Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

123. Memorandum From William Griffith of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, October 19, 1979

SUBJECT

• How to Deal with the Germans

The more I think, the more disturbed I have become about our talk on this subject yesterday at lunch. Not because of the specific incident last weekend,² but because of your remarks re how to deal with the Germans.

I think that past and present history demonstrates that you are wrong.

(1) “Whipping” them was substantially the French and British policy, especially re reparations, toward the Weimar Republic, only to make all the concessions later to Hitler. Had they made them to Weimar, it might well have lasted.

(2) Bonn is not Weimar. The FRG today is stronger economically in some respects than we are, and we can no longer carry out an international economic policy against the will of Bonn and Tokyo.³

(3) Schmidt, with all his faults, is the best chancellor since Adenauer, a disillusioned admirer of the USA, and much less likely than Strauss to flirt with Moscow.

(4) Bonn’s sentiment against the Administration is roughly what U.S. polls show.

(5) Moscow, with the Brezhnev speech,⁴ has begun its most sophisticated offensive against the FRG and its relationship with us (to split the SPD and then us from it) since Stalin’s 1952 offer. And Schmidt seems to be holding firm. (See his interview with Radio Hesse attached at TAB B.)⁵

More Information

Karl Kaiser just called from Bonn to say that his bosses feel (as you did) that a talk by you there now might be more risky than helpful.⁶ Since this is what you originally feared, and since you have now decided not to talk there anyway, I recommend that you forget about this aspect.⁷

He also said that Wehner and Bahr are back on the TNF bandwagon. This confirms what I have heard.

I have had general discussions on these issues with Smyser (the first-rate ex-Counsellor in Bonn) and [less than 1 line not declassified] (the excellent CIA analyst on Germany). They concur in the above analytical position.

So I urge you to prayerfully reconsider your view.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the enclosed letter to Schmidt (TAB A).⁸

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence With Foreign Leaders File, Box 7, Germany, Federal Republic of: Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, 6–10/79. Confidential; Eyes Only. Outside the System.
2. See Document 189.
3. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 222.
4. In an October 6 speech in East Berlin, Brezhnev announced the withdrawal of 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks from the GDR but warned that deployment of new U.S. missiles in Western Europe “would change essentially the strategic situation on the continent.” (John Vinocur, “Brezhnev Says Soviet Will Cut Forces in East Germany,” New York Times, October 7, 1979, pp. 1, 12)
5. Tab B was not found attached. On October 14, Schmidt told Radio Hesse that “the latest Soviet proposals on nuclear arms brought both skepticism and hope to the West but an agreement on production and deployment of new medium-range missiles in Europe would be decisive.” (“Schmidt Bids West Accept Soviet Offer,” New York Times, October 15, 1979, p. A5; Michael Getler, “Schmidt Urges Improving Arms Despite Soviet Offer,” Washington Post, October 15, 1979, p. A11; “Upgrade NATO, Schmidt Urges, but Keep Talking,” Christian Science Monitor, October 15, 1979, p. 2) On October 13, the Embassy in Bonn reported on Schmidt’s upcoming radio interview; see footnote 3, Document 189.
6. Karl Kaiser was the head of the Scientific Directorate of the Research Committee of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik.
7. Next to this paragraph, Brzezinski drew a line and wrote and underlined the word “agree.”
8. Tab A was not found attached. Brzezinski checked Approve option and wrote “reluctantly” under the line. In an October 19 letter to Schmidt, Brzezinski wrote: “Dear Helmut: After just reading the full text of your interview with Radio Hesse, I write to say how excellent I thought the policy position you took is. (The New York Times story on it was quite misleading.) I also entirely agree with you with respect to Soviet motives. As long as we stick to the simultaneity of deployment decision and negotiations proposal, as you set forth, we are on the right track. With best personal regards, Sincerely, Zbigniew Brzezinski.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Office File, Box 54, Chron 10/15–21/79)