114. Memorandum From John Renner of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen)1
SUBJECT
- Organization of the Administration
The making and implementing of US international economic policy is floundering. Policy lines are not clear. Responsibilities are diffuse. Operations are confused. The Administration is not effective in its dealings with the Congress, the public, or foreign governments. Serious criticism of the Administration’s way of doing business is pervasive.
This is so primarily because no one below the President is coordinating the Administration’s effort, and the President is too busy to get involved in any other than the most important and most pressing issues. The EPG is not effective; it has neither the Presidential backing nor the staff to keep the various Departments in line. Strauss has his [Page 477] hands full with the trade negotiations,2 jaw-boning, and fire-fighting. CEA focuses mainly on macro-economic issues. State is influential on some issues but not on others. The NSC has neither the mandate nor the staff to coordinate international economic policy across the board. DPS frequently involves itself in predominantly international issues but its interests and competence are primarily domestic.
Issues that go to the President for decision frequently are neither rigorously thought through nor systematically presented. The President often is not exposed to the multiplicity of advice and the vigorous exchange of views he needs to make good decisions.
Issues that do not go to the President are resolved either incompletely or not at all. As a consequence infighting is rampant and the Administration moves in many directions simultaneously.
The President deserves better support. I see two types of solutions:
1. The President could designate a Cabinet officer as his principal assistant and spokesman on international economic issues.
2. Or the President could establish an international economic staff in the White House and appoint a director of this staff with the responsibility of coordinating the efforts of the various Departments involved in making and implementing international economic policy.
Either solution could work satisfactorily if the person designated had the President’s full support and a small, knowledgeable, and disciplined staff to ensure follow up. Neither would work if these elements were missing.
My preference would be for the second solution. I think the government functions better when operational and staff functions are kept separate. An international economic staff in the White House could devote full time and effort to serving the President without being distracted by the operational responsibilities of a line Department. Also I think this solution would fit better into President Carter’s method of operation. He appears to want several contending voices under him and might not be willing to delegate great power to a single spokesman. But I imagine he would welcome the more coordinated effort by his Administration that an international economic staff in the White House would bring about.
I am aware of the fate of previous efforts to improve the economic policy making process and recognize the obstacles that would have to be overcome. Nonetheless, I think that it is essential to try to persuade the President to make fundamental changes in the way international economic policy is made and implemented.
[Page 478]If you agree that we should move in this direction, I will prepare a fuller analysis and present alternatives for the President to consider.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Box 59, Administration’s Policy/General, 1978. Administratively Confidential. Sent for information.↩
- Reference to the on going Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations under the GATT that began in 1973.↩