274. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan1
SUBJECT
- Organizing for Serious Arms Control Negotiations
For a number of reasons, which will be presented in a separate paper,2 I believe we can expect the Soviets to have a high interest in making headway on arms control during the next four years. In order to be able to have a responsive and imaginative process within the US Government, I recommend that you consider two fundamental changes in the way your Administration handles this issue. First, the record of the first term makes clear that there is determined opposition within the Department of Defense (OSD, not JCS) to the very concept of arms control. In my judgment, this opposition will endure unless personnel changes are made. Secondly, this opposition and a traditionally incremental approach to making changes to the US position within State makes it desireable to elevate the management of the bureaucracy to the White House. Right now, the Interdepartmental groups (IGs and SIGs) are managed by the Departments. Unless and until these groups are chaired within the White House, we will continue to face the paralysis we have often faced these past four years. What I am suggesting is that you consider naming a high-level experienced personal representative to manage this process—a man the Soviets would respect and who is knowledgeable on both the technical and political aspects of arms control. There are two or three possible candidates for such a position.
Were you to think this a sensible thing to do, it would be important to discuss it with George Shultz so that there is no appearance of his suffering a diminution of his authority. But the truth is that your predecessors have only been able to make breakthroughs when they have entered the process directly from the White House. If George can be asked to think about this, it could lead to its being his idea and thus minimize the public appearance of his being subordinated in the process. You may wish to think about this prior to your meetings with [Page 974] the Secretary this week. If he comes to agree with the value of such a change, it might be possible to use it in your meeting with Gromyko and, later, to announce this initiative which promises a more visible and active role by the President in the next four years. Such an announcement would show leadership and meet persistent criticisms from the Congress and press of the way the process has been handled these past four years. It would also be seen by Gromyko and the Soviet leadership as indicative that you are indeed serious about arms reductions in the coming years. I would be glad to discuss this at your convenience.
- Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (07/27/1984–09/27/1984); NLR–362–3–22–6–6. Secret; Sensitive. Reagan wrote in the margin: “Let’s talk about this. RR.”↩
- An interagency paper entitled “Next Steps in Preparing for Vienna,” September 4, is in a package of preparatory material for the September 18 NSPG meeting. (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, September 1984 Chron File #40–42)↩