47. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting1


  • PRM/NSC–11—Intelligence Structure and Mission


  • The Vice President
  • A. Denis Clift
  • Fritz Schwarz
  • State

    • Warren Christopher
    • Harold Saunders
    • Herbert Hansell
  • Defense

    • Secretary Brown
    • Charles W. Duncan
    • David E. McGiffert
    • Deanne Seimer
    • Lt. General William Y. Smith
  • CIA

    • Admiral Stansfield Turner
    • James Taylor
  • OMB

    • James McIntyre
    • Edward R. Jayne
  • Justice

    • Attorney General Bell
    • Frederick Baron
    • John Harmon
  • NSC

    • Zbigniew Brzezinski
    • David Aaron
    • Samuel M. Hoskinson
    • Robert A. Rosenberg


The first meeting of the full SCC on PRM/NSC–11, Intelligence Structure and Mission focused on the Part III Study, and in particular, on Section III of the report “Structural Options.”2

Both Harold Brown and the Attorney General’s Subcommittee (Part I) had recommended an early start in our inter-relationship with the Congress, first with those pieces of charter legislation concerned with safeguards against abuse. The SCC consensus was that the Administration’s own thinking was most advanced in this area and this was a proper course of action. The Vice President added that his own discussions with Senator Inouye were along the same lines; that his committee is most concerned with first addressing safeguard legislation.

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The SCC then approved the establishment of a senior working-level Coordinating Committee chaired by David Aaron to bring to the point of decision the work done on non-structural problems such as:

—The overseas counterpart of the domestic foreign intelligence electronic surveillance bill

—Foreign intelligence physical search legislation

—Restrictions on covert action and clandestine collection

—Oversight mechanisms

—Counterintelligence activities.

There was substantial deliberation over the eight structural options, focused on resource management, line authority, consumer requirements, tasking, production and accountability.

The debate resulted in a consensus that there are really somewhere between two to four realistic options to pursue in a follow-on meeting.

Harold Brown favors an option that essentially modifies E.O. 11905 by enhancing PRC(I) and DCI resource management authority by removing ambiguities.

Stan Turner supports a complete restructure of the intelligence community (except departmental analysis) under line, resource management and tasking authority of a “Director of Foreign Intelligence.”

Warren Christopher agreed with Stan Turner’s approach generally except that he proposed establishment of a “Board of Directors” to which Stan Turner reports for review, guidance, and approval.

—The consideration of a “Consumers Union,” chaired by the National Security Advisor, that would establish intelligence collection and production requirements and priorities was proposed. This would provide a means to assure that consumers, rather than the intelligence community, set the needs from [for] intelligence.

It was agreed that these options should be further developed for consideration by the SCC during the week of 20 June prior to presentation to the President.

It was also agreed to develop a third option which, in addition to incorporating some of the above features, would be based upon concern for improving the quality of intelligence—in particular, political intelligence—as well as one which would focus on strict control of the clandestine service.3

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 91M00696R: Subject Policy Files, Box 2, Folder 1: PRM–11. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
  2. See Document 41.
  3. Brzezinski initialed below this final paragraph.