Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

109. Memorandum from Robert Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 24, 1978

SUBJECT

• Europe and Germany

The Problem

At the moment, relations with Western Europe in general—and with Germany in particular—can be rated as “good.” This is not just the dog days of August, but reflects several factors, including:

— the end of the break-in period for the Administration in European eyes (longer for us than for most, for several reasons);

— the President’s own personal diplomacy;

— a successful NATO summit; and

— consultations and the evolution into suitable diplomatic frameworks of most of the contentious issues (like Euratom renegotiation). Strategic issues, for example—such as SALT—are yielding benefits through sheer hard work with the Allies.

As one German official commented after the Bonn Summit, however, it is one thing to get the leaders together and clear the air; it will be another to weather the reemergence of tough issues.

As I have thought about our experience with European policy during the past 18 months, the following observations have emerged:

— we have left the era in which the top levels of the government have been dominated by people who instinctively look at the world through European lenses (even Kissinger, with his background, moved away from that perspective). This reflects the background of our senior people (who did not serve in the European war and then found their work dominated by postwar reconstruction, founding NATO, etc.); and there of course has been the increase in problem areas outside Europe, while the Continent itself seemed relatively peaceful (in policy terms) or yielded to established and familiar patterns of relations.

— the growth of functional issues—most pronounced in this administration—has had a particular effect on Europe as a region: so many of these issues have a profound effect on Europe and become the stuff of our relations with Europeans, yet institutional responsibility is largely vested in the government by function, rather than by region. Alone among the regions of the world, our relations with Western European countries (in terms of unmet problems) focus more either on what happens functionally on a broader basis or on what happens elsewhere in the world (Soviet Union, Africa, Middle East).

— thus institutionally, key issues for our relations with Europe have developed in ways in which the European perspective is often not the dominant factor, or sometimes even taken into account to the degree that a coordinated European strategy would call for. The most important example at the moment is international economic policy, where until recently it has not been possible to gain sufficient realization within the Government as a whole that what we do in overall international economic policy is having a critical impact on our political relations and position in Europe, as well. Economic policy has now taken over from Soviet issues as the key European concern about U.S. “leadership,” “purposefulness,” “reliability,” etc. To be sure, much of our international economic policy has had a European dimension (the Bonn Summit, etc.), but there has not been a sense of how this policy needs on a daily basis to be fitted within an overall strategy for Western Europe. Perhaps “strategy” is too strong a word: it is more a matter of instinctive approaches and practices that automatically see the relationship of particular, broader issues to the European dimension.

As noted above, in some areas—such as arms control—the European dimension is being effectively handled through an interagency process. But in others the lines of authority and action are oriented in a different fashion—including both foreign and domestic policy.

Steps to Take

We have dealt with some issues through ad hoc arrangements, for good or ill with regard to Europe (e.g. Concorde,² Viggen sales,³ Euratom renegotiation⁴). On some issues (e.g. Portugal, France, Italy), we have been able to use the European Problems Group,⁵ and we should probably use that mechanism even more. On some issues (e.g. economic policy), the overall coordinating mechanism in the government still needs beefing up, and not just for European reasons (now that the Summit is past, Henry Owen could be invaluable here, provided he is given enough interagency coordinating authority).

Of course, there would always be value in a major Presidential speech on Europe, drawing together a number of threads and themes. But that still does not resolve the institutional and bureaucratic problem.

What I have to propose for now is modest, but could have wider application later: I suggest my convening an interagency “Germany Group,” on a confidential basis, to focus specifically on relations with that country. The choice is obvious: it is the key European Ally, the one where most problems in relations with West Europe do and will center, and the one where there remains the greatest possibility of renewed misunderstanding and difference of interests.

The object would be for this group to meet regularly a) to make sure each agency is up-to-date on [less than 1 line not declassified] German attitudes, problems, and needs; b) to act as an early-warning device for different agencies; and c) to do what is possible to ensure that an overall approach for dealing with Germany is built in to individual policies that may have their basic focus either in a function (e.g. arms control, economics, arms sales, non-proliferation) or in other regions (e.g. Africa). More than anything else, this would be a sensitizing and alerting procedure. It might even permit a start on longer-range issues—such as the problem of competition in high-technology areas.

There is also the constant German refrain that there is no senior U.S. official who “understands” them; in part that means they do not have a sense that the German perspective is adequately included in different U.S. policies. This group might help to rectify that problem.

This could be a natural outgrowth of the European Problems Group, but with participants more oriented to Germany, and drawing in people from other regions and functional areas, as appropriate. The core group would be State (EUR/PM/EB); DOD (ISA/JCS); Treasury; Commerce; ICA; CIA; and Domestic Council.⁶

If you agree, I would like to try this for a while, on a low-key basis, to see whether it can lead to greater government-wide sensitivity to a German perspective on particular issues.

(So far, I have talked with Hormats, Stoessel, and Goodby about this idea, and they believe it would be valuable.)⁷

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Box 12, Europe: 1978. Confidential. Sent for action. At the top of the page, Aaron wrote: “OK idea but I don’t know what they could really do that is not done elsewhere. DA.”
2. See footnote 6, Document 160.
3. See Document 269.
4. On April 10, the United States cut off supplies of enriched uranium to Euratom countries pending the renegotiation of the U.S.-Euratom supply agreements to block uranium reprocessing into plutonium that could be used for nuclear weapons, as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. (Paul Lewis, “U.S. and Europe Said to Patch Up Atom-Fuel Dispute,” New York Times, June 29, 1978, p. A5) Telegram 13322 from USEEC Brussels, July 7, reported that on July 7, the EC informed Hinton that the EC was ready to open talks on the U.S.-Euratom cooperation agreements on matters not covered by INFCE. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780279–0393)
5. Not further identified.
6. Brezezinski drew a line next to this paragraph and wrote in the margin: “good.”
7. Brzezinski drew a line next to the last two paragraphs with an arrow that led to a handwritten comment at the bottom of the page: “try it—provided it doesn’t become another time-consuming but non-operational exercise. OK. ZB.” Minutes of an October 13 meeting of the German Working Group are in Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 51, Chron: 10/8–21/78.