371. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
Venezuela’s Policy in Central America and the Caribbean [portion marking not declassified]
Key Judgments
In its effort to become a major force in Central America and the Caribbean, Venezuela is using its financial and political resources to expand its influence throughout the region. In doing so, it is responding to the potential threat to its interests from the increasing pressures for change in the area, as well as hoping to promote progressive, friendly governments in several countries. [portion marking not declassified]
Venezuela, however, does not appear to have the resources to be as effective as either of the two dominant outside powers, the United States and Cuba. In the short term, Caracas’s bid for influence will be hampered by domestic partisanship, a shortage of technical and human resources, and a lack of central direction and coherent strategy. Over the long term, Venezuela’s commitment to this course and the availabil [Page 1081] ity of surplus oil revenues for aid programs are uncertain. [portion marking not declassified]
These circumstances and Caracas’s deteriorating relations with Havana should produce closer cooperation with the United States. President Herrera’s government recognizes a considerable community of regional interests with Washington but cannot abide the public perception at home or abroad that it is acting as a US surrogate. The prospects for closer cooperation also will be affected by Herrera’s confidence in the depth and breadth of US consultations, as well as by the extent to which Washington appreciates Venezuela’s more parochial concerns and its fears of big power confrontation in the Caribbean basin.2 [portion marking not declassified]
Venezuela accepts that it must compete with Cuba for influence in the region, but is apprehensive and prefers to maintain stable relations with the Castro regime and to avoid involvement in US-Cuban disputes. If Venezuela proceeds with plans to release a Cuban exile accused of bombing a Cuban airliner in 1976, however, Havana may break relations in the next few months.3 [portion marking not declassified]
In Central America, Venezuela’s short-term policies seek to counter external forces that support violent revolution or reaction and to provide economic assistance and political initiatives that will relieve internal pressures in those countries. Its longer term objectives are to reduce political polarization in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras by encouraging democratic openings, bolster political pluralism in Nicaragua, and sustain and protect Costa Rica’s democracy. El Salvador currently is the key to Venezuela’s strategy.4 [portion marking not declassified]
[Page 1082]In the Caribbean, Venezuela hopes to counter Cuban expansionism, preserve stability by shoring up democratic institutions and national economies, and avert superpower confrontations. Jamaica is the testing ground for more aggressive pursuit of these objectives. [portion marking not declassified]
Venezuela prefers to work much of its policy through multilateral mechanisms, such as international financial institutions, the Andean Pact, the Inter-American Energy Plan, and the OPEC Development Fund. Herrera believes this approach supplements, and in some cases replaces, Venezuelan resources and reduces Caracas’s political exposure. [portion marking not declassified]
The new joint Venezuelan-Mexican Petroleum Financing Facility, the cornerstone of Venezuela’s regional policy, can significantly further Caracas’s interests. Among the agreement’s potential pitfalls, however, are unanswered questions regarding its practicability as an instrument of political leverage and its vulnerability to possible Mexican-Venezuelan rivalry. In any event, the agreement promises to blunt charges from Central American and Caribbean nations that OPEC’s pricing policies have undermined their economies, while the financial benefits will contribute to regional economic stability. [portion marking not declassified]
Domestic politics is playing an important role in Venezuela’s policy toward the region. Former President Perez, still an independent force in Central American–Caribbean affairs and spokesman for the largest opposition party, differs with the Herrera administration on policy toward a number of countries, especially El Salvador. Herrera’s confrontational style has hurt chances for interparty cooperation, but probably not enough to undermine Venezuela’s overall policy. [portion marking not declassified]
[Omitted here are Parts I (“Central America-Caribbean Policy: Motives and Tools”) and II (“The Cuban and U.S. Factors in Venezuelan Policy”) of the assessment, and Appendices A (“Venezuela’s State-to-State Relations With Central America”) and B (“Venezuela’s State-to-State Relations With the Caribbean”)]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 82T00150R, Box 3, Folder 3. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Latin America Division of the Office of Political Analysis; coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Central Reference, [less than 1 line not declassified], and the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America.↩
- “Caribbean basin” refers to all of Central America and the Caribbean Sea. Central America includes Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, and Belize. “The Caribbean” refers to all of the islands of the Caribbean Sea, plus Guyana and Suriname. [Footnote in original]↩
- A reference to Orlando Bosch, who was acquitted of the bombing by a Venezuelan military court in September. (“4 Acquitted in Cuban Bombing,” New York Times, September 27, 1980, p. 3) In telegram 10558 from Caracas, November 29, the Embassy reported that “additional delay is still a possibility” in Bosch’s release. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800571-0198)↩
- In telegram 11023 from Caracas, December 14, Bowdler reported that Calvani had told him that the U.S. “suspension of aid” to El Salvador “had caused domestic political problems for COPEI,” “but it had been an important element in the shaping of the new agreement” between the PDC and the Salvadoran military. Calvani had told the military “that Venezuela could not stand alone, after the US’s action, in the face of mounting world opinion against El Salvador.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900073-1968)↩