Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region

237. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 1, 1980, 11:45 a.m.–12:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of the President’s Meeting with Members of Congress on Latin America (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• Frank Moore, Assistant to the President for Congressional Liaison
• Madeleine Albright, NSC Staff
• Robert Pastor, NSC Staff/Notetaker
• Representative Charles Wilson (D-TX)
• Representative Henry Hyde (R-ILL)

Representative Wilson opened the discussion by saying that both he and Representative Hyde had been supporters of the President on foreign aid throughout the President’s term. He said that as conservatives, both Congressmen had been very helpful in getting the foreign aid bill passed. Although he was able to deliver several votes to the Administration on foreign aid, Representative Wilson modestly suggested that his contribution was small compared to the forty or so conservative Republicans that Representative Hyde was able to deliver. However, both Congressmen have difficulty in supporting the President in the light of some recent decisions made in the area of foreign policy. It is possible that the UNITAS was the last straw, and he doesn’t see how he can help the President on foreign policy anymore, especially since the Administration consistently favors left-wing tyrannies and is against governments with right-wing views. Perhaps he (Wilson) had been wrong in his assessment of developments in Nicaragua, but the decision to exclude Chile was ridiculous. This is a case which involves a purely security operation, and should not have been politicized. He criticized Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, for taking this action as personally insulting and “absolutely infuriating.” (C)

Representative Hyde said that he would like to supplement what Representative Wilson said. President Carter said that it would be difficult to improve on it. (C)

Representative Hyde said that he had always supported aid for several reasons. First, he supported aid because of the humanitarian needs of poor people in developing countries. Second, the US had a moral obligation to assist these countries. And third, we needed to assist these countries in their development in order to assure our own access to strategic minerals and for other economic reasons. However, he protests the fact that there are some in the government who try to use foreign aid as a political weapon to help tyrannies on the left. According to this formula, Argentina is a bad guy, and Communist countries like Yugoslavia, Romania, and radical governments like Tanzania, are to be helped. He thinks that this double standard is wrong, and that the threat is really coming from the left. He also thinks that the people who are implementing US foreign policy are livid against right-wing regimes, and that they take whatever steps they can to demonstrate their anger against these regimes. In conclusion, Representative Hyde said that he is ready not to support these aid programs anymore. (C)

President Carter said that he appreciated the full report of the two Congressmen, and said that he agreed with a lot that they had to say. However, it is not all black and white. Left-wing regimes have no place at all in US foreign policy. The US does not give any aid, and indeed does not even have diplomatic relations with governments like Vietnam, Cuba and North Korea. With respect to right-wing regimes, we do in fact have relations, trade and often give assistance. We also give some special attention to governments like Chile, Argentina and Brazil. We view these countries which we want as our friends as crucial. The President remarked that when he invited General Pinochet to Washington for the signing of the Panama Canal Treaties in September 1977,² there were some who thought that this could even lead to riots in the United States, but he felt that such an invitation should be extended. Mrs. Carter has traveled throughout Latin America and has met with many leaders.³ We have sought good relations with the governments in Latin America. (C)

President Carter said that he felt the human rights policies are making a very positive impact in Latin America. In Ecuador, Peru and perhaps even in Bolivia, these governments are moving toward democracy, and we can see significant progress. (C)

President Carter said that the assassination of Letelier and an innocent American person with him was a terrible and unconscionable act, which took place in the streets of Washington, our capital. President Carter feels that sanctions were appropriate in this case. At first, we gave Pinochet time to deal with this issue, and we tried to put on an image of cooperation in order to facilitate his investigating, and if possible extraditing the criminals involved in the assassination. We made clear to the Chilean government that we viewed this matter with great seriousness, and expressed our expectation that the Chilean government would try to find the people responsible for the crime and independently investigate their alleged involvement. Chile, however, did not do any of this. They should have. As a result, we took a number of steps to express our great displeasure with their failure to take action on this case. The decision that was made on UNITAS reflected this effort to make clear our displeasure with their lack of action.⁴ (C)

The President said that the UNITAS decision had a momentum of its own and that by the time that he got involved with it, it was too late. He said, however, that he had informed State that although he didn’t want Chile to participate in the exercise this year, it could be done next year.⁵ We had to do something. It is possible that this action or other actions may have been too much; the President said he did not want to quarrel with that point. However, the Letelier assassination was a very serious insult to the United States. And we were correct in bringing pressure to bear on the Chilean government. We wanted to convey a very clear and significant message of displeasure to the Chilean government, and I believe we have made this point. (C)

Representative Wilson said that we have done too much. With the actions of Christopher and others in the State Department, he sometimes gets the feeling that there is a preference for Allende rather than for Pinochet. The reduction of the size of the Embassy and the other steps are indications of more than is necessary. (C)

Representative Hyde compared the trial of the criminals involved in the Letelier affair to the US putting J. Edgar Hoover on trial. It was not likely that we would do something like that because Hoover was said to have files on everyone, and we shouldn’t have expected the Chileans to do it either. Moreover, we have identified the wrong guys as the culprits. He cannot believe that Pinochet approved such an action, although it is possible that there were some in his intelligence agencies who did. Nonetheless, we do push the Chileans much too hard in the Inter-American Development Bank and elsewhere by continually voting against them. (C)

Representative Wilson said that at the same time that we are voting against Chile, we are voting for Romania. He does not think this makes any sense for us to continually criticize right-wing regimes and support left-wing governments. He said that he is not asking for the Administration to turn around completely, but only to let “us win one.” He said that that is only normal politics—to let one side win a few. But he doesn’t feel that he has had any help or any recognition or any support for that position in the last three years. He said that Warren Christopher makes all of these decisions, not the President, not Secretary Miller. (C)

President Carter recommended that he talk to Warren Christopher. (C)

Representative Hyde said that Secretary Miller recently vetoed loans to Chile, and he thought that was overkill. (C)

Representative Wilson said that since 1945, there has been an attempt by every Administration to reach across to not only seek bipartisan support, but also across ideological lines on foreign aid. But he does not think that this is true of the Carter Administration. He insisted that there are not that many Tom Harkins on Capitol Hill, and President Carter would have to deal with some conservatives on this. (C)

Representative Hyde said that it is hard to constantly be helping the Nicaraguans if the conservative view is never supported. (C)

President Carter said that the two Congressmen had made their points very well. There is a lot that he can agree with, and some that he would disagree with, but he did not want to quibble. It is possible that we could have overmade our point to Chile. (C)

Representative Wilson asked whether the President couldn’t say that publicly. (C)

President Carter said that he would have to think about it, although he didn’t believe that it would be helpful for us to make such a comment at this time. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President, 7/80. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.
2. See Document 205.
3. See Documents 268 and 165.
4. See Documents 235 and 236.
5. In a May 29 memorandum to Muskie regarding a breakfast meeting the next day, Tarnoff advised: “The President has asked that the decision to exclude Chile from participation in this year’s UNITAS naval exercise be discussed.” In handwritten notes regarding the May 30 breakfast meeting, Muskie wrote: “Chilean maneuvers: stay with decision but let them know next year.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretary—Subject Files of Edmund S. Muskie, 1963–1981, Lot 82D100, Box 3, Pres. Breakfasts July, Aug, Sept 1980)