61. Memorandum From the Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence (Bowie)1
Washington, September 29, 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR
- Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
- Director, Intelligence & Research, Department of State
- Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security
Affairs
- Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT
- Presidential Intelligence Priorities
1. Under the Presidential decision and Executive Order,2 the main
formal mechanism for the policy-makers to define their needs for
intelligence will be the Policy Review Committee. Hence, in developing
priorities, it is useful to ask how the PRC can best express its interests to the Intelligence
Community. It will wish to make sure that the Intelligence Community
devotes itself not only to furnishing information of immediate policy
concern, but also to providing the basic research on issues that will be
of continuing policy concern over extended periods of time.
Consequently, I have concluded that the Policy Review Committee might
well adopt a two-tiered approach to developing intelligence
priorities.
2. The sample list of broad topics of basic long-term interest (Tab A) is
intended to guide our long-range efforts in analysis and collection, and
point the way to more specific topics for basic National Intelligence
Estimates. This list would probably change only gradually over time, but
it should receive regular review to ensure that it always accurately
reflected major concerns.
3. Tab B is a sample list of issues of immediate interest. Many of these
issues are, in fact, subsets of the more basic topics in Tab A. I would
expect that the Policy Review Committee would review this listing at
regular intervals—perhaps every other month—with a view to ensuring that
it is up to date and, further, that it take into account planned policy
initiatives and expected developments that might generate needs for
intelligence.
4. I am submitting these lists as the basis for discussion at our next
meeting. We can then discuss the usefulness of the proposed approach
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as well as the substance of
the lists themselves, which, if approved by the PRC, would be sent to the agencies of the Intelligence
Community for translating into specific intelligence requirements.
Tab A
List Prepared in the Central Intelligence
Agency4
Washington, undated
National Intelligence Topics of Basic Long-Term
Interest
I. Advanced Countries [less than 1 line not
declassified]
—economic conditions and prospects
—trade
—political and social trends
—cohesion of NATO
—foreign policy issues
II. The USSR and Eastern Europe
—Soviet foreign policy
—Soviet military capabilities and intentions
—strategic arms reduction
—advanced technology
—Soviet economic prospects
—trends and stability in Eastern Europe
—Communist activities in the Third World
III. China
—Sino-Soviet relations
—economic and political prospects
—prospects for U.S./PRC
normalization of relations
—military capabilities and intentions
—foreign policy
IV. Key Developing Countries [1 line not
declassified]
—industrial and resource development
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—economic policy
—foreign policy objectives
—domestic instability
—indigenous military capabilities
V. Less Developed Countries
—economic progress and prospects
—agricultural and infrastructure development
—domestic political stability
—foreign policy interests and priorities
—role in North-South debate
VI. Global Issues
—human rights
—nuclear proliferation
—energy
—arms transfers
—technology transfer
—transnational terrorism
—food and population prospects
—resources
—environment
VII. Strategic Areas of Continuing Concern
—Middle East
—Korea
—Greece/Turkey
—Southern Africa
Tab B
List Prepared in the Central Intelligence
Agency5
Washington, undated
Critical Issues of Immediate Interest
I. USSR
A. Soviet assessments of the U.S. (including assessments such as
SALT proposals).
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B. Soviet economic prospects.
C. Leadership after Brezhnev.
D. Critical issues affecting future strategic balance.
(1) Soviet ASW capability.
(2) Soviet ASAT capabilities, and
significance as warning.
(3) Soviet defense capability against bombers, SRAMs and cruise
missiles.
(4) Soviet progress in advanced technologies crucial to developing
weapon systems.
E. Soviet capability for sustained combat
operations in a prolonged
NATO-Pact conflict.
F. Soviet and Pact chemical warfare capabilities.
G. Warning times associated with Soviet options for initiating war in
Europe.
H. Soviet capabilities against SLOCs.
II. PRC
A. Chinese policies to U.S.
B. Trends in Sino-Soviet state relations.
C. Chinese military capabilities and intentions against Taiwan.
III. Western Europe
A. Prospects for the 1978 elections in France and implications.
B. Evolving PCI role in Italian
politics.
C. Turkish policy toward Cyprus.
IV. Middle East and South Asia
A. Prospects for restoration of political stability in Pakistan.
B. Probable Arab and Israeli strategies toward settlement and if
current peace efforts collapse.
C. The viability of the Sadat government.
D. [1 line not declassified]
V. Africa
A. Evolution of the Rhodesian problem.
B. Prospects in South Africa.
C. Ethiopia-Somalia hostilities.
D. Conflict in Angola and Zaire.
VI. East Asia-Pacific
A. Indications of North Korea’s priorities, internal and
external.
B. Instability in South Korea.
C. The Philippines’ view of its relationship with the U.S.
D. Prospects in Taiwan.
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E. Japan’s evolving view of its international role.
VIII. Latin America
A. Cuban objectives vis-a-vis the U.S.
B. Panamanian developments affecting the Canal treaty.
IX. Economics
A. Potential threats to oil sufficiency: [less than
1 line not declassified] production shortfalls.
B. Trade imbalances and trends toward protectionism.
X. Nuclear Proliferation
A. South Africa’s nuclear strategy.
B. Nuclear policy and plans [less than 1 line not
declassified].
C. [less than 1 line not declassified] uranium
export policy.
