213. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan1
SUBJECT
- Sakharov Plans to Go on Hunger Strike
Elena Bonner, Sakharov’s wife, has left with our Embassy in Moscow several documents “to hold until her return”. They indicate that Sakharov had planned to begin a hunger strike April 13 and to request our Embassy to offer Mrs. Bonner temporary refuge during the hunger strike.2 His goal was to obtain a positive response to Mrs. Bonner’s longstanding request for permission to go abroad for medical treatment. A medical problem—phlebitis—apparently caused him to postpone the hunger strike. Mrs. Bonner is due back May 7 from Gorkiy, Sakharov’s city of exile, and there is a strong possibility that he will begin the hunger strike shortly thereafter.
A Sakharov hunger strike would receive enormous world attention. We would come under great pressure to grant Mrs. Bonner the refuge Sakharov requests, which would further complicate matters. It would [Page 774] be very difficult for the Soviets to give her exit permission while she was staying in our Embassy. Moreover, once having taken refuge in our Embassy, Mrs. Bonner would be unable to play a decisive role in seeking to end Sakharov’s hunger strike, and the life-threatening consequences would be even more acute. The major diplomatic confrontation that would ensue would very likely bring the rest of our dialogue to a standstill which, depending on the outcome, could endure for some time.
I think that the best chance for heading this off is for you to make a personal appeal to Chernenko to grant exit permission to Mrs. Bonner. She has been abroad twice before for medical treatment and there appears to be no problem such as state security which would keep her from going again. If we were able to tell Mrs. Bonner that such a private request had been made, we would have a good chance at persuading the Sakharovs not to undertake public steps, such as the hunger strike and request for refuge, which would undercut your efforts. A draft letter is attached for your consideration.3
- Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, April 16–30, 1984, Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by R.F. Smith; cleared by Simons, Palmer, and G. Matthews (HA). Smith initialed for Simons and Matthews. This drafting information appears on the covering action memorandum from Acting Assistant Secretary Kelly to Shultz. A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the covering memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. A typed note at the top of the covering memorandum reads: “Memo from Secretary to President LDX’d to White House on 4/18—2045 MVS.”↩
- In the covering action memorandum to Shultz forwarding this memorandum to Reagan, Kelly noted: “There is convincing evidence (Tab A) that Sakharov plans to go on a hunger strike soon and to request the U.S. government to provide temporary refuge for his wife.” Kelly attached at Tab A telegram 4699 from Moscow, in which the Embassy reported: “Before departing for Gor’kiy on April 12, Elena Bonner gave EmbOffs ‘for safe-keeping’ copies of three separate appeals drafted by Sakharov: one to Chernenko, one to the USG, and one to ‘friends the world over.’ In the appeals Sakharov announces the beginning of a hunger strike and asks, inter alia, that the USG grant Elena Bonner temporary refuge in the Embassy for the duration of the strike. The hunger strike, announced for April 13, was presumably delayed.” The telegram continued: “Bonner made it clear that she was not at this moment asking for any action on the appeals.” The Embassy warned: “There will be great public pressure for us to grant refuge should the hunger strike take place and Sakharov’s request be made public.” The summary concluded: “Given the current low ebb in our relations with the Soviets, we expect our involvement would be ineffectual, merely stiffening the Soviets’ resolve not to appear to give in to foreign pressure. The Soviets might welcome the prospect. As we observed during the prolonged stay of the Pentecostal families, to shift some of the public pressure from themselves to the United States, with Bonner’s presence here attributed more to a lack of will on our part than to Soviet intransigence, our inclination is to try to persuade Bonner, if she raises the issue, that our participation would not serve a useful purpose.”↩
- A signed copy of this letter was not found; it is unclear if it was sent.↩