Here is a redraft of the “Dealing With the Soviets” memorandum that we
discussed with you yesterday afternoon.2
Since Rick had to be out of the building for most of the day he has not
seen it, but Mark Palmer has
and his suggestions have been fully incorporated.
Attachment
Memorandum Prepared in the Policy Planning
Council3
Washington, July 26, 1984
DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS
I. Where We Stand
—In the past four years, we have managed to halt what had become a
worrisome pro-Soviet shift in the global “correlation of forces.” On
our watch, “containment” has become an operational reality instead
of a pious slogan.
—Likewise, the strictly damage-limiting objective of detente—to
“manage” the emergence of the Soviet Union as a global
superpower—has been supplemented by a new determination to resist
Moscow’s demands for unilateral advantage.
[Page 891]
—These changes have been accompanied by what our critics call a
“deterioration” in U.S.-Soviet relations. In fact, our ability to
meet the Soviet challenge is greater than at any time in recent
memory. There is clear evidence that Moscow knows this and has
become more sensitive to the costs and risks of continuing a
cutthroat competition.
—More concretely, we can—and should—take credit for the following
successes:
• We have made real (though still insufficient) headway in
redressing the military balance, restoring our economic vigor
and our national self-confidence.
• We have demonstrated a renewed willingness to use [less than 1 line not declassified] force
in the “grey area” competition (Grenada, Lebanon, Central
America, Afghanistan, etc.).
• We have reconfirmed the cohesion of the anti-Soviet coalition
of the democratic nations and China.
• We have stimulated and been able to capitalize on rising doubts
about Moscow’s reliability as a friend and ally (Grenada, Iraq,
Angola, Mozambique).
• We have put and kept Moscow on the diplomatic defensive (INF, START, CW,
Vienna).
• We have cast doubt on Moscow’s claim that “there is no
international question that can be settled without Soviet
participation” (Southern Africa).
• We have reinforced Moscow’s “isolation” within the Communist
world (improving U.S. relations with China, Yugoslavia, Hungary,
Romania, etc.).
II. Opportunities
—Our primary objective in a second term will be to consolidate and
build on these achievements, thereby further narrowing Moscow’s
opportunities for self-aggrandizement.
—At the same time, we will want to be alert and to probe for signs
that Moscow is willing to deescalate the competition and take
meaningful steps to stabilize East-West relations.
—Contrary to conventional wisdom, the continuing leadership
transition in the Kremlin may be conducive to a modification of
established Soviet policies and priorities and create further
incentives for international self-restraint:
• This is what happened in the post-Stalin succession
struggle, and it could happen again.
• While there is no way we can determine (or even accurately
monitor) the jockeyings for power within the Kremlin, we can
help to ensure that would-be militants face an uphill struggle
and more moderate elements can make a plausible
case.
—What is required, above all, is continued firmness and resolve. It
is illusory to think that the Soviets will moderate their behavior
in [Page 892] the absence of
countervailing power. We must further increase our military
capabilities and convince Moscow that it will lose a continuing arms
race.
—Our demonstrations of military prowess must be coupled with
political overtures and negotiating initiatives that convey a
sincere willingness to take account of legitimate Soviet security
concerns and to reach equitable agreements. Otherwise, the
competition will escalate to increasingly dangerous and, for us,
unsustainable levels.
III. Negotiations
—One of the strengths of Soviet foreign policy has always been its
steady, patient determination. The Soviets have a long-term
strategy. We must have as well.
—Moscow’s outrageous behavior makes it tempting to treat the Soviet
Union as an international pariah and limit diplomatic contacts and
communications to an irreducible minimum. This is the more tempting
because more intensive dialogue can create dangerous illusions among
susceptible Western publics. Nonetheless, this is a temptation we
must resist. Negotiations—and negotiating flexibility—are crucial
ingredients of our overall strategy:
• Some agreements with the Soviet Union would be in our
interest. (Similarly, with other adversaries Vietnam on MIA,
Cuba on Marielitos, Nicaraguans on ways of halting subversion,
etc.)
• In such cases, we must put forward negotiable proposals and be
prepared to make reasonable compromises and trade-offs.
• Serious diplomatic exchanges and credible offers to negotiate
are essential for putting relations with Moscow on a more stable
basis and reducing the risk of unnecessary confrontation.
• They are also essential in order to retain domestic and allied
support for our overall strategy. Over the long run, Western
publics will not tolerate the absence of good-faith efforts to
reach agreements.
—Even in the near term, standing pat helps the Soviets put us on the
defensive:
• Pressures build up and force us to
move. The move we make loses some of its political impact
because people believe we were forced into it.
• To some extent we lose control of the process and leave the
initiative in the hands of our opponents.
—The need for negotiating flexibility is particularly acute in a
period which could see some erosion of Congressional support for the
defense programs, security and economic assistance [less than 1 line not declassified] efforts
required to counter the Soviets and give them real incentives to
moderate their behavior.
—Accordingly, we must continue to use negotiation as a weapon of
political strategy. We have done this:
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• Putting forward a positive arms control program was good
strategy.
• In Central America, our positive political program (support for
Duarte, Contadora, Marielito talks) is keeping our opponents off
balance and our public support more solid. Similarly in Southern
Africa.
IV. Problems and
Pitfalls
To sustain our strategy we must anticipate and overcome a variety of
difficulties:
—We must clearly identify our negotiating goals and priorities and
ensure their effective and timely implementation. Decisive
presidential leadership is needed to overcome bureaucratic
infighting and obstructionism here in Washington. Otherwise, as
experience clearly indicates, the interagency process will lock us
into a position of sterile immobilism.
—We must not oversell the agreements we reach or exaggerate the
prospects of a fundamental and enduring change in U.S.-Soviet
relations. The Soviets will not change their spots and we must
protect our strategy against the public’s tendency to fluctuate
between outrage and euphoria.
—We must be prepared to respond to recurrent incidents of outrageous
Soviet behavior without allowing them to deflect us from our
strategic course. Your decision to couple strong condemnation of
KAL with new arms-control
initiatives provides a model for the future. We start with no
illusions about the Soviet Union and we are thus in a position to
maintain a steady course (unlike Carter, who was shocked by Afghanistan).
—We must not permit the prospect of reaching agreement in some areas
(if it in fact materializes) to inhibit our reaction to Soviet
encroachments on our interests in other areas. We must compete while
negotiating and be ready to confront not only periodic episodes of
Soviet misconduct but an uninterrupted Soviet effort to prevail in a
long-term global contest.
