Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region

372. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State¹

Caracas, January 10, 1981, 1742Z

243. Subject: Military Assistance to El Salvador. Ref: State 003728.²

1. Secret–Entire Text.

2. Due to visit of Codel Santini,³ the absence of the Foreign Minister, the sickness of Minister of Presidency Garcia Bustillos, the heavy schedule of Calvani, and the fact that the Venezuelan Government doesn’t really begin working again until mid-January, it was difficult to get the message (reftel) to appropriate officials until January 9. I met with Garcia Bustillos and Calvani. Both were extremely pleased by our decision.

3. Garcia Bustillos, whom I saw first, said he would inform the President immediately since the President is deeply involved in all of the decision making. He said that I should have my substantive talks with Calvani, but that he supported the decision. He said he hoped that it would not be given much publicity and that we can minimize attention to the decision. He also offered that he hoped the Reagan administration would continue to pursue this similar policy and that it would not feel it necessary to draw excessive public attention to U.S. military assistance to Salvador.

4. The meeting with Calvani was much longer and more substantive. Calvani was very pleased by the information and by the decision. Indeed, he kept mumbling to himself throughout our conversation how relieved he was that we were taking these steps. He also referred back to his last discussion here with Bill Bowdler in December⁴ recalling that Bowdler had said we and Venezuela should treat this as a pedagogical exercise for the Salvadoran military requiring them to demonstrate certain progress and, as a reward, providing some military assistance stepping up the assistance as performance improves.

5. Calvani said that he had been in touch by telephone with various contacts in Salvador throughout the day on the 9th when the supposed large offense was to materialize from the left. He was receiving reports that the situation was quiet. He showed me his schedule of the day before to explain why he had been unable to meet with me. Virtually every meeting he had was connected in some way to efforts to brief on Salvador or to extract his government’s assistance for Salvador. Calvani itemized for me briefly those steps that he thought were on the way within the Venezuelan Government to support Salvador:

—The oil facility has finally been approved for Salvador and Nicaragua. The President has asked Minister of Energy Calderon Berti to fly to Salvador first and Nicaragua second within the next week or so to sign agreements in the capitals. Calvani did not know whether the Mexicans would also participate in the signing in Salvador. Calvani underscored the point that it was the President who had insisted that Calderon go to Salvador and accomplish the Managua signing on the same trip for obvious political impact.

—The team Venezuela sent to Salvador to evaluate the Land Reform Program has completed its report, and it has been submitted to the Ministry of Agriculture here. Calvani has made his appeal to the Minister in front of the Minister’s principal advisers. He has requested the follow-up assistance called for in the report for money, fertilizers, seeds and technicians. Calvani said the two problems are that the Salvadorean Government has been imprecise about what it needs in the way of seeds and fertilizers. Also the Minister of Agriculture in Venezuela might be changed within the next few days, meaning Calvani might have to begin this briefing process all over again with the new Minister and his new team.

—Calvani is seeking to provide two types of police assistance. First, he has spoken to Sosa Chacin, the head of the Venezuelan Technical Police (PTJ), about providing personnel, equipment, and expertise to help develop a technical police capacity under the Fiscal General in Salvador. Calvani had invited the Fiscal General to visit Caracas for this purpose, but unfortunately, the individual he had invited has just recently been replaced, so he must start that process over again in Salvador.

—Calvani has also been talking with the Mayor of San Salvador to improve the city policy operations, particularly to combat simple crime. He has a commitment from the Governor of the Federal District in Caracas to work out a bilateral agreement with the Mayor of San Salvador. But this commitment might be undone because in the upcoming cabinet shuffle, the Governor of Caracas may move to another Ministry.

Calvani showed frustration at the bureaucratic problems he is facing in developing these assistance programs, making his job as coordinator for El Salvador virtually full time, but he is optimistic about Duarte and his government.

6. I asked him whether, following Bill Bowdler’s fruitful December visit, he had finally had a meeting with the Accion Democratica Party leaders as we had urged at the time. Calvani brightened up and said he had forgotten to tell me that indeed they had met only a few days after the Bowdler visit. He said he wasn’t keeping “anything” from me, and he had intended to call me right after the meeting but had forgotten. He said that he, Eduardo Fernandez, COPEI Secretary-General; and Oswaldo Alvarez Paz, COPEI Parliamentary Leader, had met AD President Gonzalio Barrios, Luis Esteben Rey, Simon Alberto Consalvi, and Hernandez Grisanti for a very long session on Salvador. Calvani said that, after 5 minutes, he came to agree with my judgment that the Adecos were suffering from an extreme lack of information. Throughout most of the rest of the conversation, the exercise became one of information transfer, more than a debate over judgments and strategy. Calvani urged on them again, as Bowdler had and I have frequently, that they send a team to Salvador urgently to get first-hand knowledge. They said they would do it. But Calvani is persuaded (as am I after being at this for over a year now) that AD is so divided internally that it cannot make the decision to send a group, much less manage to select the individuals to send. Calvani said that the meeting was inconclusive but generally positive. The same group may meet again or may meet with President Herrera soon. However, all in the group recognized that AD’s cooperation would depend, to a large degree, on the attitude of Carlos Andres Perez, who remains extremely hostile to the Duarte Government.

7. The fact that the Department provided me this advance information on our policy was extremely useful here in maintaining credibility about our policy and our desire to share with the Venezuelan Government.⁵

8. Department may wish to pass to Embassy San Salvador.

Luers

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, no film number. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. Dated January 7. The Department instructed the Embassy to “inform appropriate GOV officials that, in response to an appeal from President Duarte to strengthen his position with the armed forces, the USG plans to resume military assistance to El Salvador.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, no film number) See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XV, Central America, Document 457.
3. In telegram 2564 to Caracas, January 6, the Department transmitted a press release announcing that a congressional delegation led by Santini would visit Venezuela on January 7 and 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810007-0191)
4. See footnote 4, Document 371.
5. In telegram 9174 to Caracas, January 14, the Department provided further details about the resumption of military assistance to El Salvador for use in discussions with the GOV. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, no film number)