Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

208. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Kelly) and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Howe) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, April 5, 1984

SUBJECT

• NSDD–137: U.S. Nuclear Arms Control Strategy for 1984

The White House has issued an NSDD² (attached) setting out the President’s decisions on our nuclear arms control strategy based on the March 27 NSC discussion.³ On the whole, the thrust of the NSDD is favorable to us and can be used to support our continuing efforts to move forward on START and other arms control issues.

Continuing Approaches to the Soviets: In an apparent bow to OSD, the NSDD cites several times the virtues of our current positions and states: “we will not compromise our principles by chasing expedient agreement.” At the same time, however, it also notes that we should “use every appropriate avenue to explore ways . . . to bridge the distance between the requirements of our principled positions and the legitimate concerns of the Soviet Union,” specifically citing trade-offs.

Priority Study of START/INF Options: To that end, the SACPG is directed not only to flesh out our current proposal, but to complete its evaluation of “options that could under certain conditions bridge [U.S.-Soviet] differences” by May 5. In this connection, the NSDD notes that while the previous arms control mistakes should not be repeated, “if elements of previous agreements put in the right context meet our needs, we should not ignore them”—an implicit rejection of the OSD argument that the Framework concepts of State, JCS and ACDA are too similar to SALT II.⁴

Chernenko Letter: A draft letter is requested for Presidential review by April 7; it is tasked in general terms to cite again the flexibility of our position, express our readiness to explore trade-offs, and replay our readiness for constructive dialogue on START/INF.

Other Arms Control Items: The NSDD states the draft CW treaty will be tabled before the end of the current CD round. It states ongoing work on nuclear testing, space-related issues and additional CBMs should be “brought to a timely conclusion.”

Protecting Against Disclosure: The NSDD emphasizes the need to protect the ongoing SACPG work from unauthorized disclosure, and, in this regard, states that Congressional testimony, consultations with our Allies, background statements to the press and public statements are to be cleared in advance through Bud McFarlane.

Public Affairs Handling: The President calls for intensified efforts to explain publicly the U.S. arms control record, setting an April 14 deadline for a detailed plan to do so (we would note in this regard, State already has underway a special arms control speakers’ course at FSI; you are, moreover, scheduled to give a major arms control address to the League of Women Voters in early June).

Coordination of the Administration Position: Finally, citing the need for “clarity and coherence,” you are designated as “the Administration’s chief spokesman on arms control.” Testimony and all major statements are to be cleared through McFarlane.

1. Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 2A, 1984 Arms and Arms Control, Mar.–May. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley; cleared by Gordon, Dobbins, and Dean. Brackets are in the original.
2. See Document 206.
3. See Document 203.
4. See Document 185.