Office of the Historian

236. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

Washington, February 19, 1980

SUBJECT

  • Chile and Argentina (U)

I sent you a memo for the VBB last Thursday on Chile and Argentina (attached).2 I understand that it was decided that State and DOD should battle the UNITAS issue out on their own. They have not come to a conclusion and David Newsom wants us to take a position and, presumably, decide the issue. I continue to recommend the following (please check your concurrence as appropriate):

1. Agree to UNITAS for Argentina.3

[Page 695]

2. Disapprove UNITAS for Chile.4 (C)

There is also an issue between State on (would you believe) whether or not a DOD cartographer’s slot should be abolished as part of the Letelier crackdown. This is a matter of massive inconsequence from any point of view. Since DOD has taken a longer cut in percentage terms than other Embassy elements (and we would be scrubbing UNITAS for Chile) I suggest that we back DOD on this matter. Concur?5 (C)

There is also the question of visits left over from the VBB although I don’t think this is particularly contentious. Do you concur that:

1. Allen should be allowed to visit Argentina?6

2. The Galtieri invitation should be delayed?7 (C)

I still think the larger issue (discussed on page 2 of attached memo)8 needs resolution. If you do not want to burden the VBB with it, please let me know your preferences. Should we:9

Substantially consider the Letilier phase over?

Continue to take follow-up actions influenced by it? (C)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 9, Chile, 1-10/80. Confidential. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Pastor. Aaron initialed the memorandum. An unknown hand wrote at the top of the memorandum: “2/20 See Bob Pastor’s comments attached,” a reference to a February 20 memorandum from Pastor to Brzezinski. (Ibid.)↩
  2. Not found attached. The memorandum is dated February 13. (Ibid.) “Last Thursday” refers to February 14.↩
  3. Brzezinski checked the “yes” option.↩
  4. Brzezinski checked the “yes” option. In the right-hand margin next to both points 1 and 2, Aaron wrote: “I agree so does Pastor. DA.” The decision not to invite Chile to participate in UNITAS for 1980 was reaffirmed on April 1. (Memorandum from Brzezinski to Aaron, Denend, and Dodson, April 1; Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Historical Material, Box 15, Meetings: Vance/Brown/Brzezinski, 3/80-9/80)↩
  5. Brzezinski checked the “yes” option. Aaron underlined the phrase “back DOD” and initialed in the left hand margin. In a February 20 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor wrote: “One of the President’s decisions was to reduce the size of our own mission. If all of us agree that this slot is unnecessary, then to be consistent with the President’s decision it should be abolished. I see no reason why we should back DOD on this matter.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 9, Chile, 1-10/80)↩
  6. Brzezinski checked the “yes” option. A reference to H.K. Allen, chairman of the Ex-Im Bank.↩
  7. Brzezinski checked the “yes” option. In the left-hand margin next to both points 1 and 2, Aaron wrote: “Looks OK.”↩
  8. In his February 13 memorandum to Brzezinski (see footnote 2, above), Thornton wrote: “The President authorized a number of steps in the Letelier case and these have been taken (or are about to be taken.) The question arises as to whether we want to continue punishment of the Chileans on this issue. Do we want this to be a time-limited action or is it supposed to remain a semi-permanent factor in US-Chilean relations?” He continued: “My preference is to put the issue behind us—the UNITAS decision would be our last one under its influence.” In his February 20 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor disagreed: “I would pose Tom’s question differently: How much staying power does the USG have? I think it would be a terrible embarrassment to the President if we proceeded with ‘business as usual,’ such as suggested by the UNITAS exercise, four months after he announces a strong and firm policy.” (Ibid.)↩
  9. Brzezinski did not check either option, but he placed a vertical line in the right-hand margin and wrote: “avoid having to take a position ZB.”↩