—Poland and Afghanistan are briefly mentioned but nothing significant is said
about either situation.
On balance there is nothing new in the substance of the letter, which is
noteworthy only for its relatively non-polemical tone. Brezhnev could have opted to come back
hard. He clearly chose not to.
Attachment
Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Reagan
3
Dear Mr. President,
I carefully studied your letter of April 24. And I will tell you right
away of my appreciation of the frank expression of your views and
feelings as well as the principle directions of your Administration’s
foreign policy. It is in the same spirit of frankness that I want to
give you my reply believing that clarifying mutually the positions of
each other has an important significance in developing a dialogue
between us. This, as I understand, corresponds to your intentions
too.
[Page 161]
Your letter, regrettably, is based upon a general premise of the Soviet
Union being responsible for the tensions existing in the world. Such a
premise not only is at variance with the factual state of affairs, but
leads away from the real causes behind the current situation, and, thus,
can only make it more difficult to find ways to eliminate those causes
in order to remove the tensions.
All assertions concerning a Soviet military threat or our alleged search
for military superiority do not become any more convincing through
having them repeated. Aims and intentions which are not ours must not be
ascribed to us. After all, we set our goals ourselves. And we, for our
part, say in no uncertain terms: the Soviet Union did not have and has
no intentions to achieve military superiority. We have no need for
it.
Our actions in the field of assuring our country’s defense capability—and
we are doing nothing beyond that—have always been only a forced reaction
in response to the military programs carried out in the West. Indeed, it
is a generally recognized fact that every new spiral in the arms race
has been initiated by the United States. And what is typical is that
each time such thrusts were accompanied by vociferous outcries about the
“Soviet military threat”, about the US “lagging behind” on a particular
kind of weapon. True, it would be admitted later on in a whisper that no
“lagging behind” had in fact taken place, that someone, as it were, had
made a “wrong calculation”. But, by then, what was done was done, new
weapon systems had been deployed and the quantity of arms amassed had
been significantly increased. This is what the facts testify to, and,
indeed, they are accessible to everyone.
We are witnessing today an active propagation of the thesis that the
alleged “imbalance of forces” has occurred and that the USSR entertains some “sinister
intentions”. Your predecessors, however, including the President whom
you succeeded, recognized that there was a parity in the military area
between the USSR and the USA, between the East and the West. Does
it mean that all depends on who does the counting?
It is not in the Soviet Union at all that huge military budgets are being
adopted and programs are being started on an unprecedented scale to
produce new weapon systems, which does not only exceed the defense
requirements but reasonable limits in general. Again, it is not in the
USSR that demands are being made
to rescind agreements reached earlier on arms limitation, that the
intention is loudly proclaimed to surpass militarily all other states,
that a definite status is being given to doctrines envisaging the
possibility of delivering the first strike and waging “limited” wars
with the use of nuclear weapons. And that is precisely the way it
is.
Therefore, it is not our side that should be urged to exercise restraint.
The Soviet Union is not for the competition in armaments, [Page 162] nor is it for their endless
build-up. We stand for the preservation of the existing parity in the
military-strategic area, which is the most important guarantee of peace
and stability of all peoples, as well as for a gradual reduction of the
arms level on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security
of either side.
Nor is there any ground, Mr. President, to charge us with having the
intention to obtain some unilateral advantages anywhere in the world, to
call into doubt our commitment to the principles embodied in the UN Charter, in the Helsinki Final Act or in
the Basic Principles of Relations between the USSR and the USA. This simply does not square with the
facts.
The Soviet Union is resolutely against interference in the affairs of
other peoples, against imposing someone else’s will on them. But we are
also against anybody arrogating to himself such a right, and when
attempts to this effect take place we are invariably on the side of the
peoples who stand up for their own independence.
I will address myself briefly to certain specific questions raised in
your letter.
You speak positively of our consent to have the zone of application of
confidence-building measures in the military area substantially
expanded, to include also all of the European part of the USSR. However, the Western participants
of the Madrid meeting, including the USA, have up to now been evading
the answer to the question what they, for their part, are ready to do in
this connection on the basis of reciprocity.
It is to be hoped that the USA will take
a more constructive position at the Madrid meeting both on the question
of convening a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe
and on the other questions being discussed there, and that it will,
thereby, demonstrate its intention to reckon with the hopes of peoples
for the continuation and development of the process of strengthening
security and cooperation in Europe in accordance with the Final Act.
It is a matter of regret that the USA reacted negatively to our proposal
to place a moratorium on deployments of new medium-range nuclear missile
systems in Europe by the countries of the NATO and by the USSR.
References made in this respect to the necessity of deploying new
American medium-range missiles in Western Europe in order to off-set
some sort of “superiority” of the Soviet Union simply are not borne out
by the actual state of affairs. One might believe that there exist no
numerous American forward-based nuclear systems in Europe and near it
which are capable of reaching the territory of the USSR or that the nuclear weapons of the
US NATO allies have suddenly
disappeared. But all that is there, indeed, and we can in no way close
our eyes to it.
[Page 163]
The objective approach, the principle of equality and equal security
require that in making an analysis of the situation one should not limit
himself to any single type of weapon, but should see the nuclear
potentials in a comprehensive way. A true reflection of the factual
state of affairs can be found only in that approach. And this state of
affairs is such that the Soviet nuclear weapons in Europe do not exceed
the aggregate level of the nuclear systems of the NATO group and, therefore, there exists
now in Europe an approximate parity in the respective types of weapons.
The replacement by the Soviet Union of the old missiles by the
modernized ones has not changed the situation. Accordingly, the
moratorium that we propose would merely freeze the existing approximate
parity, making it easier to reach agreement on the ways to reduce the
level of that parity. We noted that on more than one occasion you
expressed yourself in favor of such a reduction.
We cannot view the US desire to station in any case its new missiles in
Western Europe as anything but the intention to disrupt the strategic
parity and to achieve superiority. It goes without saying that we will
have to react to it in a proper way. But wouldn’t it be worthwhile
giving a thought whether such a turn of events will reinforce anybody’s
security, including that of the USA? We are convinced it will not.
This is the reason why we call upon the US Administration and you
personally to weigh up again, realistically and with all factors in
mind, the developing situation and to take steps in order to open the
way toward achieving through negotiations an effective limitation and
reduction of nuclear arms in Europe. Given the will on both sides, it is
possible, I believe, to reach this goal.
A few words on Poland. It appears that some sinister plans on the part of
the USSR are perceived by Washington
in everything, and sometimes there is even talk on the possibility of
some “internal aggression” in Poland. A question is in order—what at all
is meant by the “internal aggression”? Is it possible, for example, that
the USA can commit an aggression
against itself?
Earlier I already expressed to you our position as well as our assessment
of the US behaviour with regard to Poland. It remains the same. The
United States must in no way interfere in the Polish domestic
affairs.
The United States stated on more than one occasion that it would not like
to see the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. It is, in fact, this idea with
regard to Afghanistan that is present in your letter too. But the Soviet
troops are there not just because we want it to be so. We repeated many
times that we would withdraw our limited military contingent, provided
the aggression against Afghanistan was ceased and a political settlement
of the international aspects of the Afghan problem was found. Should the
United States be really willing to facilitate such a [Page 164] development, it could certainly do much in
this direction. Mentioning the negative position of the Pakistan
leadership doesn’t change a thing. It is well known why Islamabad under
various artificial pretexts is now avoiding negotiations with Kabul.
Mr. President, in a detailed manner and in the spirit of frankness I have
laid down the thoughts which came to me in connection with your letter.
I believe this will be useful both for additional clarification of the
proposals that had been put forward in my letter of March 6 and for your
better understanding of the Soviet position on certain pressing
international issues, as well as on questions concerning the relations
between our countries.
I hope that our exchange of views as well as the discussions at other
levels will help find mutually acceptable solutions which would
constitute our common contribution to the strengthening of peace. In
this regard I take note of the assurances contained in your letter that
the United States is vitally interested in the peaceful resolution of
international tensions and that your Administration is prepared to
settle disagreements by negotiations.
Sincerely,
