Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

269. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, September 4, 1984

SUBJECT

• Establishing a Private Channel with the Soviets

While it is encouraging that Secretary Shultz has decided that a private channel could be useful, I do not believe that the idea of proposing one to Gromyko (or inviting him to propose one) is the way to proceed if we want one that is effective and which does not give Dobrynin a monopoly over both directions of the messages.

Private channels are useful basically for two reasons:

(1) They would allow us to work out compromises privately and informally, giving the Soviet leadership the possibility of avoiding accusations that they are compromising on principles; and

(2) If properly established, they would allow us to communicate directly with elements of the Soviet bureaucracy outside the Foreign Ministry.

When and if the Soviet leadership has decided that they want improved relations, they will desire a private channel, largely for the first reason. But if we put the ball in their court, by working through Gromyko, we can be sure that he will arrange any channel established so that it is maintained under his control, thus depriving us of the second advantage—which could ultimately prove very useful to us. Also, if we accept Dobrynin as the channel, we in effect give him a monopoly over communications in both directions. This is something we should never do again, since (particularly in the absence of frequent high-level direct meetings), we would have absolutely no control over the spin he puts on our messages.

I believe that any effort to establish a private channel should be made directly to the Soviet agency with which we wish to communicate. The obvious target for us is the Central Committee apparatus, which provides the staff support for the General Secretary (and other Central Committee Secretaries such as, for example, Gorbachev).

Such efforts undoubtedly would be reported to Gromyko, and if they come from someone in State, he would have solid bureaucratic ground to turn it off, since it is his formal duty to deal with foreign ministries. An effort by the White House to communicate with the CC Secretariat is different, however. Since it is, roughly, counterpart to counterpart, Gromyko would in effect have to argue that the Secretariat personnel cannot be relied upon to deal with us. This would be more difficult for him to do, and Zagladin’s willingness to meet with me in February and to have Menshikov meet me in March shows that it is not out of the question.² (You will recall that Menshikov pointed out that the contact had been approved by the Politburo, including Gromyko, and that Zagladin was authorized to receive messages through Hartman provided they were from me—but only under that condition.) I take this as confirmation that the bureaucratic factors mentioned above are in fact operative.

Since we have not followed up on the March meeting, we cannot be sure that the arrangements worked out earlier are still acceptable. However, if we have something substantial to say, I believe the route to try initially is the one used before; if the Soviets reject it, then it will be a signal that they are not ready for a private channel in the full sense. If they are willing, however, such a mode of communication could be very useful to us if (as appears very likely) the Soviets are on the brink of another transition. The CC Secretariat will be in the vortex of any maneuvering; the Foreign Ministry will be very much off on the side.

Testing Soviet willingness to reactivate the channel established earlier would be very simple. With Secretary Shultz’s approval, I could ask Hartman by secure telephone to pass a proposal to Zagladin that the two of us meet. If he accepted, it would mean that they are willing to activate the contact.

In sum, I recommend:

1. That Secretary Shultz be dissuaded from mentioning the matter of private channels to Gromyko or anyone in his party, and

2. That I be authorized to proceed as outlined above if we wish to test Soviet willingness to establish a channel.

Before anything is decided or done, it might be useful if I had the opportunity to discuss privately with Secretary Shultz and you some of the tactical considerations in establishing and maintaining a special channel.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (07/27/1984–09/27/1984); NLR–362–3–23–1–0. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. Reagan also wrote in the margin: “This sounds practical. RR.”
2. See Documents 180 and 195.