383. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Brzezinski) to President
Carter1
Washington, June 17, 1980
SUBJECT
- Post-INFCE Explorations by
Gerry Smith
At Tab A is Warren Christopher’s
paper on the timing of Gerry
Smith’s post-INFCE
explorations with the Europeans and Japanese on his proposals for
modifications in US non-proliferation
policy. The paper is simply a listing of reasons for and against
authorizing Smith to proceed;
Christopher does not offer a
recommendation.
In my view, your decision should be based on the following consideration.
The decision on Tarapur2 will encounter determined resistance on
the Hill. Many there who applauded the policy you announced in 1977, see
the Tarapur decision as a significant move away from that policy.
Moreover, we face a growing coalition of opposition made up of those who
oppose Tarapur on substance, and Reagan supporters who simply want to
embarrass you.
No matter how tightly Smith’s
instructions are worded, his explorations will be seen as another
deviation from your policy, generating further opposition on the Hill
and among liberal supporters. The question is whether or not you want to
address both of these issues simultaneously. I think not, and there is
no need to do so since you can control the timing of the Smith initiative, waiting until after
it has been fully reviewed in the normal NSC process.
RECOMMENDATION
That you not authorize Smith to conduct post-INFCE explorations at this time.3
[Page 975]
Tab A
Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State
Christopher to
President Carter
4
SUBJECT
At the Friday foreign policy breakfast,5 I promised to send you an analysis of
advantages and risks to Gerry
Smith’s proceeding with post-INFCE explorations now, as opposed
to after Tarapur is resolved by the Congress.
Reasons for Not Going Ahead Now
—Movement on this approach now could create public perceptions that
“the Carter Administration
is proposing to weaken its non-proliferation policy” or “the
Carter Administration is
changing signals on breeder reactor programs.”
—The Tarapur decision complicates our moving forward now with
post-INFCE in two ways.
First, both decisions will be characterized by some as U.S.
non-proliferation retreats—Tarapur as a fall off of our commitment
to full-scope safeguards, and post-INFCE as a retreat from our opposition to premature
reprocessing and plutonium use. Second, it could be argued that our
Tarapur decision is inconsistent with our post-INFCE explorations. That is, the
Tarapur decision is based on the rationale of preserving controls
over U.S.-origin material to prevent its reprocessing in India,
whereas our post-INFCE
explorations are designed to relax such controls where we have them
in Europe and Japan outside of EURATOM.
—The approach could be characterized as helping European and Japanese
nuclear programs (in particular breeder, advanced reactor and
reprocessing programs) that might otherwise fail. And, our approach
may not in fact achieve greater allied cooperation in improving the
non-proliferation regime.
—The precedent of this approach could undercut our effort to prevent
the spread of sensitive technology and material to countries outside
Europe and Japan, or result in charges of discrimination by
countries which we assert do not meet the necessary criteria.
[Page 976]
Reasons for Going Ahead Now
—Other countries expect us to take INFCE results into account, and key Allies have already
approached us on harmonizing policies. If we do not move soon, the
Australians (who are actively negotiating with EURATOM and Japan) could make
agreements which would undercut our ability to limit reprocessing
and plutonium use. We also need greater fuel supply assurances to
meet anticipated criticism at the NPT Review Conference.
—Our supply leverage is diminishing and our reliability is in
question. Failure to commence explorations now would risk our
Allies’ going their own way in their nuclear programs and making the
issue an even greater irritant in our relations. We could also lose
their cooperation in improving the non-proliferation regime, in
particular deterring commercial thermal recycle.
—Going ahead with Tarapur and the post-INFCE explorations is entirely consistent. Both actions
are designed to support the non-proliferation regime—in the case of
Tarapur, to preserve safeguards and controls over U.S.-origin
material in India; in the case of post-INFCE, to obtain limits and controls on U.S.-origin
material in EURATOM (which we
currently do not have) and greater non-proliferation cooperation
generally including full-scope safeguards as a condition of future supply. Both decisions also serve
broader foreign policy objectives.
—Post-INFCE explorations will be
less sensitive politically than Tarapur, especially since they will
be low-key, non-committal and confidential and would be only with
Allies who are either NPT parties
with full-scope safeguards or, in the case of France, a nuclear
weapons state. USG consideration of
post-INFCE options has
already had some press play (particularly in the trade press). We
have had extensive consultations with those most concerned in
Congress, and no one has objected to further explorations.
Options
______ Let Gerry Smith go
ahead with explorations now.6
______ Postpone Gerry Smith’s
explorations until after Congress acts on Tarapur.
(A copy of proposed instructions for Gerry Smith is attached for your convenience.)
[Page 977]
Attachment
Draft Telegram7
USIAEA for Ambassador Smith
from Secretary. Subject: Post-INFCE Explorations.
1. SECRET (ENTIRE TEXT)
2. The President authorizes you on an absolutely non-committal basis
(and in a low key and confidential manner) to explore with the major
European governments and Japan arrangements by which they would
agree to cooperate in strengthening the non-proliferation regime and
limit the reprocessing of spent fuel and use of plutonium. Your
purpose is to clarify what we might expect from our allies in return
for greater predictability in the exercise of consent rights over
the use of US-origin spent fuel.
Based on these explorations, we would be better able to develop
positions for the statutorily mandated renegotiation of our
agreements with EURATOM, Japan,
and certain other countries.
3. In your explorations, you should be guided by the following
elements:
A. What we would seek:
—Deferral by the involved countries of commitments to commercial
thermal recycle for a specified period.
—Limiting new reprocessing capacity to that required for breeder and
advanced reactors and restraint in the separation of plutonium to
avoid unnecessary stockpiling and pressures for thermal recycle.
—Support for development of an effective IPS and avoidance of excess
national stockpiles of plutonium.
—Agreement by EURATOM and Japan
to US consent rights called for in
the NNPA.
—Continuing limits over US-origin
material after use in breeder and advanced reactor RD&D
programs.
—Increased commitments to spent fuel storage as our alternative to
reprocessing.
[Page 978]
—Improved cooperation in dealing with countries of proliferation
concern, including concrete steps to strengthen restraints on
exports of sensitive technology and material to such countries.
—Commitments to condition significant new nuclear supply commitments
on NPT-type safeguards on future,
as well as existing, facilities.
—Cooperation to make reprocessing associated with breeder reactors
more proliferation resistant.
—Cooperation on improving the “once-through” cycle.
—Dedication of future enrichment capacity to produce low-enriched
uranium only.
—Greater commitments of financial and technical resources and
political support for development and implementation of improved
IAEA safeguards.
B. What we would consider offering:
—The United States would adopt predictable ground rules for the
exercise of US consent rights and
control over reprocessing and use of plutonium in certain RD&D
programs for breeder and advanced thermal reactors. Specifically,
you may explore advance agreement to reprocessing of US-origin material in mutually agreed
facilities for use of the resulting separated plutonium in certain
agreed breeder and advanced reactor RD&D programs in advanced
NPT or equivalent countries
that meet certain criteria.
—You may indicate willingness to consider generic agreement to
reprocessing in the United Kingdom and France for other countries
that have good non-proliferation credentials, or no spent fuel
storage alternatives, or where it is in our non-proliferation
interest to remove spent fuel.
—You should also indicate the US is
reviewing in the context of preparations for the NPT Review Conference, licensing of
export of low-enriched fuel for a longer term than now, as well as
backup assurances and increased technical assistance, to NPT parties with good
non-proliferation credentials.
4. You should make clear that in return for flexibility on
reprocessing and plutonium use we would expect agreement to
improvements in the present non-proliferation regime, particularly a
more helpful active role in dealing with problem countries. You
should stress that no final policy decisions have as yet been
made.
