486. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting1


  • UN Special Session on Disarmament


  • State
  • Gerald Helman
  • Jerome Kahan
  • David Gompert
  • Defense
  • Lynn Davis
  • Susan Flood
  • ACDA
  • Adam Yarmolinsky
  • Lawrence Weiler
  • Charles Flowerree
  • JCS
  • Lt. Gen. Arnold Braswell
  • CIA
  • Sayre Stevens
  • George Allen
  • AID
  • Alexander Shakow
  • Mary Jane Heyl
  • Energy
  • Donald Kerr
  • Ray E. Chapman
  • White House
  • David Aaron
  • NSC
  • Samuel Huntington
  • Robert Putnam

The question of whether or not the President should speak at SSOD depends heavily on the content of the US presentation. If he is to speak, it is highly desirable that the presentation not be limited to [Page 1201] the sorts of initiatives currently under study. A Presidential address should offer an ambitious 10-Year Disarmament Program, outlining long range goals and objectives for enhancing global security in such areas as strategic arms control and regional stability. ACDA will pull together agency suggestions for a 10-Year Disarmament Program into a draft for NSC review within the next week. No final decision was taken on the date for the US presentation.

A proposal for extending negative security assurances beyond the President’s statement of October, 1977,2 is now being put into final form. Regional bureaus and JCS are particularly concerned about the impact of such an initiative on relations with our allies. More complete information is needed about the probable reactions of key allies. Some of this information may be obtained from the May 2 meeting of NATO disarmament experts, at which the UK proposal for negative security assurances may be discussed. When more information on allied attitudes is available and when the options paper has been completed, the issue will be raised for consideration at the SCC.

The “eyes and ears of peace” proposal for US technical assistance for regional peace-keeping will be considered in the Backstopping Committee next week.3 Agencies were urged to make any technical objections to the proposal as precise as possible.

Further consideration of our treatment of ERW at SSOD will be postponed until additional policy guidance is available.

Within the next week, interagency agreement within the Backstopping Committee is anticipated on initiatives on regional confidence-building measures, nuclear accident reporting, and preferences for NPT parties. (The offer of fuel cycle services has been deleted from the latter proposal.) Views of State/EA will be solicited on the nuclear accidents initiative. A split paper is anticipated on the Disarmament/Development proposal for a UN Special Development and Security Fund. All these proposals, as well as the report of the group studying the cutoff proposal, will then be submitted to the SCC for decision or endorsement.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 117, SCM 013, Mini-SCC, SSOD: 4/20/78. Confidential. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Draft minutes of the meeting are ibid.
  2. On October 4, 1977, Carter told the UN General Assembly that “In order to reduce the reliance of nations on nuclear weapons, I hereby solemnly declare on behalf of the United States that we will not use nuclear weapons except in self-defense; that is, in circumstances of an actual nuclear or conventional attack on the United States, our territories, or Armed Forces, or such an attack on our allies.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, pp. 1715–1723)
  3. Reference is to a NSC proposal that the United States provide equipment to monitor compliance with disarmament agreements to nations or regions who requested such assistance.