268. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
10777. For Under Secretary Armacost and Asst Secretary Burt. Subject: Looking Toward the UNGA—Moscow’s Mind-Set.
1. (S—Entire text).
2. Summary: As the Department begins preparations for the Secretary’s UNGA bilateral with Gromyko,2 it may find useful some sense of the mind-set he will bring to the exchange. We expect he will be self-righteous at best and possibly quite confrontational. The political environment for the meeting will be less than propitious, and nothing in Gromyko’s recent performances, or in Soviet policy more generally this year, suggests he will be any more prepared in New York than heretofore to respond constructively to US initiatives. This does not obviate the need for a positive US position nor does it diminish the value of the bilateral itself. It does mean we should not have unrealistic expectations as to what the meeting will accomplish. We should use the exchange to prepare the ground for Soviet policy reviews likely to follow the US Presidential elections. Sending Gromyko back to Moscow with the impression that US policy for the mid-eighties will be vigorous, consistent and constructive regardless of the Soviets’ attitude will be far more important in this context than our treatment of specific issues. End summary.
[Page 958]Gromyko—A Confrontational Approach
3. Meetings between US and Soviet Foreign Ministers have taken place under less auspicious signs than the forthcoming UNGA bilateral—but not much. Gromyko has spent the past year honing his anti-administration spiel on interlocutors from Perez de Cuellar to Geoffrey Howe.3 He has lambasted US policy every time he has been given access to a podium. In the wake of KAL first anniversary recriminations, the perceived slights which led him to cancel his UNGA trip last year will be fresh in his mind.4 He will sit down with the Secretary within days of the proposed start of the Vienna meeting that didn’t happen, a source of embarrassment to the Soviets, and one which will not improve Gromyko’s mood. In short, there is no evidence Moscow will have come out of its nearly year-long sulk, and no reason, a month before the US Presidential elections, why it should choose New York to do so. Odds are, therefore, that we can expect Gromyko at his worst both publicly and privately.
Publicly . . .
4. In terms of substance, we doubt he will have anything very dramatic to say in either forum. Having been burned by their June 29 space arms control ploy, any initiatives Gromyko may unveil in his address to the Assembly will probably be confined to areas on which we will have difficulty responding positively. Based on recent Soviet moves, candidates for a public proposal include something on limiting naval forces, a repackaging of one or more elements of Chernenko’s March 2 arms control/nuclear norms menu, or the July 29 Soviet Middle East plan. None of these are likely to electrify the audience, and Gromyko may resort to harsh criticism of the administration, a la his performances in Stockholm and Budapest earlier this year,5 to mask his unwillingness to come to terms with the big issues.
. . . and in Private
5. We see no reason to expect anything different in private. Gromyko’s objective, in the absence of any fresh ideas of his own or desire to respond to our initiatives, will be to keep the Secretary on the defensive by attacking the Administration’s record. He will make the most of the August 11 joke.6 He will portray our handling of the Soviet space initiative in the worst possible light. He will dwell heavily on [Page 959] the “state terrorism” theme. He will lecture the Secretary that US claims to have regained the strength necessary for serious arms control are belied by the administration’s failure to curtail military budgets. He will, in short, seek to make the case that our actions do not correspond to our words, and that the basic thrust of Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy is to undermine the Soviet Union and its allies as viable social systems.
Prospects for a Change
6. Nothing we can do at this point is likely to make Gromyko and his colleagues adopt a more constructive approach in New York. That will come—if it comes—after November 6, when the Soviets will no longer be able to argue that conciliatory US statements are an electoral ploy, and especially when they have had a chance to reassess the substance of post-election US policy. Any proposals we make for cosmetic or minor steps in New York are likely to be turned aside as inadequate or cynical; more substantive overtures will simply be pocketed. This does not mean that we should not use the period between now and September (or even November) to keep the ball in the Soviets’ court through prudent initiatives. On the contrary, we should recognize that the Soviets have become prisoners of their own immobility (of which Gromyko is a principal architect) and they need to find their way out of the impasse. We should not expend negotiating capital to overcome their intransigence, but they need to be convinced that it is worth their while to resume real negotiations.
7. The UNGA meeting offers a good opportunity to drive home this message. While Gromyko will not have a negotiating brief, he will be alert to any indications as to the long-term direction of US policies. The impressions he takes back will shape post-election Soviet reviews of East-West policy which are certain to begin once the votes are counted in the US. That being the case, the agenda for the New York meeting will be less important than the general approach the Secretary brings to it.
Some Thoughts on the Agenda
8. As suggested above, Gromyko’s aim will be to keep the Secretary on the defensive. He is likely to focus on the administration’s arms control record, and particularly our response to Moscow’s recent space initiative. We will need to rebut firmly Gromyko’s litany of complaints. But we will find little advantage in a “who-struck-John,” and should seek as early as possible to move the conversation beyond simple polemics. In addition to whatever we may have on arms control, we will want to raise Sakharov and human rights in general, reiterating our call for an independent verification of his condition and for an end to Bonner’s persecution. In view of Moscow’s non-response to our proposals for detailed discussions of Southern Africa and the Middle [Page 960] East, it would be inappropriate to press further for such talks. This need not prevent the Secretary from outlining our views on these and other regional questions, however. In view of recent Soviet/DRA pressure against Pakistan, we should take advantage of the occasion to make clear to Gromyko our solidarity with Islamabad.
9. In the bilateral area, it will not hurt to recognize the small steps taken in recent months, underscoring that such progress reflects the administration’s willingness to approach issues of mutual concern in a businesslike fashion when it finds a partner. It would be well in this context to emphasize the importance of a positive response to our proposals on improving North Pacific civil air safety, in unblocking a variety of bilateral matters (Aeroflot, consulates, and possibly the exchange agreement). New York would also be the logical place for new initiatives to expand the bilateral consultative process. We could express our readiness to raise the frequency and level of US-Soviet political contacts during the year ahead. If a concrete proposal were considered desirable, we could indicate a willingness to begin yearly pre-UNGA consultations at the policy level—a move under discussion in 1979 but never implemented.
A Broader Message
10. As already noted, however, more important than the ritual exchange of views we can expect on specific issues will be the overall impression we make on Gromyko. The Secretary’s presentation—on specific topics and more generally—should pose for the Kremlin a fairly stark choice: To move toward a more businesslike and satisfactory relationship with the US after November or accept the consequences over the next four years and beyond. At the UNGA, as in our other high-level exchanges with the Soviets in recent months, our message should be that the US is strong, vigorous in its approach to the problems facing it, and confident of its ability to engage the real issues of the eighties. Gromyko should understand that our approach is not directed a priori against Soviet interests, and that the demise of the USSR is neither our goal nor our expectation. It should be equally clear to him, however, that we will be as consistent as we will be patient, and that we have no intention of begging or bribing Moscow to deal with us on matters which are as much of concern to the Soviets as to ourselves.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840010–0077. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.↩
- Shultz and Gromyko had a meeting scheduled during the UN General Assembly session in New York in late September.↩
- Javier Pérez de Cuéllar was the United Nations Secretary General. Geoffrey Howe was British Foreign Secretary.↩
- See footnote 7, Document 260.↩
- For Gromyko’s address to the CDE at Stockholm, see footnote 3, Document 159.↩
- See Document 263.↩