, to serious Soviet proposals or use such guidance in countering the development of a situation which could create a serious setback for the United States in its effort to gain support among allies and within the United States. (C)

Ronald Reagan

1. Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, Shultz-Gromyko—January 1985 [Final NSDD—Geneva Instructions 01/01/1985] (1). Secret. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan was in Palm Springs, California, from December 29 to January 2 (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) so presumably signed the NSDD in Palm Springs. Reagan also initialed at the top of the first page. In a January 1 PROFs note, McFarlane wrote: “At the conclusion of a one hour, forty-five minute meeting with Cap, George and me, the President approved the instructions for Geneva subject to a few minor edits.” McFarlane listed the changes, which were incorporated into this final version. McFarlane instructed: “With these changes, the President has signed it. Please have a smooth prepared but do not distribute it.” (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSDD Package, 12/31/1984–01/01/1985 (1) In an undated handwritten note to Reagan on “Aboard Air Force One” stationery, likely written during their January 2 return trip to Washington, McFarlane wrote: “Mr. President, This is a ‘smooth’ version of the NSDD you’ve already signed after your meeting with Cap and George Jan 1 at Annenberg’s. Could you please sign this ‘original’. It is a verbatim reprint. Bud.”
2. Shultz and Gromyko were set to meet January 7–8, 1985 in Geneva.
3. During the previous INF negotiations, the Soviet delegates argued that British and French systems should factor into reduction totals. The U.S. countered that they had no control or negotiating power over the systems of their NATO Allies.
4. NSDD 104, “U.S. Approach to INF Negotiations—II,” September 21, 1983, laid out these proposals. Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. V, European Security, 1977–1983.