Office of the Historian

37. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

Washington, November 27, 1978

SUBJECT

  • Beagle Channel Update

Since November 2 when the special Argentine-Chilean commission adjourned without having reached an agreement on the jurisdictional dispute in the Beagle Channel, several diplomatic messages between the two countries’ Presidents have been exchanged. The Argentines [Page 156] agreed to a Chilean proposal that a mediator be chosen to resolve the dispute only if boundary questions could be discussed first. The Argentines want exclusive maritime claims in the Atlantic, and three islands in the Beagle Channel under Chilean jurisdiction threaten these claims. The Chileans have resisted the idea of setting such terms of reference for a mediator.

Intelligence reports indicate that the GOA has been hastily purchasing arms: patrol boats from Israel, France, West Germany, and South Korea; aircraft from Israel (30 Mirage III jets) and France (parts for Alouette helicopters); ammunition from France (the Exocet naval missile), U.K., West Germany, Belgium, Italy; and communication equipment from France and Israel.2 Hardliners in the Argentine military believe the time has come for a show of force. One of the leaders of this group, the commanding general of Argentina’s I Corps, told our Ambassador that if the dispute is not resolved by the first two weeks in December, Argentina would take the initiative and fight Chile.3 Reinforcing this message, the admiral who commands the Argentine Coast Guard told an American Embassy officer last Friday (November 24) that Argentina will occupy the disputed territory and will break diplomatic and trade ties with Chile unless negotiations are resumed in ten days.4

We have just learned from the Chilean Foreign Minister that he is pleased by the conciliatory nature of Argentina’s latest note, which is reported to have recommended the modalities of the December 11 Foreign Minister’s meeting in Buenos Aires, and he will recommend that Pinochet accept it.5 It’s not clear yet whether this means that the Chileans have accepted Argentina’s definition of the issue.

Our position has remained one of talking to both sides (and others—e.g., the Brazilians) without getting in between. I continue to believe that is the best course. Trying to mediate between the Argentines and the Chileans would make Camp David look easy, and we just don’t have the same kind of stake in the Beagle Channel that we have in the Middle East.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 45, Latin America, 8–12/78. Secret. Sent for information. Inderfurth and Denend initialed the memorandum.↩
  2. Not found.↩
  3. In telegram 9248 from Buenos Aires, November 22, Castro reported on his conversation with Suárez Mason. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780481–0639)↩
  4. In telegram 9307 from Buenos Aires, November 24, the Embassy reported on a conversation with Santa Maria. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780485–0222)↩
  5. In telegram 9010 from Santiago, November 26, Landau reported on his conversation with Cubillos. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780523–0264)↩