344. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Brzezinski) to President
Carter1
SUBJECT
- Japanese Nuclear Talks—Negotiating Guidance
A Japanese delegation arrives for talks on June 2, 3 on the Tokai
reprocessing issue. The memorandum at Tab A—prepared by the NSC Interagency Group on
Proliferation—seeks your instructions for these talks.
This meeting is being held at Japanese insistence. The U.S. tried
unsuccessfully to postpone it, feeling that very little has changed
since the last round.2 Also, the timing of
these talks is bad for us since, as you know, Vance has been discussing with
Ambassador Gerard Smith the
possibility of his assuming overall responsibility for proliferation
negotiations. Smith’s presence
would provide us with the negotiating expe[Page 881]rience that has been so noticeably lacking in
previous proliferation talks.
This memorandum raises some issues not treated in the interagency paper,
summarizes the views of the five lead agencies—State, Defense, ERDA, ACDA, and Schlesinger—and sets forth the options available to
you.
OPTIONS AND ARGUMENTS
Option 1: Permit reprocessing
at Tokai on a provisional, experimental, multinational basis
involving IAEA participation to
test safeguards.
As you know, Tokai cannot operate commercially without a prior finding of
safeguardability by the U.S. We wish to avoid such a finding since our
policy is based on the premise that reprocessing by its very nature
cannot be adequately safeguarded. This option assumes that Tokai could
be allowed to operate experimentally without the
finding of safeguardability. However there is some question as to
whether that could in fact be done without opening the USG to legal challenge. State and
ERDA
both believe that Option 1 should be
authorized as a fallback option available to the U.S. delegation should
Option 3 and 2 prove
non-negotiable.
ACDA
and Defense disagree.
Schlesinger
believes that it could be seen as inconsistent with domestic
policies.
We expect that the Japanese will table some version of this option.
Option 2: Explore through
expert consultation the feasibility of alter-ing Tokai so that it
could operate to test both reprocessing and partial
coprocessing.
As you know, partial coprocessing produces a mixed product of uranium and
plutonium “spiked” with highly radioactive waste products which make the
mixture dangerous and expensive to handle.
State believes that this should be the second
allowed position.
ERDA
agrees.
ACDA
on the other hand feels that in some respects Option 2 is the least preferable option, in that—unlike Option
3—it establishes a precedent for reprocessing. Nor does it have the
advantage of Option 1 of avoiding discrimination of treatment between
the Japanese and FRG (which also has an
experimental reprocessing plant).3
Option 3: Explore the
possibility of operating Tokai only with a modified process that
does not produce pure separated plutonium (i.e., some form of
partial coprocessing).
All agencies agree that some version of this option is most preferable
but they differ in their expectations of its acceptability to the
Japanese. Defense and
ACDA
believe that only this option should be au[Page 882]thorized for negotiations, while State and
ERDA
believe that fallback options will be necessary.
Also, both Defense and
ACDA
believe that the U.S. should not offer to
provide plutonium for the Japanese breeder, as proposed in the
interagency paper. ACDA has calculated
that reprocessing of the British-supplied fuel from the Magnox reactor
at Tokai can provide sufficient plutonium to meet Japanese needs.
Schlesinger
supports, but did not choose between, some version of Options 2 or
3.
Option 4: Seek Japanese
agreement to defer running the Tokai plant for a fixed period of
time, offering an incentives package in exchange.
All agencies agree that this option is likely to be non-negotiable.
SUGGESTED U.S. STRATEGY
All agencies are agreed that we should seek agreement on Option 3. They
differ over whether we should offer to provide plutonium, and as to how
far we should fallback in this meeting. Our strategy clearly should be
to avoid the political damage that would result if the Japanese prove
adamant against Option 3 and the talks reach a deadlock. At the same
time, we want to avoid damaging U.S. non-proliferation objectives
through showing so much flexibility (i.e., interest in Option 1) that
the Japanese return home encouraged to maintain a rigid position.
Therefore, I recommend that the delegation be
instructed to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on Option 3,
as modified to bar an offer of U.S.-supplied plutonium. In addition, if no progress can be made, and the Japanese propose some version of Option 1, the
delegation should be instructed to respond by
drawing them out on the details of their proposal. Our delegation should
make it explicit however that the Japanese should not read into our
response any expectation of eventual U.S. approval of such an
option.
YOUR DECISION
1. Our Basic Position
Option 3 (State, ERDA) ______
OR
Option 3—no plutonium (DoD, ACDA, NSC) ______4
[Page 883]
2. Fallback—in order of
increasing flexibility.
None (DoD, ACDA) ______
Respond to Option 1, but do not offer it (NSC) ______
Option 2 (State) ______
Option 2 and 1 (ERDA) ______5
Attachment
Memorandum Prepared by the NSC Interagency Group on
Proliferation6
NON-PROLIFERATION AND REPROCESSING IN JAPAN
Based on the President’s instructions to listen to Japanese views on
how to deal with the pilot reprocessing plant at Tokai, U.S.
representatives from State, ACDA
and ERDA met with a visiting
Japanese delegation between April 5 and 15. At the closing session
it was agreed that another meeting would take place in which the
U.S. and Japan would offer new proposals. This memorandum seeks your
guidance and instructions for discussions scheduled on June 2 and 3
in Washington.
Japanese spokesmen consistently have stressed that because members of
the European Community including West Germany can reprocess
U.S.-origin fuel under the U.S.–EURATOM agreement with-out prior U.S. approval, while
Japan cannot, Japan is effectively being discriminated against with
regard to plutonium technology development and breeder-related
research. In this context they have argued that under the U.S.-Japan
agreement our rights are limited to allowing us to make a
determination as to whether safeguards can effectively be applied to
the facility and that it is inappropriate for the U.S. to employ
them to force alterations in the Japanese program.
The Tokai issue has become one of the major campaign issues in the
forthcoming Upper House elections. Prime Minister Fukuda is deeply concerned about
the political consequences of this issue. In support of their case
for proceeding to operate Tokai as initially intended,
[Page 884]
Japanese officials have referred to the President’s April 77 and May 28 press
conference remarks citing Japan as one of the countries which have
“a perfect right to go ahead and continue their own reprocessing.”
They aver that the President reaffirmed that position in private
discussions at London with Prime Minister Fukuda.9
Japanese spokesmen have proposed that resolution of the Tokai issue
be placed in the context of a broad political understanding in which
Japan would publicly support our nuclear fuel cycle evaluation
program and our position on the security risks inherent in plutonium
production. They also appear ready to support our conclusion that
recycling plutonium for light water reactors is neither necessary
nor economically justified. In return the United States would affirm
that it does not intend to discriminate against Japan and, until
such time as a viable alternative to a plutonium fuel cycle may be
established, that it will grant approvals of transfers of spent fuel
for reprocessing elsewhere, and avoid invoking provisions in the
U.S.-Japanese bilateral agreement in such a way as to jeopardize
Japan’s long-term nuclear strategy. Additionally the United States
would seek to facilitate Japanese access to assured supplies of low
enriched uranium and Japanese interest in becoming a supplier of
enriched uranium.
United States non-proliferation policies have been articulated in the
President’s public statements, PDM–8 decisions and proposed
legislation. Any decision on Tokai must bear in mind not only the
high political importance of that issue to the Japanese, but our own
interests as well. A Tokai decision would be the first, by this
Administration, on a foreign reprocessing facility. Although the
facility, and its context, are somewhat unique, a U.S. decision
could set precedents. The manner in which the U.S. exercises its
rights could affect European Community willingness to renegotiate
reprocessing rights they now have under the U.S.–EURATOM agreement for
cooperation.
[Page 885]
There are four general options available under the existing
circumstances:
Option 1: Permit reprocessing at Tokai on a
provisional, experimental, multinational basis involving IAEA participation to test
safeguards. Operating on the assumption that one of the
outcomes of the fuel cycle evaluation program might be the continued
use of plutonium in some nuclear programs, this Option would permit
exploration of various safeguards, surveillance, containment and
accounting procedures—and multilateral plant concepts—with a view to
ensuring that any eventual reprocessing would be carried out only
under the most stringent and acceptable conditions. The operations
would not involve a determination that
reprocessing plants can be safeguarded. They would be of limited
duration, entail a limited number of reprocessing campaigns and
would be cast explicitly in the context of test activities to cover
the contingency that a restricted number of reprocessing facilities
might emerge in the longer term. The derived plutonium would be
employed in the Japanese advanced reactor programs.
This alternative would in all likelihood be acceptable to Japan,
although it would beg the question of whether and when Tokai could
operate commercially. However, it could establish a presumption that
reprocessing is “safeguardable” and signal to other nations that
national reprocessing is acceptable. Those risks could be reduced by
explicitly linking the Tokai safeguards test activities to the
possibility of the eventual emergence of a limited number of
carefully sited multinational reprocessing facilities. Furthermore,
the notion that improved surveillance, containment and
accountability resolve the problem of plutonium stockpiling and
abrogation of safeguards agreements would be explicitly rejected.
This Option could be seen as inconsistent with the U.S. policy of
indefinite deferral of commercial reprocessing. On the other hand, a
major advantage of this option is that it reduces the pressure we
will otherwise face to supply plutonium for Japan’s experimental
breeder program.
Option 2: Explore through expert consultation the
feasibility of altering Tokai so that it could operate to test
both reprocessing and partial coprocessing. This option
would involve reorienting the Tokai facility to test alternative
methods of extracting value from spent fuel without separating
plutonium such as partial coprocessing. In addition it would permit
a limited amount of conventional reprocessing in order to derive
information regarding safeguards accounting and surveillance
techniques. Criteria would be established to assess the
non-proliferation value of the selected technology. While this
solution would permit some traditional experimental reprocessing, it
would be compatible with our international nuclear fuel cycle
evaluation program, give tangible international content to our
evaluation program [Page 886] with
leadership assumed by a major nuclear-user state, and enable the
Japanese to start up the Tokai facility in a manner reasonably
consistent with our non-proliferation objectives. Furthermore, a
safeguardability determination would not be required.
Although there could be some political sensitivity in Japan, this is
fairly close to what they already have proposed informally and
should defuse the immediate issue between us. On the other hand, it
must be recognized that this option would entail significant
modification of Tokai without assuring the continuing operation of
the plant or an outcome consistent with long-term nuclear planning
and could be regarded by the Japanese as a threat to their fast
breeder reactor program. To alleviate this concern, we believe this
option would have to be accompanied by U.S. offers to make available
to Japan, directly or indirectly, the plutonium necessary to the
continuation of their breeder research program.
Option 3: Explore the possibility of operating
Tokai only with a modified process that does not produce pure
separated plutonium based on a program worked out through expert
consultations with the United States. This alternative is
similar to Option 2 but excludes the
possibility of running Tokai in a manner that would produce pure
plutonium. While partial coprocessing might be the selected
alternative technology, final selection of an operating process
would depend on the conclusions of an expert committee of Japanese
and U.S. nuclear experts. As in Option 2 the non-proliferation value
of the selected technology would be assessed according to specified
criteria. In order to facilitate continuation of the Japanese
advanced reactor research program, the U.S. would undertake to
provide the required plutonium directly or indirectly and would
facilitate Japanese access to ensured supplies of low enriched
uranium and uranium feed.
The Japanese might regard this proposal as discriminatory in view of
the fact that European countries are engaged in conventional
reprocessing. The U.S. would have to facilitate Japanese access to
plutonium for their experimental breeder program along the lines
noted in Option 2. Depending on the quantities involved, our nuclear
agreement might have to be modified for this purpose.
The U.S. also might be faced with Japanese requests to contribute
substantially to the cost of the Tokai modification. The time needed
to implement this Option (possibly as much as three years) and other
related uncertainties is not likely to make it very appealing to the
Japanese. However, this alternative could satisfy the letter and
spirit of U.S. policy on deferring conventional reprocessing while
offering the Japanese a technical solution for running the Tokai
plant.
Option 4: Seek Japanese agreement to defer running
the Tokai plant for a fixed period of time, offering an
incentives package in exchange. Under this [Page 887] Option the U.S. would seek Japanese
agreement to defer start-up of the Tokai plant during the evaluation
period. In exchange, the U.S. would offer to provide the plutonium
necessary for continuation of the Japanese advanced reactor
programs, facilitate Japanese access to assured supplies of uranium
ore, take measures to provide forward deliveries of low enriched
uranium for the Japanese LWR reactors permitting the creation of a
three-year advance LEU stockpile on
Japanese territory. The Japanese asked for these assurances during
the first round of discussions. If the circumstances so dictated,
the U.S. would seek to facilitate Japanese participation through
equity sharing or involvement in U.S. multinational enrichment
facilities, or in enrichment activities elsewhere.
This Option would prevent the start-up of a new reprocessing facility
but, as in Option 3, would require us to either deliver substantial
quantities of plutonium or to approve sustained transfers of
irradiated fuel from Japan to France or the United Kingdom for
reprocessing and to authorize the return to Japan of separated
plutonium. The latter course could lead to establishing undesirable
precedents. This Option also might entail facilitating the sharing
of technology for enrichment purposes. The Option would undoubtedly
be received very negatively in Japan because of the political
implications of Japan acceding to U.S. demands on Tokai as well as
its obvious discriminatory features vis-a-vis West Germany and the
European Community.
