170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva1
239666. White House for Brzezinski and Schlesinger. Subject: Instructions for CTB Delegation.
1. The following Presidential instructions for the trilateral CTB negotiations have been received from the White House.
2. Begin quote. “In the trilateral CTB negotiations that begin on October 3, I want you to continue presenting and seeking Soviet acceptance of our positions on the key substantive issues, and to maintain the momentum towards a resolution of remaining differences among the three participants. In doing so, you should be guided by the following considerations.
3. You should hold firm on our basic position that PNEs should not be permitted, and while hearing the Soviets out on any new ideas they may have, be prepared to explain why the accommodation schemes they have presented are not adequate for eliminating military benefits.
4. As you are aware, in my discussions with Gromyko,2 I offered to give the Soviets the results of our testing experience which demonstrates the limited technical and economic utility of PNEs. The SCC will promptly develop an appropriate presentation and forward it for your use in the negotiations.
5. If the Soviets propose a formula for including in a PNE ban a provision for continuing review to determine whether PNEs might be permitted in the future, you may indicate that we are prepared to give this serious consideration.
6. You should continue to explore the possible contribution that a network of automated seismic installations in US and Soviet territory could make to CTB verification capabilities, describing relevant technical factors, such as types of instrumentation, site selection, installation and maintenance. However, you may, as appropriate, indicate that we do not insist on a large number of such installations.
7. You should continue to press the Soviets to agree, in advance, to detailed procedures for carrying out on-site inspections, including full delineation of rights and functions of observers, and should outline our bilateral and multilateral approach to on-site inspection arrangements. [Page 404]You are also authorized to indicate to the Soviets that we are prepared to consider ways in which differences might be narrowed between mandatory and voluntary on-site inspection provisions.
8. We should maintain the position that the treaty should provide for entry-into-force without the adherence of all nuclear powers, and that parties should have the right subject to suitable notice provisions, to withdraw if, after five years, all nuclear powers have not joined. You may indicate to the Soviets that we are prepared to reduce the duration provision to three years if in your judgment this will elicit commensurate Soviet moves on other outstanding differences.” End quote.