Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

91. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 14, 1977, 2:40–3:40 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany
• Berndt von Staden, German Ambassador
• Guenther von Well, Foreign Office Political Director, FRG
• Heinz Weber, German Embassy (Interpreter)
• President Carter
• Vice President Mondale
• Secretary of State Vance
• Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Gregory F. Treverton, NSC Staff

The President, agreeing with the Foreign Minister that any differences between the United States and the Federal Republic would be resolved in an air of partnership, made the following specific points:

— Non-Proliferation. The United States is concerned over the proliferation of reprocessing capabilities. We recognize the necessity of multilateral solutions which will diminish the danger of particular agreements being abrogated, and we ourselves are prepared to do more than we have in the past.

— Portugal. The United States feels very strongly that Portugal must be helped soon through the consortium; we have pledged $550 million ourselves. The President indicated that he had written Chancellor Schmidt about the consortium and hoped for a favorable response.² He understood that Germany thought less money than provided in the consortium might be required but suggested that if that position is not strongly held, Bonn might accommodate us.

— Economic Stimulation. The President repeated his feeling that one percent of GNP is the appropriate amount of stimulation for the major Western economies, and said he thought Germany had been reluctant.

— London Summit. The President looked forward to meeting Chancellor Schmidt in London, and he indicated his plan to attend the first day of the NATO meeting.³

— AWACS and Tanks. The President said the United States wanted the Federal Republic to participate in an effective program to monitor NATO air space. He emphasized how far the United States had gone in keeping AWACS alive so it might be a NATO program. He suggested, frankly, that it should be considered on its merits by the Federal Republic, not combined with negotiation of tanks. He cited recent difficulties with joint tank programs and indicated that we want to live up to our part of the bargain.⁴

The Foreign Minister responded point-by-point:

— Non-Proliferation. The Foreign Minister stressed his government’s historic commitment to non-proliferation, and he mentioned the importance of incorporating the so-called threshold countries into the London group in order to sustain the credibility of the non-proliferation goal. He indicated that his government will fulfill its agreement with Brazil and suggested that the more certain Brazil is of that, the greater will be Brazil’s willingness to abide by multilateral restraints. He stressed his government’s intention to cooperate and to continue the Christopher–Hermes conversations.⁵

He asked what the United States regarded as the most sensitive portion of the agreement—the transfer of blueprints or the actual transfer of hardware which would occur only several years hence. Secretary Vance indicated that any transfer at this sensitive time would be counter productive, but the Foreign Minister asked the United States to look into the question again. He noted that Germany can be more flexible if it is not perceived to be under United States pressure. The Vice President suggested that it might be possible to transfer only blueprints for non-sensitive aspects of facilities.

The President said that to the extent transfer of blueprints can be delayed, that would be a great help. We will make special efforts to indicate that we trust Brazil and regard non-proliferation as a worldwide problem. We do not distrust any nation, but we do not want to add another country to the list of those that can explode bombs.

— Portugal. The Foreign Minister agreed that the success of the Soares government is critical. The difficulty is finding a way to implement our common desire to help Portugal. He indicated his government wants Portugal (and Spain) to be members of the EC. He stressed the role of the EC as a political instrument and emphasized the importance to the United States of having a strong, united Europe.

— London Summit. The Foreign Minister welcomed the President’s desire to participate in the NATO meeting in London and was certain that Schmidt and other heads of government would attend.

The President stressed his desire to cooperate with the Federal Republic and make common front with it whenever possible. Secretary Vance will report fully on his conversations in Moscow.⁶ The Foreign Minister noted that the Secretary had agreed to raise the issue of Berlin while in Moscow.

The President indicated the United States commitment to human rights and its desire to cooperate closely with the Europeans during CSCE follow-up, so that the results will be useful. He indicated that the United States did not seek to make Belgrade⁷ a confrontation with the Soviet Union or anyone else. The Foreign Minister said he regarded it important to keep the multilateral process of detente going, not to treat Belgrade as an end point.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 35, Memcons: President: 3/77. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Genscher visited Washington on March 13–14 for talks with U.S. officials.
2. In a March 5 letter to Schmidt, Carter encouraged the West German Government to contribute to a planned $1.5 billion consortium loan to meet Portugal’s projected balance-of-payments shortfall. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 65, Portugal: 1–4/77)
3. For Carter’s May 7 meeting with Schmidt in London, see Document 6. For Carter’s participation in the London G–7 and NAC meetings, see Document 7.
4. According to an undated Department of State briefing paper for this meeting, FRGs concerns included the Defense Department’s decision to produce a new main battle tank without the standardization of components that had previously been agreed, and in particular the delay of consideration of a West German tank gun. Some West German political leaders suggested that the FRG further postpone its long-delayed decision to commit funding for AWACS. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 24, German Federal Republic: 1–3/77)
5. Reference is to consultations on the West German-Brazilian nuclear cooperation agreement, under which West Germany had agreed to supply Brazil with enrichment and reprocessing technology that would allow Brazil to produce highly-enriched uranium. The consultations were led by Christopher and Hermes and began in Washington on February 10–11 and continued in Bonn on March 10. (Telegram 32301 to Bonn and Paris, February 12, and telegram 4365 from Bonn, March 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840086–0619, N770001–0505 and D770084–0525)
6. Telegrams 5766 from Bonn, March 31 and Secto 3077 from London, April 1, reported on Vance’s March 31 meetings with Schmidt and Genscher. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N770002–0341 and P850050–2334, N770002–0356 and P840076–0326)
7. See footnote 3, Document 1.