315. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

SUBJECT

  • Soviet-Peruvian Military Relations and Mrs. Carter’s Visit

Your memorandum of July 212 said that Mrs. Carter’s visit3 could provide an opportunity to explore whether President Belaunde would be interested in replacing Peru’s military relationship with the Soviet Union by one with the U.S. I attach a paper on this subject4 which replaces a paper entitled Arms Purchases, Arms Restraints, previously supplied for Mrs. Carter’s briefing book. We believe Belaunde, and indeed many Peruvian military, might prefer to resume a substantial military supply relationship with the United States and to reduce their relationship with the U.S.S.R., not only for political reasons but because of significant maintenance and support problems with Soviet equipment. However, there are major obstacles:

—The outgoing military government has probably placed orders for all of the major purchases the military has in mind, for now, including the trainer aircraft we had hoped to supply. Therefore there may be little opportunity for the next year or more to supplant a major Soviet or other third country sale;

—Any major U.S. sale would have to be for cash. We cannot compete with either the size or the terms of the concessional financing offered by Soviet and West European suppliers. The trainer sale, for example, would have amounted to 15 to 20 times the amount of FMS financing we have budgeted ($3 million), within global priorities and limited resources, for Peru;

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—The equipment most likely to interest Peru in the longer term is likely to be the F-X aircraft, which Presidential guidance does not authorize us to offer on a government-to-government basis. However, we are in receipt of a license application from one of the F-X manufacturers (Northrop) and are currently considering whether to approve a marketing presentation.

—U.S. sales of major items to Peru would be criticized by Ecuador and Chile, which fear Peru’s military strength, and could further upset the regional arms balance;

—The possibility of our maintaining and repairing Soviet equipment owned by Peru, in order to supplant Soviet advisers and technicians (about 100), would be technically difficult and we are uncertain of the cost. Again, the Peruvians would have to pay.5

Nevertheless, we believe we should continue to indicate our willingness to advise Peru on its maintenance and support problems with Soviet equipment, and our readiness to sell military equipment which will not introduce new levels of sophistication or disturb the arms balance in the Andean region.6

The benefits to the U.S., and to Peru, of moving away from Peru’s present relationship with the Soviet Union are obvious. However, the U.S.S.R. has demonstrated its willingness to provide the equipment Peru wants. The Soviet entree to a major Latin American country is important to them and they would no doubt object strenuously should Peru seriously consider replacing Soviet technicians with Americans.7 While the Soviets have not gained as much influence as they would like from the relationship, it is evident that Peru’s military dependency on them has affected its position on various international issues. However, if the Peruvian military has actually acquired all the Soviet equipment it wants, the U.S.S.R. would not be in a position to prevent the renewal of a U.S.-Peruvian military relationship.

The cost to the U.S. Government would be the political one of defending sales to a country which has just made a major purchase of advanced Soviet aircraft. There would also be a budgetary cost were FMS financing levels to be increased from the present $3 to $4 million a year, or grant training increased to the level of 1977 and prior years (approximately $900,000).

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The cost to Peru is likely to be perceived by Belaunde as also both political and financial. Politically, he would risk returning to a relationship with a supplier, the U.S., whom he may view as unreliable (because of a painful experience with U.S. sales policies in his first administration), and charges that Belaunde would be moving away from non-alignment and into the U.S. pocket. Financially, he would have to be willing to give up concessional Soviet terms.8

This memorandum has been coordinated with the Department of Defense.

Peter Tarnoff 9
Executive Secretary
  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 64, Peru, 1/80-1/81 [#2]. Secret.
  2. The memorandum, from Aaron to Newsom and Komer, asked for “a short memo on the costs and benefits to Peru, the U.S., and the USSR of a shift in Peru’s military supply relationship toward the U.S. and away from the USSR. What could the U.S. propose which would be realistic and practical both from the U.S. and the Peruvian perspectives?” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Peru, 1979–1980)
  3. Rosalynn Carter headed the U.S. delegation that attended the inauguration of Belaunde on July 28. In telegram 6805 from Lima, July 31, the Embassy reported on her trip. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800370-0713)
  4. Not attached. The July 23 paper, entitled “Arms Restraint and Peruvian Arms Purchases from the U.S.S.R.,” is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 44, Peru, 1-12/80.
  5. An unknown hand placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph and drew an arrow pointing toward the paragraph.
  6. An unknown hand placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph and drew an arrow pointing toward the paragraph.
  7. An unknown hand underlined the word “Soviet” and the phrase “no doubt object strenuously should Peru seriously consider replacing Soviet technicians with Americans.”
  8. In an August 5 memorandum to Brzezinski and Aaron, Pastor wrote: “Mrs. Carter said that she did not have the opportunity in Peru to raise this with Belaunde, but Bill Bowdler is planning a trip there sometime in the Fall, and said that he would raise it at that time.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 44, Peru, 1-12/80) (S) No record of a fall trip by Bowdler to Peru was found. In telegram 8393 from Lima, September 15, the Embassy reported on Eaton’s September trip to Peru. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800446-0081)
  9. Bremer signed for Tarnoff above Tarnoff’s typed signature.