330. Presidential Directive/NSC–81


  • The Vice President
  • The Secretary of State
  • The Secretary of Defense
  • The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
  • The Administrator, Energy Research and Development Administration
[Page 831]


  • The Director of Central Intelligence
  • The Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
  • The Assistant to the President for Energy Policy


  • Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy (C)

It shall be a principal U.S. security objective to prevent the spread of nuclear explosive—or near explosive—capabilities to countries which do not now possess them. To this end U.S. non-proliferation policy shall be directed at preventing the development and use of sensitive nuclear power technologies which involve direct access to plutonium, highly enriched uranium, or other weapons useable material in non-nuclear weapons states, and at minimizing the global accumulation of these materials.

1. Specifically, the U.S. will seek a pause among all nations in sensitive nuclear developments in order to initiate and actively participate in, an intensive international nuclear fuel cycle re-evaluation program (IFCEP) whose technical aspects shall concern the development and promotion of alternative, non-sensitive, nuclear fuel cycles. This program will include both nuclear supplier and recipient nations.

2. For its part the United States Government will:

—Indefinitely defer the commercial reprocessing and recycle of plutonium in the U.S.

—Restructure the U.S. breeder reactor program so as to emphasize alternative designs to the plutonium breeder, and to meet a later date for possible commercialization. As a first step the need for the current prototype reactor, the Clinch River project, will be reassessed.

—Redirect the funding of U.S. nuclear research and development programs so as to concentrate on the development of alternative nuclear fuel cycles which do not involve access to weapons useable materials.

—Provide incentives, in the area of nuclear fuel assurances and spent fuel storage, to encourage the participation of other nations in the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program. Detailed studies of these programs shall be carried out by the NSC Ad Hoc Group established herein, and submitted to me as directed in the accompanying memorandum.

—Initiate a program of assistance to other nations in the development of non-nuclear means of meeting energy needs.

—Increase production capacity for nuclear fuels.

3. It shall also be U.S. policy to strengthen the existing non-proliferation regime: by encouraging the widest possible adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to comprehensive international safeguards; by strengthening and improving the IAEA; and by providing stronger sanctions against the violation of nuclear agreements. There[Page 832]fore the U.S. will announce its intention to terminate nuclear cooperation with any non-nuclear weapons state that hereafter

—detonates or demonstrably acquires a nuclear explosive device; or

—terminates or materially violates international safeguards or any guarantees it has given to the United States.

4. In order to implement these policies to perform the necessary studies, and to coordinate departmental activities in the non-proliferation field, I hereby establish an NSC Ad Hoc Group, to be chaired by the Department of State, and to include the Presidential Assistant for Energy. This group shall establish task forces, chaired by the appropriate agencies, to perform, among others, the tasks detailed in the accompanying memorandum.

Jimmy Carter


Tasks for the NSC Ad Hoc Group 2

The NSC Ad Hoc Group, established in PD–8, is directed to:

—prepare and submit by March 31 a comprehensive list of all activities, facilities and technologies related to nuclear power, which involve direct access to weapons useable materials;

—prepare and submit by April 1, a review of the Fiscal 1978 budget with appropriate recommendations to implement the policies set forth in the accompanying Presidential Directive;

—prepare and submit by April 5, proposed nuclear export policies, including: a summary of current applications for export of Highly Enriched Uranium and plutonium; criteria which should be applied to nuclear exports at the licensing stage; a list of criteria and conditions which should be required for new and amended agreements for cooperation, and necessary revisions in existing agreements; explicit options covering U.S. policies on consent to retransfer, reprocess, reexport and reuse U.S.-supplied fuels, Highly Enriched Uranium, plutonium, and materials irradiated in U.S.-supplied facilities; and legislative proposals to implement these recommendations;

—prepare and submit by May 1, a detailed study of measures the U.S. might take so as to be able to offer nuclear fuel assurances to na[Page 833]tions participating in the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program, including: rigorous revised estimates of future nuclear energy demand; measures to expand U.S. enrichment capacity; analysis and justification of U.S. stockpile programs; recommendations for appropriate terms and conditions for future toll enrichment contracts; assessments of the benefits of declaring an open season on enrichment contracts; exploration of international undertakings and agreements; and other short and long-term options for providing nuclear fuel assurances and collaborating with other suppliers;

—prepare and submit by May 1, a thorough study of measures the U.S. might take concerning nuclear fuel storage including: measures to expand U.S. spent fuel storage and transportation capacity; proposals for meeting the storage needs of those participating in the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program; analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of international spent fuel storage (but not plutonium storage which the U.S. shall discourage and measures to accelerate the development, demonstration and licensing of long-term spent fuel storage, both retrievable and terminal.

—prepare and submit by May 1, a program for promoting the development of non-nuclear energy alternatives and for assisting other nations with non-nuclear means to meet their energy needs.

Jimmy Carter
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–80–0017, Box 62, A–388.3 NON–PRO 1977. Secret.
  2. Secret.