As you know, there is substantial sentiment in the building to have the
SCC reconsider whether a suspension
of testing during the ASAT talks is in
the United States’ interest. (See Tab A.) The NSC staff refuses, however, to put that issue in the issues
paper being drafted for the meeting in the absence of a request to do so
by a principal. Simply to ask to have the issue discussed does not
prejudge where DOD comes out.
Accordingly, I recommend that you call Dave
Aaron and ask that suspension of testing be included in
the paper as an issue for the SCC.
Tab A
Working Paper Prepared in the Department of
Defense2
SCC Action
The direction to seek a “no test” agreement during the negotiations
should be retracted for the following reasons:
—The Soviets have an orbital ASAT
system in hand that has:
a. An 80% reliability.
b. Has been improved—demonstrated intercept on first orbit and may be
employing a passive sensor.
c. Launch pad turnaround is estimated to be hours.
d. Launch pads available could be 4 and, with the SS–9, approximately
23.
e. Could eliminate 14 US critical low
altitude satellites in 45 hours.
f. Can threaten synchronous targets using SL–12.
—With a “no test” arrangement during the negotiations, the Soviets
will have less incentive to come to terms that result in a balanced
US/USSR situation and in a quick and orderly fashion.
—They know that during this time frame, all US satellites are threatened and vulnerable and theirs
are not.
—It is clear to the Soviets that the US has done little in the way of engineering and
technology to get ready for ASAT
development.
—Such an agreement could slow US
programs because of DoD budget
constraints and the Soviets would have effectively gained a 3- to
4-year advantage.
—Even if the US built an entire
ASAT system ready to launch,
the Soviets would have us at a 1- to 2-year disadvantage because it
would take that long to test such a system and solve engineering
problems.
—US booster options will be
disappearing because of conversion to the Shuttle.3
—In a “no test” situation, the Soviets may insist on a US equivalent response.
—We have nothing to offer except to say we won’t test our superior technology.
—It is questionable if they will accept such a proposal.
—They may insist that we cancel our on-going R&D.
[Page 62]
—Since we have publicly advertised what we are doing (MHV, conventional, non-nuclear ABM), they can point specifically to
such programs.
—They have previously contended that the US is the aggressor in this area and they are not. In a
public relations move, such as the neutron bomb, they could probably
make this view stick.
—The Soviets may insist on restrictions to the Shuttle during this
period.
—This could include no tests of the teleoperator (jeopardy to
skylab).4
—During treaty negotiations, the absence of a
no test agreement could force the Soviets to an acceptable
agreement.
—A rapid moving US
ASAT program could give them
incentive to come to an agreement before a US test occurs.
—Politically, a “no test” agreement during negotiations could be a
problem.
—It would be difficult to negotiate an agreement that did not include
such an article.
—We are not ready to come to such a conclusion.
—The US would always face an
asymmetry.
—A caveat that says the US will test
if we determine the negotiations are not progressing does not help
the situation.
—The President would be put in a position of breaking an agreement
and of justifying that the Soviets were not negotiating in good
faith.
—The implications with respect to détente would prevent us from ever
making such a move.
ALTERNATIVES
1—Do not request “no testing” during negotiations and make it clear
to the Soviets that we are progressing as rapidly as possible.
2—Have a “no test” agreement that expires at the earliest time the
US could test the MHV.
3—Have a “no test” agreement for all other kill mechanisms except EW
and low altitude non-nuclear kill.
