Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy

19. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, February 24, 1979

SUBJECT

• NSC Weekly Report #89

I. Opinion

Foreign Policy: Tone and Orchestration

You confront a paradox: everyone who has met with you, whether it be mass media dinner guests or participants in the Congressional foreign policy briefings, afterwards invariably say how immensely impressed they were by your mastery of foreign policy, by your knowledge of details, and by your ability to relate that knowledge to a broad vision. Just last night I was told that Mrs. Reston² commented after a dinner with you that she cannot recall any President who could match you in that regard. After one of the Congressional briefings, Tip O’Neill said that no one can have the slightest doubt that you are not only fully in charge of foreign policy but that you have a clear and coherent picture as to where this country ought to be heading.

Yet at the same time, it is a fact that both abroad and increasingly at home the United States is seen as indecisive, vacillating, and pursuing a policy of acquiescence. We are perceived as neither responding effectively to Soviet assertiveness and as unable to generate a broad strategy that is relevant to the times.

Why this incongruity?

Part of the answer, I suppose, is to be found in what you said at the State Department the other day:³ we live in a complex age, and complexity does not lend itself to simple explanations. We can no longer color the world in shades of black and white, and we can no longer reduce challenges to a single phenomenon, be it Hitlerism or Stalinism. However, I suspect that part of the problem is also to be located on a less philosophical plane, with some of it related to tone and orchestration.

For example, I think a genuine problem has been created by the press’s fascination, exploitation and magnification of the so-called Vance-Brzezinski rivalry. To be sure, some differences do exist and you are not only aware of them, but, as you have often said, you do want divergent viewpoints presented to you. At the same time, the fact is that on most matters Cy and I are in basic agreement, and there has been no underhanded maneuvering to have one’s point of view prevail.

As one looks back on previous administrations, one can note similar divergences, and in the case of FDR they were certainly much wider philosophically and more intense. The real difference is that FDR was seen as orchestrating and deliberately exploiting such differences whereas the press is now creating the impression that you are buffeted by them. You know and we know that this is not so, but it is the perception that is damaging.

Accordingly, it would be very useful if you took some deliberate steps to demonstrate that you are exploiting the differences while pursuing a steady course. Schram in a recent story asserted that this is exactly what you are doing and it was the first positive expression of that view.⁴

One way to achieve that objective would be to use Cy soon and visibly in relationship to China, and to use me in some fashion in relationship to the Soviet Union. For example, you told Deng that the United States and China should have regular consultations. When the crisis in Indochina is over,⁵ it would be useful for Cy and some of his top assistants to go to Peking at your direction to engage in high-level discussions. Similarly, it might be useful, and domestically even appealing, to have me spend a couple of days in Moscow in consultations with the Soviets on issues of common concern, perhaps with my counterpart who works for Brezhnev. This could be in preparation for the Summit.⁶

With reference to the latter, I should note that we really have not had sustained and truly tough-minded “consultations” with the Soviets since you took office. Most of Cy’s sessions have been primarily negotiating ones, and I suspect that some of the misunderstandings that exist are due to suspicions that have become more intense. Kissinger, even while bombing Hanoi, did engage in such forthright consultations with the Soviets and they were mutually helpful in defining more precisely the limits of what is tolerable and what is not. At the minimum, I would suggest engaging in some soul searching with Dobrynin here on the basis of guidance cleared by you and Cy.

In addition, it might be useful for Cy to give a foreign policy speech in which he would stress some of the themes that you have recently expressed: the importance of power, and our recognition that relations with the Soviet Union may require from time to time a forceful American reaffirmation of our interests (e.g., in relationship to Iran, or peace in the Far East, or the Soviet military buildup). I am scheduled to give a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations in Chicago some time in late March or early April and my plan is to use it, subject to your approval, for a strong defense on SALT and for an explanation of its importance to our overall foreign policy.⁷

There may be other ways in which orchestration by you could be symbolically expressed, but I have the feeling that some initiatives along the lines suggested above are needed.

Finally, I attach a page from Nixon’s memoirs which is very suggestive.⁸ If we can combine a Camp David success with a wider Middle East regional security initiative and a comprehensive energy initiative, we might generate genuine momentum that would be politically significant.

2. National Security Affairs Calendar (see Tab A)⁹

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 42, Weekly Reports [to the President], 82–90: [12/78–3/79]. Secret. A handwritten “C” indicates that Carter saw the memorandum. Also printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 113.
2. A reference to Sally Reston, wife of James “Scotty” Reston, a New York Times journalist. Carter wrote “good idea” followed by a downward pointing arrow in the margin adjacent to this sentence.
3. A reference to Carter’s remarks at a foreign policy conference at the Department of State for editors and broadcasters on February 22. For the text, see Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, pp. 310–312.
4. A presumable reference to Martin Schram’s February 8 article in the Washington Post, “China Policy: A Born-Again Brzezinski,” p. A1.
5. A reference to Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea on December 25, 1978. The invasion resulted in the removal of the Khmer Rouge, but Vietnam remained in Kampuchea after the invasion as an occupying force.
6. Neither of these proposed consultations took place. The Summit is a reference to Carter’s meetings with Brezhnev in Vienna June 14–18.
7. Brzezinski made a speech on April 4 to the Chicago Committee of the Council on Foreign Relations. For the text, see the Department of State Bulletin, May 1979, pp. 48–51.
8. Not found attached.
9. Not found attached.