Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

214. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, April 20, 1984

SUBJECT

• U.S.-Soviet Relations: Current State and Next Steps

I have the following thoughts on the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations, which you may wish to consider in case there is discussion on the subject with the President and Secretary Shultz during the China trip.

1. The public stonewall the Soviets have erected to our positions is disappointing, but should not be unexpected. In my view, we are on the right course both in dealing with them, and in positioning the President on the high ground for the political debates which will intensify this year. Both objectives will be served by continuing our position of leaning forward, short of course of making major substantive concessions without a quid pro quo.

2. Although Malcolm McIntosh’s analysis is in general very accurate,² it seems to me that he may underestimate the intensity of the debate which I believe is going on in the Soviet leadership over policy toward the U.S. The odds are that he will prove to be right that the Soviets will be unable to change course importantly before late next year. But, given the debate, the pressures on the Soviet system, and the differences among personal interests of the principal players (and we can only guess at the precise nature of these), we should not exclude the possibility that some fundamental decisions could be made this year.

3. Attempting to maximize whatever chance still exists for the Soviets to deal with us seriously this year is fully consistent with the requirements of our public diplomacy—which should remain our top priority in the coming months.³

4. The President’s desire to meet with Chernenko during the Olympics now seems increasingly impractical. Does he still exclude the possibility of working toward a meeting in connection with the U.N. session in September?⁴ That obviously presents problems of timing, but it is probably more realistic than hoping for an opportunity at the Olympics.

5. The Soviet handling of the Olympics will in fact be an important element in the relationship. If they stay away, they will step up propaganda to a degree that a shift in the tone of their dealing with us will have to wait a certain cooling off period. This raises the question of whether we should do anything else to attract them to the Olympics.

a. I start from the premise that we have already bent over backwards to meet their demands, and should go no further. Certainly, we should not handle their participation in any way that presents a serious security threat, or that smacks of groveling to persuade them to attend.⁵

b. On the other hand, being familiar with Soviet psychology, I must say that the leadership probably has serious concerns about the potential for harassment of their team and officials, and takes seriously the campaign by private organizations to lure their athletes away. They probably believe that many of these activities have official USG connivance.

c. Given this attitude, we might wish to consider two steps—which could be taken in early May—which might operate to alleviate some of the concerns:

(1) The President could write Chernenko assuring him that his Olympic team will be welcome and will be treated in full accord with principles of the Olympic Charter. The letter should be carefully drafted to avoid any implication that he is begging them to come, but I believe that such a message could have some effect on the Soviet decision, particularly if it were made public.⁶

(2) Word could be passed through Dobrynin that if any senior Soviet officials desire to attend the Olympics, we will be pleased to arrange appropriate invitations for them. This would imply that their counterparts here would invite them, and would also convey the implication that we do not plan to stage any “provocative” (in their eyes) actions which would embarrass them.

6. We should also consider carefully whether we should make one more effort to suggest an overall framework of interaction for the rest of the year. I could, for example, test such an idea with Zagladin in May. We would obviously have to think carefully what we put in it, but a package which should be attractive to them might include:

a. renewing START and INF negotiations along the lines Scowcroft was willing to discuss;

b. the CBMs/NUF trade-off at Stockholm;

c. submitting TTBT and PNET treates for ratification, subject to some further arrangements on verification; and

d. beginning negotiation of some aspects of ASAT (e.g., weapons directed at high orbital systems).

Such a package would go far to address those items on the Soviet agenda which are not prima facie pernicious. It should be clear, of course, that what we are suggesting is a package deal, and that the sequence will be important (e.g., we must get back to INF and START before there can be negotiations on any aspect of space systems).⁷

7. If we can do it, I believe an unofficial but authoritative proposal along these lines would get serious consideration. While the Soviets have to work themselves out of the policy corner where they have positioned themselves, I believe they recognize the President’s strength of leadership and, behind all their hurt feelings rhetoric, they would like nothing better than to demonstrate that they can deal with him. But Chernenko has to be able to argue that he is getting something, or else the charge that he is only helping the man who wants to do them in will prevail.

8. The idea of suggesting a meeting in Moscow of an interagency team from here to review the U.S.-Soviet agenda (and determine whether a Gromyko-Shultz meeting would be useful before the UN session in September) might be useful in this context. I understand that Rick Burt has suggested to Secretary Shultz that a team including Burt, Rodman, Perle and myself go to Moscow for a tour d’horizon and counterpart meetings. If accepted by the Soviets, such an effort might not only clarify Soviet intentions on some of the issues, and their willingness to consider a more forthcoming stance, but also would provide an opportunity for a private meeting with Zagladin where some of the issues could be pursued more directly and unofficially. (Alternatively, of course, there are other ways to arrange such a meeting if the Soviets desire one.)

Obviously, these matters require a good deal of thought, but I offer them now because I believe that if we are to move at all along these lines, it should be no later than sometime in May.⁸

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations April 1984 (2). Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Although the memorandum is uninitialed, McFarlane’s marginalia (see footnotes 3 through 8, below), indicate that he received it.
2. Malcolm Mackintosh was a prominent British Sovietologist during the Cold War era, who served in the Foreign Office and then continued to advise the government on the Soviet Union and intelligence matters after his retirement. It is unclear to which analysis Matlock was referring.
3. McFarlane wrote in the margin: “agree.”
4. McFarlane wrote below: “No.”
5. McFarlane wrote in the margin: “agree.”
6. McFarlane wrote in the margin: “agree.”
7. McFarlane wrote in the margin: “agree.”
8. McFarlane wrote at the end of the memorandum: “Jack—The Pres would benefit from an analysis of the internal personal political interplay going on in the Kremlin now as it affects foreign policy. Could you prepare that please working with whomever you think best. Bud.”