Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region

38. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy¹

Washington, December 8, 1978, 2343Z

310384. Subject: Beagle Channel. Ref: (A) Buenos Aires 09558² (B)

1. (C–Entire Text)

2. Summary. Department is increasingly concerned that hostilities may be imminent in the dispute between Argentina and Chile over the islands south of the Beagle Channel and the resulting claims to maritime zones in the South Atlantic. Mediation by the Pope—a possibility in which Argentina is interested—may be one of the few remaining possibilities of avoiding bloodshed. Ambassador is requested to approach Vatican, express our grave concern that Argentina may resort to military action if the December 12 Foreign Ministers’ meeting³ is not successful and encourage Vatican make a firm offer to mediate the dispute as soon as possible.

2. Argentina and Chile have carried on an increasingly acrimonious dispute over territorial rights to islands and islets south of the Beagle Channel for nearly 100 years. The dispute was submitted to arbitration in 1971 and the award which was handed down by the British Crown for the three major inhabited islands principally favored Chile. Argentina declared the award void in January 1978. Negotiations between the two countries since that time have been largely unsuccessful and even before formal talks ended on November 2, Argentina began sabre rattling exercises intended to convince the Chileans that hostilities would result if a negotiated settlement could not be agreed upon. Changing political realities in Argentina have projected hardliners who favor a war with Chile into increasingly powerful positions.

4. Our Ambassador in Buenos Aires has had several conversations with Papal Nuncio to Argentina, Laghi, who has suggested that the Pope might be willing to mediate the dispute if he felt that situation was sufficiently critical and that further bilateral progress could not be made (REFTEL A).

5. The Department believes that critical point in the dispute may have been reached (REFTEL B).⁴ In fact, latest intelligence reports indicate situation may be even more critical than we had previously thought.

6. You should immediately contact highest ranking Curia official available and make following points:

—USG believes that possibility of hostilities between Argentina and Chile is imminent.

—Demarches to Chile and Argentina by the US, the EC–9 and numerous Latin American countries have not diminished the possibility of war; the two countries maintain their apparent collision course.

—If the December 12 meeting of Foreign Ministers does not reach substantive agreement, and this appears increasingly unlikely because of the Chilean insistence on limiting the question to maritime boundaries while Argentina demands that all territory in the far south be considered, war seems likely.

—However, if the Pope were to immediately offer his good offices to mediate the conflict, this might possibily avert conflict. Only the moral authority of the Pope may be able to avert what appears to be a slide into war.

—Papal efforts could be expressed in a number of ways, including: personal messages to both presidents, public statement urging peaceful resolution of the problem and/or an invitation to presidents of the two countries to meet with him to review situation if this is appropriate.

—If the situation is deteriorating as it appears to us that it is, whatever is done must be dramatic enough to give Argentina serious pause.⁵

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780507–0584. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to Buenos Aires, Santiago, Bogotá, Brasília, Caracas, Montevideo, Mexico City, and Lima. Drafted by Ruser and Bumpus; cleared by Guzman and in EUR, IO/UNP, and S/S-O; approved by Vaky.
2. Dated December 5. Castro reported that the Nuncio had “denounced GOA’s tactics in its news releases creating feeling Pope was only acceptable person as a mediator,” that Laghi had said that the “Pope was not anxious to accept mediator role,” and that the Nuncio had said that “when all was said and done Pope would accept role if he became convinced war was imminent and possibility lives could be lost.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780500–1015)
3. Meeting was between Cubillos of Chile and Pastor of Argentina.
4. No telegram was referenced. In telegram 9630 from Buenos Aires, December 7, Castro reported: “While the final decision probably has not yet been made, I am convinced that the Argentine armed forces will initiate military operations against Chile,” “unless Chile comes to the December 12 talks prepared to deal forthrightly with the issues.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780505–0243) In telegram 9323 from Santiago, December 8, Landau reported: “As matters now stand it is likely that the December 12 foreign ministers meeting will fail.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780506–0740)
5. In telegram 24060 from Rome, December 9, Wagner reported his discussions with Villot, Caprio, and Casaroli. Casaroli “undertook to recommend promptly that Pope send parallel messages to Videla and Pinochet, prior to foreign ministers meeting December 12, urging them to continue effort towards peaceful settlement of dispute and issue public statement along same lines.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780509–0012)