Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

92. Memorandum Prepared by the Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany (Stoessel)¹

Bonn, March 30, 1977

CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT’S COMMENTS ON US-FRG RELATIONS

In the course of my long meeting with Chancellor Schmidt March 29 he discussed a number of topics, most of which have already been reported.² However, he talked in some detail about US–FRG relations, requesting me not to report his comments by cable but to brief the Secretary orally about them.³ Schmidt asked the notetaker from his office to prepare a report of our conversation in single copy only for him, and he said he would brief Foreign Minister Genscher orally on the talk.

Schmidt said he was deeply concerned about the state of our relationship. The problem about the FRG–Brazil deal was difficult enough, but if this were the only outstanding issue it would not be so bad. However, there has been a cumulation of things which are clouding the relationship and which disturbed him greatly. As examples, he mentioned:

— FRG Economic Policy. Schmidt feels he is getting entirely too much public advice and pressure from US Administration officials concerning what he should do about the FRG’s economy. While economic policy matters are legitimate subjects for confidential talks at the Summit or directly between government leaders, he strongly resents the amount of public comment in the US regarding the FRG situation. The FRG, after all, is a big economy which, all things considered, is not doing so badly, and which has been helpful to its neighbors and other countries. He is firmly opposed to moves toward “reflation” and the US should understand this.

— Berlin. Schmidt was shocked by the unilateral US action, taken without any notice whatsoever, to terminate SOFO activities.⁴ This is a matter of vital concern to the security of West Berlin and the FRG; he finds it incomprehensible that this move was taken without consultation.

— Human Rights. Schmidt is concerned by the public pronouncements of the President and by the actions he has taken, such as the letter to Sakharov and the reception of Bukovski.⁵ There has been no consultation with the FRG about these matters, although Schmidt personally feels that he is under pressure because of them. He did not really want Amalrik to be received by State Secretary Wischnewski,⁶ but he felt he had no choice in view of what President Carter had done. The continued emigration of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe is essential, and Schmidt does not want to endanger this. He also remarked that Giscard has been put in a very awkward position by the President’s actions.

Schmidt said these points were illustrative only and he could cite others. He was prepared to believe that many of the current problems resulted from a new administration in Washington and that, by the end of the year, things hopefully will have settled down. However, he is concerned by the psychological damage which could be done in the meantime in terms of the attitude of people in the FRG toward the US and the alliance.

At times pounding the table and speaking in loud tones, Schmidt said he had to tell me that in all the 12 years he had been in high office in the FRG he had never been so irritated and concerned as he is now about relations with the US.

He stressed that his own inclinations and those of all leading political figures in the FRG are favorable to working with the US. Also, he considers that the alliance between the US and the FRG is and must continue to be the central, vital element of FRG foreign policy. Given developments in the last few months, however (and here he had in mind US attitudes on the Brazil deal and nuclear energy questions in general as well as the points made above), Schmidt said he could only hope that the US Government shared this dedication to our relationship.

1. Source: Department of State, Stoessel Papers, Lot 82D307, Box 3, Ambassador, Chron: Memos for the Record, 1976–77. Secret; Sensitive.
2. In telegrams 5882, 5883, 5884, and 5885, March 29, Stoessel reported Schmidt’s comments on economic assistance to Portugal, SOFO operations in Berlin, the FRG-Brazil nuclear deal, and Carter’s forthcoming statement on nuclear policy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840084–2220 and N770002–0268, P840084–2218 and N770002–0269, P840084–2213 and N770002–0272, and P840084–2207 and N770002–0274)
3. No record of an oral briefing for Vance has been found. However, in telegram 5600 from Bonn, March 30, Stoessel sent Vance a report on Schmidt’s attitudes, noting: “He appears alternately frustrated, perplexed and irritated by problems that are in many respects more sobering than any that he has confronted since his assumption of office.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N770002–0302)
4. On January 29, Brown had ordered a suspension of SOFO activities; on March 30, Carter directed that operations be reinstated. See Documents 90, 93, and 94.
5. Reference is to Carter’s February 5 letter to Soviet dissident Andrei D. Sakharov and Carter and Mondale’s March 1 meetings with Soviet dissident Vladimir K. Bukovsky. (Christopher S. Wren, “Sakharov Receives Carter Letter Affirming Commitment on Rights,” New York Times, February 18, 1977, p. 3 and Bernard Gwertzman, “Carter and Mondale See Bukovsky, a Soviet Dissident,” New York Times, March 2, 1977, p. 1)
6. On March 4, Wischnewski met at the Politischer Klub in Bonn with Andrei Amalrik, Soviet writer and dissident. (Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPBD) 1977, Document 414, note 4)