345. Memorandum of Conversation1


  • International Political Issues: Panama Canal Treaties, Non-Proliferation, Middle East, Africa, Belize, Nicaragua, and Conventional Arms Restraint


  • President Jimmy Carter
  • Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance
  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Terence A. Todman, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
  • W. Anthony Lake, Director, Policy Planning Staff
  • Robert A. Pastor, NSC Staff Member
  • Ambassador Viron P. Vaky
  • Guy F. Erb, NSC Staff Member
  • Venezuela

    • Carlos Andres Perez, President
    • Simon Bottaro Consalvi, Minister of Foreign Affairs
    • Manuel Perez Guerrero, Minister of State for International Economic Affairs
    • Valentin Acosta Hernandez, Minister of Energy and Mines
    • Carmelo Lesseur Lauria, Minister, Secretariat of the Presidency
    • Hector Hurtado, Minister of State, President of the Investment Fund
    • Ambassador Ignacio Iribarren
    • Dr. Reinaldo Figuerido, Director of Foreign Trade Institute

After exchanging cordialities, President Perez asked about President Carter’s preference with regard to an agenda. President Carter said that he would like to discuss international political issues today and economic issues tomorrow.

President Perez asked President Carter for his estimate of the chances for Canal Treaty ratification. President Carter said that this was the most difficult political issue he has ever faced, with the vote still very close. We are determined, he said, that when the process is completed there is no continuation of U.S. presence after this century and no insinuation of any U.S. intent to intervene in Panama’s internal affairs. Some of the language of the reservations was unfortunate, and we will make every effort to correct the mistakes in the process of ratifying the second treaty.

President Carter said that Perez could help by adding his voice to his own in counseling Torrijos to be moderate and to wait for the [Page 987] process to be completed. Those who oppose the Treaty welcome any sign of disharmony between the U.S. and Panama, and this should be avoided. We are reasonably sure, President Carter said, that we can accomplish what we have set out to do. He said he recognized the Treaties as the most important challenge and opportunity for bringing a new spirit to inter-American relations which has been placed on his shoulders.

President Perez expressed his concern over amendments to the Treaties, especially the DeConcini amendment.2 When he learned of it, he immediately telephoned Torrijos and counseled him not to react but to wait, to be calm and “to go to the mountains and address the forest.” (President Carter interjected that he had a similar conversation with Torrijos.) Perez said that Torrijos had described his conversation with President Carter and had agreed that he should wait until the process was completed and to evaluate the situation then. Torrijos had wanted to come to Caracas, but Perez said he talked him out of it on the grounds that if he were here the press would force him to make a statement. He sent his Minister of Education, Royo, instead, and Perez had a long conversation with him. They agreed, Perez said, that the wording of the De Concini reservation was “unacceptable”. It was also unnecessary, Perez added, “since the U.S. had the power to do what it proposed anyway. War is simply declared; it is not announced ahead of time.”

Torrijos believes, Perez said, that some kind of declaration should be made in the second treaty to offset the public impact of the De Concini Amendment. Perez said he had worked out suggested wording when Royo was here, and he wanted to give President Carter an aide memoire with that wording (Perez handed the President this memo).3 If something like this was not done, Perez said, the situation would be dangerous.

Perez said that Torrijos had sent a letter to each Latin American Chief of State who had attended the signing ceremony, since he felt obligated to keep them informed of recent developments which affected the Treaties.

President Carter said that we shared Perez’ views and concern, and these views were very helpful to him.

[Page 988]

President Carter said that Argentina had promised to ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty soon. Although they have said this before, they had sent a message this month indicating they are getting ready to do so.4

The U.S. Congress had passed a law on nuclear energy, which clearly spells out the U.S. position in providing nuclear fuel with certain safeguards. President Carter said his visit to Brazil would be used to explain our position fully;5 he was afraid that Brazil may not have completely understood it. We believed it was relatively easy to cooperate in ways which will provide nuclear power and at the same time eliminate the danger of weapon production.

Perez said that during his conversations with Geisel (November 1977) he expressed solidarity with U.S. policy. Geisel was upset, and took the position that one could not keep Brazil from doing the things that the U.S. has already done. Perez told him that whatever the U.S. has already done, the world cannot afford unrestrained proliferation. It was because of aspirations in this area, Perez said, that he had proposed a multinational Latin American reprocessing center, under the auspices of OLADE or SELA, as a way of overcoming jealousies and satisfying needs. Brazil, of course, was also worried about Argentina. Geisel said that first he wanted to talk to President Carter, then he would talk to the GOV about the multinational center proposal.

President Carter said that we have tried the reprocessing route and have found it unsatisfactory. The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Study which will be completed soon will probably recommend regional centers under international safeguards, precisely to overcome national sensitivities. He said he expected that the study would find that reprocessing is simply not a necessary part of a nuclear energy system. He expressed the view that both Germany and France realize the problems and would probably not offer the same kind of arrangements now that they did then.

President Carter said that common expressions of concern would be useful in drawing the distinction between legitimate desires for peaceful use of nuclear energy and arms production. He also noted that Brazil has thorium, and this is a promising source of fuel which would avoid the plutonium problem. Geisel is discussing the use of [Page 989] thorium, and this may be an avenue out of the present problem. Perhaps, the President said, the U.S. pushed too far too fast with Brazil, but we will discuss these matters.

Perez asked whether the U.S. would be helpful to Argentina in the area of thorium technology if they expressed interest, and the President answered affirmatively.

Middle East

Perez expressed great concern over the Middle Eastern situation. He recalled that he had told Secretary Vance during the latter’s November visit,6 that the Sadat visit to Israel could end up being very dangerous if in fact Israel did not respond. That seems to be what has happened. Begin appears very intransigent and hard.

Perez said he realizes the difficulties all this presents the U.S., given the Jewish vote. But the situation was at a dangerous point. The time has come for the U.S. to take a decisive, tough position. Sadat is in danger, and the extremists are gaining in influence. The situation may get out of hand and out of U.S. control.

Perez added that when he was in Moscow (November 1976) the Russians indicated to him a desire to reach agreement with the U.S. on a Middle East solution and were in effect waiting for the Carter Administration to take power. The situation is confused and dangerous, and Perez said he would like President Carter’s views.

President Carter acknowledged that it was a subject with great political importance and difficulty in the U.S., and it seemed that whenever the parties to the dispute wanted to communicate bad news, they used the U.S. He said that the U.S. had developed a position, and a series of recommendations which were reasonably compatible with principles Israel had espoused in the past, and which were now acceptable to Sadat, and perhaps also to Hussein. The problem is that Begin no longer espouses these principles. Even if Israeli security were assured and Israeli troops were on the West Bank, there were three key problems: (a) Israel refuses to terminate civilian settlements on occupied territory; (b) it refuses to allow Palestinian Arabs to have a voice in their future; and (c) it refuses to recognize that UN Resolution 2427 applies to the West Bank. If Begin holds to these positions, no progress can be made.

[Page 990]

It may be, President Carter indicated, that internal pressures in Israel will lead to modifications. He said that he saw a recent poll that indicated that more than 60 percent of the Israeli public do not think that settlements should be retained as an issue to try to gain peace. But the Begin government is stubborn on this issue, particularly in Judea and Samaria. Many in the U.S. who have supported Israel now express deep concern over their policies. The best thing to do over the next few weeks was to remain quiet and let internal pressures in Israel operate and take root. Sadat, he said, is flexible, bold and forthcoming. But he believes we have more influence over Israel than we do. (Perez interjected that he thought so too.) Our influence, however, is limited. We will pursue the ideas we have put forward, but there are limitations.

Perez said that when he was in Vienna (March 1977) Kriesky told him he was commissioned by the EC to make a report. He prepared it but waited to publish it until after the Israeli elections. He had thought that the analyses and recommendations—in which he found a certain degree of intransigence—would have brought constructive pressures on whomever won that election. Since Kriesky was a Jew and Austria a neutral this should have been the case. But nothing ever happened. Europe’s position is now confused.

President Carter said that he believed that many leaders, including Perez, had stayed aloof in deference to the U.S., so as not to interfere with what we were trying to do. While he did not want to recruit leaders against Israel, the fact is that the U.S. cannot be the only voice to express world-wide concern. While he has not consulted with other leaders except for Perez, he will probably now do so. It would be helpful if Israel could be made to realize that the world expects Resolution 242 to be honored and that a peaceful settlement is needed.

President Carter said that the Israel Cabinet had supported Begin unanimously, but that was after a five-hour debate. He also understood that Defense Minister Weizman would be going to Egypt. If true, that is hopeful. It had been necessary to confront Begin, President Carter said, to clarify, for the first time in ten years, the differences that exist between us. Up to now Israel had been successful in fuzzing over and concealing these. This is now in the open.

Perez said that a great worry he had was how long Sadat could resist Arab pressures, especially the more extreme circles, e.g., Iraq and Algeria.

President Carter said that Sadat had the support of Morocco, Sudan, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. He is safe for a few more weeks, perhaps months. The Arabs want peace so desperately that they will accept any reasonable formula Sadat can work out, whatever they say publicly. Sadat, Carter said, was close to him and a good friend. He trusts the U.S. almost completely, but he unfortunately has an exaggerated idea of the extent of U.S. influence over Israel.

[Page 991]

President Carter said that there is a possibility that we would make our recommendations public.

On Geneva, the U.S. is prepared to go at any time, but the questions of agenda, dates and procedures have proven more difficult than substance. It was because Sadat became impatient of this that he tried the end-run of his visit to Jerusalem. The U.S. would like to work out a proposal acceptable to Egypt and Jordan and then later Syria might accept. Asked if this might be a US-USSR joint prospect, President Carter said that the U.S. keeps the Soviet Union completely informed, but no nation in the region desires to see the USSR play an important role, certainly not Egypt and Jordan and not even Syria, which expressed the deepest concern when we signed the US-USSR agreement. The problem is that the Soviets still demand total withdrawal and an independent nation under the PLO. And privately, even the Arab nations don’t want to see the Palestinians with a completely independent nation which would open their countries to subversion. Any further proposal we make will probably be a U.S. proposal. We would, however, consult the USSR and keep them informed.

Perez said he understood the Saudis were also intransigent on the issue of a Palestinian homeland. President Carter said many of the leaders in the region took a different position privately than they did publicly. They want peace so badly they would modify their position to accept a Sadat-Israeli solution, even if reluctantly.

President Carter said that we would be happy to answer any further queries Perez may have on the Middle East in the future on a private, confidential basis.


Perez said that he would like to discuss Africa. The problem of the Horn appears to be on the way to settlement, but that is not the case with Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. Having received Carter’s letter,8 Perez said, he expressed his concern to Castro. Castro, however, is deeply committed with the USSR. The Cubans defend their position arguing that the U.S. intervenes, and that while they will not intervene if they are asked for help by a legitimate government, they have the right to agree to help. Perez asked for President Carter’s advice on ways to put pressure on Cuba.

[Page 992]

President Carter said that we see a prospect of additional military action by Cuban/Soviet forces in Ethiopia against Eritrea. There is still some fighting in the Ogaden. He noted that the Cubans have 16,000 troops in Ethiopia alone. In Angola there are more than 20,000. These figures are accurate. There has been an increase in the past year, the Ethiopian contingent representing a new movement. Whether the Cubans act as the agents of the USSR or vice versa, it is all very convenient for them.

What worries the U.S., President Carter said, is not just the achievement of peace in the Horn, but that the Cubans may effect a permanent placement of troops on the continent. We see Cuban intervention as a serious threat to peace. They are offering their services in Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and in Tanzania.

In the Horn, the Soviets first over-supplied the Somalis with weapons, and this precipitated Somalia’s aggression. Then, the Russians did the same thing with Ethiopia, and it will probably lead to a similar problem.

The U.S., President Carter said, has no troops and no surrogates in Africa. All our actions are taken through the United Nations or openly and fairly as in the Anglo-American plan, which we hope will lead to an independent Zimbabwe with majority rule. The problem in Zimbabwe is that each of the leaders wants to be annointed Head of State. The President will be speaking to Obasanjo and Secretary Vance to Nigeria’s Foreign Minister in a few days about this problem.9

On Namibia, the President explained that the U.S. had worked with the Contact Group to propose terms which would hopefully be acceptable to both sides. He is fearful, however, that the South Africans might preempt the proposal and call for elections. Ambassador Young is currently meeting with African leaders to discuss this.10 The European leaders are developing a greater interest now because all now recognize the problems if a solution is not found quickly. There is also some difficulty because the black leaders in the region are currently engaged in a predictable struggle for power.

Perez confessed his pessimism with regard to South Africa. He found the Internal Settlement an infantile idea—one the black people won’t accept. Increasingly, Perez is convinced that the problem is not Zimbabwe or Namibia, but South Africa. Unless the U.S. establishes a firm position against South Africa, the Cubans will triumph, and the [Page 993] Soviets will gain great prestige. The presence of U.S. Multinational Corporations in South Africa is the fundamental problem, preventing decisive action by the U.S. and Europe in South Africa.

President Carter said that the U.S. would present a proposal to South Africa on Namibia the next day, and shortly after that, to the U.N.11 Public support would be helpful, as it would be for the Anglo-American proposal which needs help.

The U.S. has joined in instituting sanctions on arms to South Africa under the U.N. resolution, though the U.S. had that policy before. On multinational corporations, the President explained the difficulty for the U.S. and for Europe to terminate investments. Actually, it is easier for the U.S. than for the Europeans because our investment is smaller. Whether it would be helpful is a matter of debate. The U.S. agrees that the Internal Settlement is completely unacceptable.


Perez labelled the Belize problem as dangerous for Central American peace and one that could lead to a conflict with Cuba. He said Prime Minister Price had recently visited him. He tried to convince Price to cede a small amount of territory, even to labelling it not a cession but a “rectification of boundaries”. Price said no one in Belize would support a territorial cession as the price of agreement. Price was ready to agree to seaward limits that would give Guatemala greater access to the sea through the Keys. Guatemala, however, wanted Puerto Amatique.

At President Carter’s request, Secretary Vance described his conversations with Price which took place two days ago12 and after Perez’ talk with Price. Price told him he would not cede territory, but would provide an access to the sea. Secretary Vance said that he thought a minor cession was the best way to resolve the problem, but this was not accepted by Price. The Secretary added that it appeared that time has run out and that this solution may not work. Price told him that he was trying to structure a multinational defense agreement to guarantee Belizean territory. He claimed that several Caribbean nations had agreed to the arrangement, and that Britain had agreed provided that a Spanish-speaking nation would join. Price said that Panama had agreed to a defense arrangement, but will not say so publicly. Price pressed Vance for support, and was told that we wanted to consult [Page 994] with others, including UK and GOV. The Secretary added that the countries Price has talked to in the Caribbean have no defense forces, so any such alleged defense arrangement is unrealistic. He added that the U.S. had previously suggested the O.A.S. for defense arrangements.

Perez said that he had told Price he was opposed to the Belizean request for a defense force. That was no solution to the problem. Moreover, Guatemala could take it as a hostile act. Guatemalan desire for territory is very large; if it could be reduced to a token cession, this might work. Perez said that he was worried about President-Elect Lucas, who he felt was a hard man who might be tempted to use the Belize issue as an excuse for war—an escape valve for internal problems. Venezuela, Perez said, had tried to push an agreement. The maritime access idea of Price’s is a good one; combined with a token cession, it would provide a solution Price could accept. Now is the time to push for that idea. Perez said he would take advantage of his June visit to Kingston to discuss this with Manley and perhaps invite Price to meet confidentially and privately with them there. Price, of course, is impatient and is seeking Caribbean and African support for his policy.

Perez’ proposal might be a possible solution. Secretary Vance said that the problem is that Caribbean support has made Price more intransigent, and Perez agreed with that evaluation. Perez also said that he believed Guatemala would accept a settlement even if the territorial concession was minimal.

President Carter then commented that negotiations seem to have come to a stop, and the Secretary agreed that the UK seems to have thrown up its hands over the prospect of negotiating anything. President Carter asked what forum could be used to persuade Price. Perez said that the British are relaxed about the whole problem because they know that it is a hemispheric problem that we will have to settle sooner or later. Hence, he thought we should deal directly with Price. “It’s our problem, not theirs. We need to solve it ourselves.” If “technicians” could draw up a feasible boundary adjustment and even prepare a map, a small group could meet with Price and persuade him. He repeated that he would talk to Manley in Jamaica next month.

Secretary Vance said that Mexico was important in this picture, and Mexico had opposed cession of territory. Perez said that was because it also had claims and if some claims were to be met, Mexico wanted a piece of the action. But that is not a defensible position. Perez said he was proposing settlement with Guyana along the same lines—a small border adjustment in return for foregoing larger claims.

The President said he would like to be kept informed on future conversations on this issue, and Perez concluded his remarks on the [Page 995] subject by saying that he was afraid that Gen. Lucas might invade Belize and that this would increase the possibility of Cuban involvement.


Perez said that Somoza’s authority no longer exists in Nicaragua. He depends upon the national guard and that is all that keeps him in power. The danger is that the Sandinistas are growing in power and now have the support of all anti-Somoza factions. The situation is like that of Batista. It would be better if some control could be exercised over the transition, as happened in Venezuela in 1958 with Perez Jimenez. Perez said he understands that there are retired national guard officers who could head up a junta. If the situation is left to Somoza’s departure or death, a very dangerous situation will develop. Some day the US will find it necessary to take action such as it did in the Dominican Republic in 1965 because of the extremist solution that could occur.

President Carter said he believed Perez’s description of the dangers was accurate, but it was difficult to know what to do. As Perez requested, we have encouraged Somoza to let in the Latin American Commission on Human Rights, and we have a difficult time in proposing any direct action by the U.S. to bring about Somoza’s downfall. This would cause concern in the U.S. and also among small countries in the hemisphere since we have pledged to adhere to the principle of non-intervention.

Perez thought that the OAS machinery could be useful in this connection. Perhaps a Venezuelan proposal before the OAS, with support from others, would be useful. The OAS machinery has been used this way on other occasions. President Carter observed that that would depend upon the proposal. He was not sure that the OAS Charter provided a way to replace an unpopular leader of a government. Perez said what he meant was to put pressure on the actors to move for a solution. By mobilizing public opinion through the OAS, the political environment in Nicaragua would be changed, and a solution might emerge. Venezuela, he said, neither seeks nor desires direct intervention by the U.S. or anyone else.

The President said this would all have to be studied carefully, but he believed there were additional actions which could be taken. It was difficult to know what Somoza wanted—retain power, retain his wealth, keep his family safe, or what he would exchange for early elections. The President said that if Somoza shares Perez’ assessment of the weakness of his position, he may be willing to call elections before 1981. Since that’s a possibility, perhaps Secretary Vance could explore this.

But, the President continued, it’s difficult for the U.S. to be put in a position of trying to change the leader of a small nation. The people [Page 996] of the U.S. have reacted strongly about U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and are still very sensitive about the idea of U.S. intervention abroad. We would consult with you, but we cannot take the initiative. We would keep open the possibility of discussions with Somoza and with others. There should be further discussions on this between the U.S. and Venezuela.

Perez said that Somoza could not last to 1981. Guerrilla actions will increase, and Castro could exploit it. Therefore, we need to find a solution; we don’t need to define a formula here, but let’s discuss this further. He wanted to call President Carter’s attention to the gravity of the problem and its dangers; it was like 1958 in Cuba. Perez said he was in touch with a wide range of moderate civic leaders and private businessmen. He is fully convinced that in their despair they will support the guerrillas. They will destroy Somoza, or Somoza will destroy them.

President Carter then said that any public statements (about the need for political change in Nicaragua) is best done by others. We would like to discuss this privately with you and with others. We haven’t had private conversations with Somoza on this, but he has told us that he would not remain in power beyond 1981. If he shares your assessment, then he might change his mind on that.

Conventional Arms Restraint

Perez raised the issue of the arms race in the Andes. He said that Venezuela had called a meeting based on the Ayacucho Declaration, which is dormant.13 The problem is that if the U.S. doesn’t sell arms to the region, the Europeans (and the Soviets, President Carter added) do. Perez said that “we cannot remain with our arms folded”. In answer to a question by President Carter on how Ayacucho could be reactivated, Perez said that they could propose a meeting, but the situation is complicated by the breaking of relations between Bolivia and Chile.

President Carter said that in the last five years, Latin America has purchased $7 billion worth of weapons. The U.S. has become a smaller supplier because of its arms restraint policy, selling less than Britain, France, or the Soviets. We would like to reduce our arms sales even more, though there is a limit on how far we can go because of private interests. We would welcome Perez’ ideas on reviving Ayacucho.

[Page 997]

Perez said he would support the President’s policies on arms restraint and try to get them adopted by other countries, but he needed more information.

The President said he would send the U.S. arms sales policy statement, and that perhaps it could be used as a model or a voluntary formula. Recently, the U.S. asked Mexico to reassess its defense needs and President Jose Lopez Portillo withdrew his request.14 It would be beneficial to pursue this as a prelude to the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament.

Canary Islands

Perez said that there was a problem concerning the Canary Islands and the Azores which he wanted to bring to the President’s attention. The question is whether these islands are a part of Spain or of Africa; the OAU could use some support. Perez said that he would forward some more information on this issue to President Carter.

President Carter said that he hadn’t heard about this issue before, and that he liked the idea of tackling new problems. He closed the meeting by saying that he hoped to talk about the Law of the Sea issues tonight and tomorrow.15

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 63, President’s Visit to Brazil and Venezuela (3/78), 1-5/78. Confidential. The conversation took place in the Miraflores Palace. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.
  2. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXIX, Panama, footnote 4, Document 159.
  3. Not found.
  4. Presumably a reference to the message that Aja Espil delivered to the Department on March 22, notifying the USG “that Argentina has every intention of ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as President Videla committed his country to do in conversations with President Carter and Secretary Vance.” (Telegram 76482 to Buenos Aires, March 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780130-0734) The discussion of non-proliferation is also printed as Document 432 in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation.
  5. For Carter’s March 29 and 30 conversations with Geisel, see Documents 172 and 173.
  6. See Document 343.
  7. United Nations Security Council Resolution Number 242, adopted in November 1967, affirmed that the fulfilment of the UN Charter required the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.
  8. Dated February 1. Carter wrote, “it appears that the Soviets are over-arming the Ethiopians, while the Cubans are sending large numbers of combat troops and fighter pilots. We are concerned about the possibility of an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia and massive air attacks against Somali cities by Cuban planes.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 56, Venezuela, 1-4/78)
  9. For the meeting between Carter and Obasanjo, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVI, Southern Africa, Document 200. For the conversation between Vance and Garba, see telegram 3074 from the Secretary’s Delegation in Lagos, April 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153-1758)
  10. Not further identified.
  11. Presumably a reference to the Western Five proposal regarding Namibian independence. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVI, Southern Africa, footnote 11, Document 200 and footnote 2, Document 85.
  12. Reference is to a meeting between Vance and Price on March 24. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XV, Central America, Document 26.
  13. Eight Latin American countries signed the Declaration of Ayacucho in December 1974, declaring their intent to cooperate in restraining arms purchases in Latin America. The discussion of conventional arms restraint is also printed as Document 288 in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation.
  14. Presumably a reference to Presidential Directive 13 regarding Conventional Arms Transfer Policy. See Foreign Relations, 1977–81, vol. XXVI, Arms Control, Document 271. In telegram 4165 from Mexico City, March 11, Lucey reported that after he told Lopez Portillo that sale of F-5s to Mexico “would conflict with President Carter’s policy of conventional arms sales, on which he was trying to hold the line.” Lopez Portillo responded that Mexico “had no interest at all in the acquisition of fighter aircraft.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780109-0032)
  15. See Document 346. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the Carters attended a state dinner that evening. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)