108. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Expanded Meeting Between US and FRG Delegations
PARTICIPANTS
FRG
- Chancellor Schmidt
- Foreign Minister Genscher
- Ambassador Berndt von Staden
- Dr. Juergen Ruhfus
US
- President Carter
- Secretary Vance
- Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.
- Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
The President briefly reviewed some of the points discussed between himself and the Chancellor in their private meeting.2 He said it had been agreed that broader international support should be sought for a Rhodesian settlement. The President had stressed to the Chancellor his hope that the FRG could be helpful with regard to ameliorating the differences between Greece and Turkey. In connection with arms control matters, gray area systems had been discussed and there would be further consultations on that question with the FRG and the UK. On MBFR, there were problems concerning the data base as well as the question of national ceilings.
The Secretary thought the Soviets were stuck with the fact that they earlier had introduced false data about their forces and he wondered how we could get them off this position. Chancellor Schmidt recalled that former Defense Minister Leber had said that, to some degree, the differences in Eastern and Western data stemmed from the fact that in the West we use more civilians for certain tasks than is the case in the Warsaw Pact where some tasks are performed by soldiers, whereas we would have civilians doing such work.
Genscher said this was one element in the picture. A second element was that the Soviets have a special program with regard to the Poles. Thirdly, there was the question of what would happen to FRG troops subject to reduction. The FRG would prefer to redeploy them, but the Soviets seemed to think in terms of disarming and disbanding them.
The President said the Soviets seemed to acknowledge in fact that they have a superiority in troop numbers, since their latest proposal calls for a two-to-one reduction in Soviet forces. He thought we should attempt to define more precisely what is a soldier. The Chancellor noted that this might open the way to a compromise, and Dr. Brzezinski agreed.
The President inquired about the timing of the Western response to the Soviet proposal. The Chancellor suggested that the US and the FRG should get together at the working level to work out a position; thereafter, there could be discussion with the interested allies, followed by presentation of an agreed position to the Eastern representatives. He thought that the work about “defining a soldier” could be done this summer.
The Chancellor thought that it would be well if we adopted the position that some progress is being made in MBFR. The Secretary said he had already taken this position, as had the President.
The Chancellor said that he also thought it would be a good idea to introduce into MBFR the question of legalizing the declarations of intent concerning Confidence Building Measures so as to make them obligatory. The President agreed this would be helpful.
The President, referring to French proposals in the arms control field, said we had earlier had the impression that the Chancellor favored these proposals, but it had become clear in their private conversation that this was not the case. It had been agreed that it would be a mistake to move away from the present framework of MBFR. The FRG position had assuaged our concern.
The Chancellor said the FRG would always be nice to the French in public, but there is a basic difference between the FRG and France concerning MBFR. The French seemed to want to put MBFR into a lesser category, probably because they do not want to have French forces singled out. The FRG has a similar concern, but perhaps French motivations go beyond this. The Chancellor was not sure.
The Chancellor said that the FRG did not want a situation created where, say in 1990, the FRG could be singled out for pressure with regard to its military forces. The Chancellor agreed with the President’s remark that progress in MBFR on a basis of commonality would not be harmful.
The Secretary noted that the Soviets use words like parity and common ceiling but he wondered if their meaning was the same as when we used such words. The Chancellor noted that similar words had been used in the Communique following Brezhnev’s visit to the FRG. The Chancellor feels that Brezhnev personally is in favor of SALT negotiations and MBFR. However, the situation will be more doubtful after Brezhnev leaves the scene. Therefore, we don’t have too many years in which to work for an agreement.
Turning to the subject of energy, the Chancellor said he wished to inform the President that at Bremen the Nine had decided to reduce their dependency on foreign energy imports by fifty percent. This is an ambitious goal.
The President asked the Secretary to remind him to talk later about the question of the FRG and missiles in Zaire. The Chancellor noted that he had been concerned by Ambassador Young’s remarks on this subject.3 Actually, his reaction was somewhat ambivalent: he was embarrassed by what Ambassador Young had said, but at the same time he is also embarrassed by the operations of OTRAG. However, the FRG Government cannot do much about OTRAG; they are not operating in the military field and the technology they use is too simple to be applied for military use.
On Africa, the Chancellor said he had discussed with the President the idea that all efforts should be made by Western Foreign Ministers to act on an agreed basis concerning African problems such as Rhodesia, Zambia, etc. In Rhodesia, he thought the situation was very dangerous and that a civil war might break out soon.
The President said we have received indications from some African leaders as well as from Castro that, once South African troops are removed from Namibia, then the Cubans would be able to withdraw from Angola. In any case, the Soviets and the Cubans are less likely to move aggressively if we in the West act together.
The Secretary thought there were three factors which could affect the Cubans and encourage a withdrawal: (1) Namibia and the withdrawal of South African troops, (2) establishment of a neutral zone on the border between Angola and Zaire, and (3) an accommodation between Neto and Savimbi. Also, it would help if we can encourage the Portuguese to be more interested in returning to Angola. Angola seems to want them back again and this would be helpful.
The President noted that Brazil might also be of help in this connection. They speak the same language and are pleased that they have diplomatic contact with Angola.
The Secretary added that food aid, perhaps from both the US and the FRG, to Angola would be helpful in view of the severe drought there. Medical aid would also be of assistance.
The Chancellor said that he hoped some special attention could be given to Zambia, a country which is benevolent, democratic and well-motivated. It feels surrounded and has difficulty getting its copper out for export. The FRG will step up its aid for Zambia and he had asked the EC to include copper in the Lome Stabilization Agreement. This could help Zambia as well as Zaire. The Chancellor said he did not much like the idea of a worldwide copper support scheme, since this could bring benefits to the big countries such as the US and the Soviet Union.
At the request of the President, Secretary Vance spoke about the current situation in the Middle East negotiations. The Secretary said we have now received a plan from each of the two sides: these deal with the West Bank and Gaza as well as the Declaration of Principles.
It is clear that we are hung up on the West Bank and Gaza. However, there appear to be some common elements in the positions of the two parties. Each provides for a transition period of five years; each provides for detailed security arrangements for Israel; each states the importance of true peace. The big difference is about what happens after five years and what role will be provided for the Palestinians.
The Secretary said we hope to get the two parties into a dialogue, asking direct questions of each other, etc. Nothing startling is to be expected from the London meeting but perhaps we can get a process started. It is also planned that there will be subsequent meetings after the initial conference in London, probably alternating sites in the two countries.
The President commented that we had felt the statement issued by Kreisky and Brandt about the Middle East had been helpful. We have refrained from making statements in public, since this would only help Begin in strengthening his already tough position.
The President said that many members of the Israeli Cabinet want to move farther and faster than Begin. Among these are Weizman, Dayan and Ehrlich. The Secretary noted that the latter is perhaps the most important member of the Cabinet.
The Chancellor referred to the recent visit to Bonn of Saudi Crown Prince Fahd. Fahd is deeply concerned about the Middle East and he had requested that the summit meeting issue a statement on the subject. However, the Chancellor doubted if this would be useful at this time.
Continuing, Schmidt said that Fahd stressed in particular his concern about developments in the Horn and about Begin’s policies. Fahd sees a situation where the Soviets are increasing their strength in South Yemen and in Ethiopia with a view to regaining a foothold in the Middle East. Begin’s delays and intransigence help the Soviets in this regard.
The President said we have been discouraged by the slowness of Begin. Sadat wants to move more quickly. So far as a statement is concerned, it would probably be better for individual states to make comments rather than to have a joint declaration.
The President said that the people of Israel want a peace settlement. Also, the United States would be prepared to give additional assurances to Israel concerning security. Egypt also is prepared to see Israeli security protected. This could be done by various means, such as through mechanical devices, UN troops, etc. However, Begin is absolutely adamant about any withdrawal from territory. This opinion is not shared by many people in his party.
The President said that Begin thinks in terms of history and philosophy. It should be possible to demonstrate to him that there are other ways of guaranteeing security and borders. So far as security is concerned, he should take a look at Berlin.
The President said that it is difficult for Begin to agree to withdrawal because of the strength of his religious convictions. The Chancellor commented that the only way out seemed to be for Begin to give up his position as Prime Minister. The President said that, if it looked as if Begin would be overridden in the Cabinet, then he might compromise.
Turning to another subject, Schmidt inquired as to US views regarding oil reserves in the Soviet Union. Crown Prince Fahd had said that in the 80’s the Soviets will be more dependent on the Middle East for oil.
The President thought that, if one considers the Soviet Union alone, then it could probably get along on its own oil supplies. However, if it is expected to supply other countries, such as those in Eastern Europe, then it would have difficulties. Also, the President noted that Soviet oil supplies are such that special equipment in terms of pumps are required in order to extract the oil.
Dr. Brzezinski noted that the Soviet Union has large oil reserves but they are in areas where extraction will be very expensive. They also have enormous gas reserves.
The President then spoke of the enhanced radiation weapon. He thought that it would be useful to talk at the Four Power breakfast about this question in order to get the views of the others.4 The President also understands that the Chancellor is worried about cruise missiles, particularly if, in the future, Germany is the only country in Europe on whose territory cruise missiles are deployed.
The President said he has decisions coming up about the Lance missile and the 8-inch shell with regard to modifying them for the ERW.5 Before he takes a decision, he would like the views of the others.
Dr. Brzezinski said that Giscard would not wish to discuss these matters. However, the President felt that France will have to make a decision in the future about its own position concerning ERW and cruise missiles. He said there was nothing in the SALT Treaty about cruise missiles—they are treated only in the Protocol.
The President said that cruise missiles in the future will constitute a formidable threat to the Soviet Union and will shift attention away from ICBM’s. Nevertheless, the SS–20 is already an escalation. The President repeated that he would like to get the views of the others before making his decisions.
Speaking about the problems of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Secretary said they were delicate and serious. No one knows just what is happening in Afghanistan. Under Secretary Newsom is visiting there now and we will share the results of his trip with the FRG.6 So far as Pakistan is concerned, it is unclear what will happen there in the future and the prospects are shaky.
The President said we are prohibited by law from giving aid to Pakistan if they have a nuclear reprocessing plant. The Chancellor commented that Giscard had told him France would not go ahead with the contract to supply such a plant. The President said Giscard also had told him that, but he always seems to postpone telling this clearly to the Pakistanis.
The Chancellor commented that he had reason to believe that Giscard will refrain from delivering the reprocessing plant. He recalled the joint statement he had made with Giscard some time ago against export in the future of sensitive technologies. The Chancellor’s agreement had been based on Giscard’s assurances that the deal with Pakistan would not go through. The President observed that it seems clear Giscard would like for the Pakistanis to cancel the order.
The Chancellor said he would like to say a few words about the GDR and Berlin. With the GDR, relations have improved since the agreement five years ago. However, the situation is still precarious and difficult. As to prospects for his own visit to the GDR, the Chancellor said he would not object against making such a visit but the GDR, under Soviet pressure, seems unable to permit more people to leave the country. The Chancellor said he had told Honecker that he could not visit the GDR without some movement on this question. Therefore, he doubted if a visit would take place soon.
The Chancellor then reviewed briefly the Bahro case and the arrest of Huebner, a conscientious objector in East Berlin. He noted that the GDR authorities had not charged Huebner with a refusal to serve in the GDR armed forces, since this would get them involved in matters concerning the status of Berlin.
The Chancellor then said that he wished to say a few words about human rights. He noted that 75 to 78 thousand persons of German origin have been able to come to West Germany from Eastern countries within the last 18 months. Some 15 thousand have come from the Soviet Union, 50 thousand from Poland and about 15 thousand from the GDR. The FRG wants to see another 75 thousand come out in the future and it does not want to interfere with this process which is going on quite well with the GDR, Poland, the Soviet Union, and Romania. Matters also have been almost settled with Czechoslovakia for the emigration of ethnic Germans there, although not many remain. In view of all this, the Chancellor said he hoped the President would understand that the FRG is a little reluctant to join the US in a worldwide campaign about human rights.
The President said he understood. Genscher noted that Principle 7 of the Helsinki Final Act on human rights as well as the language in Basket 3 concerned reunification of families and was of great importance for divided countries like Germany. He said the FRG insists on this in dealing with Poland and the other countries. The Chancellor added that he hoped the President would understand his view that there are not only cases like Shcharansky and Ginsburg but there are 75 thousand others who have been able to get out.
The Chancellor said that he wished to inform the President that the Soviets seem increasingly concerned about the US and China. Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov had been here recently, obviously acting for the Soviets, to convey this message, and others had done so as well. The Chancellor had told them that the Chinese hold the Soviets in contempt, and he thought it was a mistake for the Soviets to match this contempt with such a defensive position.
The Chancellor said the French are delivering some military weapons to China. A few of these weapons, such as the Milan missile, contain German technology. There is also talk about delivery of weapons to China by the UK. (The Secretary thought this matter was not active for the time being.) The Chancellor also noted that the Soviets singled out Brzezinski for agitating the Chinese against the Soviets. The Chancellor senses that the Soviets are really nervous about all of this and that their concern is not just for show.
The President said he could not disagree with this. Our goal is to have normal diplomatic relations with the Chinese. We recognize that, so far as a security threat is concerned, the Soviets are more important to the US and the FRG than the Chinese. However, there are over one billion people in China and we see that they are turning to the West for the first time. We have to try to explain this to the Soviets. Also, we must be careful, because the Chinese would object violently if they felt we were using them against the Soviets.
The Secretary said we have made very clear to both the Chinese and the Soviets that we will not supply arms to either one. Genscher said that the Soviets claim that the US is encouraging others to do this, but the President said we have not done so. Brzezinski had heard that the Chinese are trying to get Italian arms. The Chancellor observed that the Italians will sell arms to strange people, and he noted that they have already sold some Leopard tanks to the Libyans.
The meeting concluded at 12:50 pm to permit the President and the Chancellor to proceed to their press conference.
- Source: Department of State, Stoessel Papers, Lot 82D307, Box 3, Ambassador Chron: Memos for the Record, 1978. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Stoessel. At the top of the page, Stoessel wrote “WRS 7/19” and “MH 7/20.” The second notation may be a reference to Van Heuvel. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the small Cabinet Room at the Federal Chancellery (not the Chancellor’s Office as indicated on the memorandum of conversation) and ended at 1:05 p.m. (Carter Library, President’s Daily Diary) Carter was in Bonn for a State visit to Germany (July 14–15) and to attend the Bonn G–7 Summit (July 16–17). For Carter’s public remarks during his State visit, see Department of State Bulletin, September 1978, pp. 6–10. On July 14, Carter also met Walter Scheel. (Memorandum of Conversation, July 14; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President: 6–7/78) On July 14, Vance met Genscher. No memorandum of conversation for that meeting has been found; for a German record, see AAPBD 1978, Document 218.↩
- Carter met with Schmidt in the Chancellor’s office from 10:32 a.m. to 12:05 p.m. (Carter Library, President’s Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation for the meeting was found. For an account based on Schmidt’s comments to an aide, see AAPBD 1978, Document 223.↩
- In a July 12 interview with Le Matin de Paris, Young was quoted as saying: “Well, while the presence of East Germans in Africa is limited, their role is increasing. There are not many troops but a substantial number of technical advisors. And the East Germans actually train and arm the Africans in situations such as this one. And there they had a good reason. They were worried by the missile development program set afoot by the West Germans in Shaba.” (Telegram 179529 to Jidda, July 15; National Archives, Central Foreign Policy File, D780291–0287) On July 13, the Department of State’s acting spokesman stated that “Ambassador Young’s interview and his remarks relating to French policy in Africa do not reflect the policies or judgments of this administration and must be considered an expression of his personal views.” (Telegram 80068 to Paris, July 13; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780287–1052)↩
- Reference is to the July 17 four-power breakfast, which took place at Chancellor Schmidt’s residence from 8:44 to 10:17 a.m. (Carter Library, President’s Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation for the meeting has been found; for an account based on Schmidt’s comments to an aide, see AAPBD 1978, Document 223.↩
- On October 18, the White House announced that Carter had ordered the production of some components of ERW for 8-inch howitzers and Lance missiles. (Walter Pincus, “Carter Keeps Open the Option on Deploying Neutron Weapons,” Washington Post, October 19, 1978, p. A2; “Carter Signs Bill to Make Neutron Parts,” Washington Post, October 26, 1978, p. A2)↩
- Telegram 191772 to Bonn, July 28, reported that on July 26, Newsom briefed Von Staden on his Asian trip. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780311–1317)↩