Despite the above, however, the major impression I get from the letter is a
sense of substantial Soviet nervousness and concern. Brezhnev asks almost plaintively why we
continue to supply arms to Afghanistan insurgents and then reassures you
that the Soviets do not seek confrontation and do not wish to “infringe on
American legitimate interests.” The Soviet concern is for “honest and
constructive negotiations” with [Page 154]
the West that will remove outstanding issues. He ends with an almost open
appeal for a face-to-face meeting with you.
In sum, while the letter offers nothing new or startling, it is markedly
different in tone from earlier Brezhnev communications and, to me at least, demonstrates a
substantial lack of Soviet confidence.
I replied that it was important to understand that there are limits to
Israeli patience, particularly when they watch the build-up of Syrian forces
in Syria itself.
Moving on to the more general question of negotiations between the U.S. and
the USSR, Dobrynin said that Moscow was prepared to negotiate on
specific issues such as Cuba, Africa, Afghanistan, arms control, and trade
whenever the U.S. wishes, but that Moscow could not accept the concept of
linkage. It is unacceptable to the USSR to
be told that the U.S. is unwilling to begin discussions with the Soviets in
one area until they correct their conduct in some other, unrelated, area. I
replied that linkage was a fact of life, and that we could not sit by while
the Soviets and Cubans continued to pump arms into Nicaragua as if these
Russian activities were of no importance to us. The Soviets must expect that
such activities would inevitably affect our attitude toward
negotiations.
Attachment
Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Reagan3
Dear Mr. President,
I gave a careful thought to your personal letter to me and want to
respond to it in the same personal and frank manner.
Just as you do, I recall our brief conversation at the reception given by
President R. Nixon at “Casa Pacifica” in June 1973. Today, as we did at
that time, all Soviet leadership and I commit our hearts and minds to
realization of hopes and aspirations of all the peoples of the world for
peace, quiet life and confidence in their future.
At the recent congress of our Party it was with all due emphasis stressed
once again that not war preparations that doom the peoples to a
senseless squandering of their material and spiritual wealth, but
preservation and consolidation of peace, and, thereby, implementation of
the foremost right of every man—a right to live that is the clue to the
future.
I noted that, recalling the year of 1973 you indicated that peace and
good will among men never had seemed closer at hand.
And, indeed, precisely in those years our two countries took the path of
reaching agreements which marked a radical turn for the better not only
in Soviet-American relations but in the international situation as a
whole. Those were the years when the USSR and the USA actively
and not without success set about to solve the task of limiting arms,
first of all strategic arms, when they started seeking in common
solutions to acute international problems, when mutually beneficial
bilateral ties and cooperation between our countries in a variety of
fields were developing fruitfully.
Why then did hitches begin to appear in that process, why did it pause
and even find itself set back? To answer this question correctly one
thing is necessary—to take an objective, non-biased look at the course
of events.
And then, Mr. President, we shall recall, that even at that time when
Soviet-American relations were developing upward voices resounded in the
United States of those who did not like such a development and who
stubbornly tried to slow down and disrupt this process. And further on,
their efforts became ever more active. Those were the [Page 156] efforts that were pulling back to
confrontation, efforts embodied in quite a number of concrete steps
directly aimed against the improvement of relations between the USSR and the USA, against the relaxation of international tension. On
the contrary, nothing of the sort was taking place in the Soviet
Union.
We have differencies of opinion between us of philosophical and
ideological nature, and it could not be otherwise. But when it comes to
the events of international life—whether pertaining to the present day,
to the recent or more distant past—then an objective approach is not
only possible, but necessary. Otherwise it is easy to misstep and to
plunge into serious errors.
Here, for example, it is said in your letter that after the Second World
War the USA had a capability to
dominate the world, but, deliberately, as it were, made no use of that
capability. Let me say it straight away, it is hard to find many people
among those who are familiar with that time through their own experience
or who have seriously studied it, that would share such an
affirmation.
Actually, the USA did the maximum it
could using a wide array of military, political, and economic means to
achieve what American leaders themselves called “Pax Americana”, in
other words, to restructure the world the way the United States wanted
it to be. But this proved to be beyond its possibilities—and this is the
way it was. Even the posession during a certain period of time of what
you call “the ultimate weapon” didn’t make the USA omnipotent.
To follow your logic, we, in our turn, could have said that after the
defeat of the Hitler Germany and, incidentally, even before the American
atomic bomb emerged, the Soviet Union was in a position to do much of
what it didn’t do being guided by its principled convictions, true to
its word and respecting its allied commitments. However I wouldn’t like
to go deeper into this subject now and to discuss events that didn’t
take place.
You are saying that the policy of the USA has never constituted a threat to anyone else’s
security. Let us go back to the facts again. Hardly three years passed
after the end of the war when the USA
set about to create the NATO—a closed
military block. One would wonder what the need for it was. After all,
facist Germany had been routed and militarist Japan—destroyed. The keys
to peace were in the hands of the allied powers of the Anti-Hitler
coalition. Who was the target of the military block of NATO and the numerous overseas American
bases? No secret was ever made in the USA who all that was directed against.
You made mention of the post-war American economic assistance programs.
The USA did really give assistance. But
who was the recipient? It was only those countries which chose to submit
their policy to [Page 157] foreign
interests. On the contrary, the states belonging to a different social
system, and, indeed, generally the peoples which did not agree to submit
their policy to outside diktat did not receive the American assistance.
That is how the matters stood. In essence that is precisely how they
stand at the present time.
If we are to take the most recent years, when after a period of ascent
the relations between our countries began to deteriorate and deteriorate
sharply, it is known that the lion’s share was contributed to that by
the Carter administration. That
was done consciously and purposefully, but in the final analysis, let us
be frank, it brought no laurels to Carter. Isn’t it so, Mr. President?
However, for some reason or other, the new US administration too has
decided to continue on the same path. Try, Mr. President, to see what is
going on through our eyes. Attempts are being made to revitalize the
USA-made military and political
alliances, new bases are being added to those which already exist
thousands of kilometers away from the USA and aimed against our country, the American military
presence abroad in general is being increased and expanded, large areas
of the world are being declared spheres of “vital interests” of the
USA. Nobody even asks if the
peoples inhabiting those areas wish to be under the patronage of other
countries. Attempts are made to tell some other peoples what to do with
their natural resources, threatening them otherwise with all kinds of
punitive actions.
For all their differences, however, the peoples have the same right to be
masters of their own destiny. There should be no double standards in
this respect. One must not believe that if something is good for the
USA then it has also to be good for
others. After all, is it good, for instance, for the average American
family, not to mention the family of a peaceful Afghan peasant, when the
intention is openly announced in Washington to go on with supplying arms
to the bands carrying out incursions into the Afghanistan territory from
the outside?
It is not for the sake of polemics that I am sharing my thoughts with
you, Mr. President. I would like them, on the one hand, to give you a
better understanding of what actually constitutes the policy of the
Soviet Union, and, on the other hand, to help clarify how we and indeed,
others as well, perceive certain actions of the USA, especially those of recent time.
The main idea, though, that I would like to convey through my letter is
that we do not seek confrontation with the USA or infringe upon American legitimate interests. What we
seek is different—we wish peace, cooperation, a sense of mutual trust,
and benevolence between the Soviet Union and the United States of
America. Guided by this sincere desire we propose now to the USA and other Western countries honest and
constructive negotiations, as well as a search for [Page 158] mutually acceptable solutions of
practically all major questions existing between us—be it restraining of
the arms race, elimination of most dangerous sources of tension in
various areas of the world, or measures for confidence building and
developing a mutually beneficial cooperation. These proposals of ours
contain no ruse or any ulterior motives. And I would like you to accept
them precisely in this way and with no bias.
Thus our policy is a policy of peace. We will never set up the fire of
war. You know very well, as we do, what such a fire would lead to. I
would want to believe in the wisdom of your people, in your personal
wisdom also not to allow anything that would push the world towards a
catastrophe.
These are some of the general considerations which I wanted to convey to
you, Mr. President, in connection with your letter. Maybe it was not
possible to express everything in sufficient detail. An exchange of
correspondence has its limitations, and in this sense a private
conversation is better. In this regard, concerning the possible meeting
between us, I would like to say that it is also my view that such a
meeting should be well prepared. We could yet return to the question of
its timing, I believe, at a moment acceptable to both of us.
Sincerely,
