229. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Vessey)1
- US/Soviet Tension
1. I attach here a rather stunning array of indicators of an increasing aggressiveness in Soviet policy and activities. These include developments in the media, civil defense sector, security operations, political harassment, logistical steps, the economy, intelligence preparations and political activity.
2. The depth and breadth of these activities demand increased and continual review to assess whether they are in preparation for a crisis or merely to embarrass or politically influence events in the United States.
3. In the light of the increasing number and accelerating tempo of developments of this type, we will shortly begin to produce a biweekly strategic warning report which will monitor and assess the implications of these incidents which we report on as they occur, but have not, thus far, pulled together in any systematic way.
- Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, June 1–30, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret.↩
- Casey signed “W.J. Casey” above his typed signature.↩
- Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].↩
- See Document 221.↩
- According to telegram 15109 from Bonn, June 7, a Soviet representative delivered a new permanently restricted area (PRA) map to the U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) at the Potsdam House on May 16. The “new PRA will severely hamper right to free unimpeded transit guaranteed under the Huebner-Malinin” agreement. (See footnote 6, below.) (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840368–0687)↩
- The Huebner-Malinin agreement, which officially established the U.S. Military Liaison Mission in Potsdam, was signed by the United States and Soviet Union in April 1947. It ensured the rights of each side to protect the interest of their nationals in the German zones of occupation and “complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever it will be desired over territory and roads in both zones except in places of disposition of military units, without escort or supervision.” (Ibid.)↩
- TRA: temporary restricted area.↩
- The study on Soviet railroads was not found.↩
- The DIA studies were not further identified.↩