Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region

41. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Argentina and Chile¹

Washington, December 15, 1978, 0118Z

315625. Subject: Beagle Channel Message to President Videla

1. (C—Entire Text)

2. Embassy Buenos Aires: You should deliver the following message soonest to President Videla from President Carter (Embassy Santiago: This is for your background in making similar approach set forth in Septel):²

Begin Text:

As you know, for some decades one of the great accomplishments of the countries in this hemisphere is that disputes have been managed peacefully. In this spirit, my country negotiated with Panama a new treaty on the Canal to deal with a longstanding source of tension between our countries. I am concerned that the current military mobilization in Argentina could result in events getting out of control with hostilities commencing and escalating. I know these concerns are shared by many of our colleagues in the hemisphere and in the world. We are working for peace in the world and have always been forthright and clear in quickly condemning aggression. If aggression were to occur because of the Beagle Channel dispute, we would speak out strongly against it.

The United States does not want to inject itself into the substance of this complicated matter and we hope early progress can be made building on your talks this week, perhaps including a mutual military stand-down. However, we would be prepared, if both parties wished, to consult with others to help develop a prompt mediation by some other party.³

Given the peaceful tradition of our hemisphere, I believe open and clear communication of our positions is critical for all our efforts toward a peaceful world. Please accept my message in this spirit.

I am also indicating my concerns to the Government of Chile.⁴

End Text.

3. White House does not plan to release text and would prefer GOA follow same practice.

4. For USUN: You may inform Waldheim that the President has encouraged the parties to settle their differences.

5. Please deliver text in English, since we wish to avoid any differences in translation nuances.

Christopher

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840139–1813. Confidential; Niact; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Immediate for information to USUN. Drafted by Bushnell; cleared in ARA, IO, and S/S-O and by Brzezinski; approved by Christopher.
2. In telegram 315626, December 15, the Department transmitted a similar message from Carter to Pinochet. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840139–1816)
3. In a December 14 evening report to Carter, Christopher wrote: “Paralleling your message to Presidents Videla and Pinochet, the Brazilians have made a similar approach to both governments, and Carlos Andres Perez has telephoned Videla. Also, the EC–9 is considering a joint démarche to both parties strongly urging a peaceful solution.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports [State], 12/78) In a December 14 conversation, McGee and Brazilian Ambassador to the OAS Alarico Silveira discussed “what actions might possibly be taken in the OAS” regarding the dispute. (Memorandum of Conversation; National Archives, RG 59, USOAS Files, 1971–1985, Lot 85D427, USOAS—Beagle Channel Dispute) In telegram 24503 from Rome, December 15, Wagner described his ongoing conversations with Vatican officials and reported that Casaroli “stated that Holy See will continue to ‘do all it can’ to defuse crisis situation and to bring about peaceful settlement of the dispute.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780517–0331)
4. In a December 16 evening report to Carter, Vance wrote: “Presidents Videla and Pinochet both expressed appreciation for your messages,” and Cubillos “asked that we send military attaché as observers, which we have declined.” Videla “said he was exploring with his military commanders possible ways of resuming confidential talks with Chile,” although he was “being pressed by his hard-liners to authorize military action.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State), 12/78)