Attached is a decision memorandum on whether the United States should
adhere to Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco on creating a Nuclear
Free Zone in Latin America.
Please state your Department’s preferences on the options presented by
COB Monday, Apr 11, 1977, so that the President will have time to
consider whether or not he would like to include an announcement on
adherence in his Pan American Day speech on April 14.
Attachment
Decision Memorandum
2
Washington, April 6, 1977
SUBJECT
- U.S. Adherence to Protocol I of the Treaty of
Tlatelolco
The Issue
Whether we should adhere to Protocol I to the Treaty for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of
Tlatelolco), which would obligate us to prohibit and prevent the
testing, use, manufacture, storage, installation, deployment, or
possession of nuclear weapons in territories located in Latin
America for which we are internationally responsible—principally
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guantanamo Naval Base, and the
Canal Zone.
[Page 1033]
Background
The U.S. supported the negotiation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which
was concluded in 1967, and in 1971 adhered to its Protocol II, under
which nuclear weapon states undertake to respect the nuclear-free
zone and to refrain from using nuclear weapons against its parties.
(The UK, France, and China have also
joined Protocol II, while the USSR
has not.) However, citing primarily the integral relationship to the
U.S. of Puerto Rico as well as its importance to hemispheric
defense, we have stated that we were not prepared to adhere to
Protocol I. (Of the three other states eligible to adhere, the
UK and the Netherlands have
joined, while France has not.)
U.S. adherence to Protocol I would eliminate one of the few remaining
requirements specified in the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the full
entry into force of the nuclear-free zone regime, which would
involve commitments by all Latin American states to forswear
acquisition of nuclear weapons and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear
facilities. (The remaining requirements would be Soviet adherence to
Protocol II, French adherence to Protocol I, and Cuban and Argentine
ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Brazil has already
ratified, but unlike most other Latin American states that have done
so, has exercised its right under the Treaty not to be bound until
all the specified conditions are met.)
When the question of U.S. adherence to Protocol I was last reviewed
internally, a Strategic Air Command squadron equipped with nuclear
weapons was deployed at Ramsey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico and
nuclear anti-submarine warfare devices were stored at Roosevelt
Roads Naval Station in Puerto Rico. At present, however, we do not
deploy or store nuclear weapons in any Protocol I territory.
Moreover, while we continue to have operational requirements for
nuclear-armed naval vessels to call at ports in the zone and to pass
through the Panama Canal as well as to patrol and conduct training
exercises in the Caribbean area, U.S. adherence would not abridge
transit rights or freedom of navigation on the high seas, and
therefore those requirements would not be affected.
U.S. adherence would, however, rule out existing contingency plans,
which could be activated at a time of advanced readiness, for
transferring nuclear depth charges to Roosevelt Roads for use by the
squadron of P–3 ASW aircraft stationed there. Alternatives would be
available for performing the ASW mission envisaged in those plans
[2 lines not declassified] although these
alternatives could involve some loss of [3 lines
not declassified]
A potentially controversial legal matter involves a provision of the
Treaty of Tlatelolco specifying that, upon fulfillment of all
requirements for full entry into force, the Treaty’s zone of
application would [Page 1034] expand
to a large area extending at some points up to 1500 miles from the
Latin American coast. While the authors of the Treaty presumably
intended this provision to have some constraining effect, our legal
analysis indicates that the activation of this “extended zone of
application” would not have any practical effect on U.S. obligations
under Protocol I and II, and would therefore not in any way restrict
U.S. freedom of navigation on the high seas surrounding Latin
America. However, to insure against future controversy, we would
want to place our interpretation of this provision on record at the
time we signed the Protocol and deposited our instrument of
ratification (presumably after consulting with key treaty parties
and determining that they would not object to our
interpretation).
Advantages of U.S. Adherence
—Would have a favorable effect on U.S. relations with Latin America,
particularly with Mexico, the principal sponsor of the Treaty, and
Panama.
—Would generate pressures for Soviet adherence to Protocol II, which
would obligate the Soviets not to store or deploy nuclear weapons in
any Latin American territory.
—Would enhance prospects for adherence to the Treaty of Tlatelolco by
Brazil, Argentina and Cuba although the latter two would still have
the legal power to block the Treaty’s full entry into force if they
considered it in their interest to do so. (In the absence of such
adherence, there is a serious risk that Argentina and Brazil will
follow the Indian route to a nuclear explosive capability.)
—Would not affect any current U.S. operational requirements or
deployments.
Disadvantages of U.S. Adherence
—Would rule out existing contingency plans for storing nuclear ASW
devices in Puerto Rico, although alternative (perhaps less optimal)
means for implementing those plans would be available.
—Would limit U.S. flexibility to deal with possible future threats in
the Caribbean and South America by deploying or storing nuclear
weapons in our Protocol I territories.
—If we adhered without requiring adherence by other holdouts (e.g.,
Cuba, USSR), could be perceived as
giving up military options in the Caribbean area without requiring
reciprocal restraints and as reducing the leverage we might
otherwise have for inducing those holdouts to take corresponding
actions.
Options
(1) Continue existing policy.
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(2) Adhere to Protocol I without conditions.
If this option were chosen, it could be announced in the April 14
Pan American Day speech, although it would be important to contact
the Puerto Rican government before any announcement in order to
confirm that they would not have objections.
(3) Adhere to Protocol I when Cuba joins the Treaty
and the USSR joins Protocol
II. If this option were chosen, it is assumed that, in view
of the sensitivity of current discussions with Cuba, we would
proceed through diplomatic channels rather than through an
announcement in the April 14 speech, which might be resented by the
Cubans as placing public pressure on them. While this option would
reduce possible criticism on the grounds that we had not required
reciprocal restraints by others, it could entangle Protocol I in
other U.S.-Cuban and U.S.-Soviet matters, and thereby delay U.S.
adherence and any benefits resulting therefrom.
(4) Adhere to Protocol I when all other
requirements for full entry into force of the Treaty of
Tlatelolco are fulfilled. Since the focus on Cuba would be
diluted, this could be announced on April 14 or pressed through
diplomatic channels. Although this option would ensure full
reciprocity, it could delay U.S. adherence indefinitely and might be
criticized by Latin Americans as imposing unreasonable conditions on
U.S. adherence.
