Attached is a revised version of the proposed Presidential Directive on
arms transfers. It has been revised by Cy
Vance and myself, in the light of Cy’s consultations on
the Hill.2
To facilitate your reading and approval, the new passages are underlined;
previously approved language to be removed is bracketed and crossed out
in pencil.
More specifically, please note that the first underlined passage merely
states the exemption which previously had been repeated several times
throughout the PD, thereby flagging it
excessively. Since the
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US has 42 defense treaties, we concluded
that we had no choice but at least to mention these special treaty
obligations specifically once.
The addition to paragraph 2 c. was in our submission to you, and I think
it is consistent with what you favor. If it is not we will take it
out.
The proposed alternative language for paragraph 5 is designed to be more
consistent with existing laws.
Since this issue is likely to be discussed at least in your bilateral
with Giscard, we suggest that
you take a copy of this memorandum with you and that its final issuance
be delayed until your return.3
Attachment
Annotated Presidential Directive4
ANNOTATED PD
5
After reviewing results of the Policy Review Committee meeting held
on April 12, 1977, to discuss US
conventional arms transfer policy, I have concluded that we must
restrain the transfer of conventional arms by recognizing that arms
transfers are an exceptional foreign policy implement, to be used
only in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated that the
transfers contribute to our national security interests.
In establishing this policy of restraint, the United States will
continue to utilize arms transfers to promote our security and the
security of our allies and close friends.
Recognizing that unilateral restraint can have only limited
effectiveness without multilateral cooperation, the United States
will continue its efforts to urge other suppliers to join us in
pursuing policies of restraint. In addition, we believe that
regional agreements among purchasers of arms can contribute
significantly to curbing the proliferation of conventional weaponry,
and we will assist in whatever way possible in the conclusion of
such agreements.
The United States will give continued emphasis to formulating and
conducting our security assistance programs in a manner which
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will promote and advance
respect for human rights in recipient countries.
Further, an assessment will henceforth be made of the economic impact
of proposed transfers of major defense equipment to those less
developed countries which receive US
economic assistance.
In recognition of our special treaty obligations with NATO countries, Japan, Australia, and
New Zealand, these countries will be exempted as appropriate from
the dollar volume restraints and other controls established
below:
In furtherance of this policy of restraint, and except in
extra-ordinary circumstances personally approved by me, I direct
that:
1. The dollar volume (in constant 1976 dollars) of [Transfers of] new
commitments under the Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance
Programs for weapons and weapons-related items in FY 1978 will be reduced from the FY 1977 total [(exempting transfers to
NATO countries, Australia, New
Zealand, and Japan in both cases)]. It will be our goal to continue
to reduce total dollar volume [s approved] in each subsequent
year.
2. With regard to newly-developed advanced weapons systems:
a. [Except in extraordinary circumstances personally approved by the
President,] The United States will not be the first supplier to
introduce into a region an advanced weapons system which creates a
new or significantly higher combat capability.6
b. Commitment for sale [, cooperative research and development,] or
coproduction of newly-developed advanced weapons systems is
prohibited until the systems are operationally deployed with US forces.
c. The Secretary of State will establish more extensive guidelines
for assessing requests for newly-developed advanced weapons systems,
including requirements 1) that supplying the system would uniquely
strengthen the requestor’s ability to perform military functions
which serve US security interests,
[and] 2) that less-advanced, existing systems with roughly
comparable capabilities are unavailable from the United States, and
3) that providing these systems will not require the presence in
country of large numbers of Americans for long periods of
time.:ue7
3. [Unless an exception is personally approved by the President,]
Unique advanced weapons systems developed or significantly modified
solely for export will be transferred only within the treaty
relationships referred to above [only to NATO countries, Australia, New Zealand, and
Japan].8
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4. Agreements for coproduction of significant weapons, equipment, or
major components, beyond assembly of subcomponents and the
fabrication of high-turnover spare parts are prohibited, [except
with NATO countries, Australia,
New Zealand, and Japan, or where the President determines that such
agreement is justified by extraordinary circumstances.] Requests for
any other items (e.g., major overhaul facilities) will be subject to
guidelines applied globally, analyzing closely whether the proposed
coproduction project would over time provide equipment in excess of
local needs. In each approved agreement, terms under which
third-country exports will be permitted, if at all, will be
stipulated, emphasizing that coproduction is intended for the
coproducer’s requirements and not for export.
5. [Unless otherwise specified, no significant weapons, equipment, or
major components acquired from the United States will be transferred
to third countries without US
permission.] In addition to the requirements of law and existing
policies concerning re-transfer assurances, the US, as a condition of sale for certain
weapons, equipment, or major components, may stipulate that the
US will not entertain any
requests for re-transfers.:ue9
6. Policy level approval by the Department of State will be required
before authorizing 1) licensing for sales promotion or technical
data transmission by private firms, and 2) US military or civilian briefings, site surveys,
transmission of technical information, or any similar activity which
might promote the sale of items of major defense equipment [defense
articles and services]. Further, US
embassies and military elements will not promote or assist in the
promotion of arms sales without specific authorization. Finally, the
Secretary of Defense will continue the review of government
procedures which may promote the sale of arms, reporting the results
of this review within 60 days.
