226. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chile1
263023. Subject: Foreign Minister Cubillos’ Call on Secretary Vance.
1. Chilean Foreign Minister Hernan Cubillos called on the Secretary on October 10 at 4:00 pm in the Department. He was accompanied by Chilean Ambassador Barros. Assistant Secretary Vaky, Deputy Assistant Secretary Guzman and Desk Officer Steven attended.
2. Cubillos expressed his gratitude for the opportunity to meet with the Secretary. He complimented the Secretary on recent successes in international diplomacy related to the Middle East problem, and expressed his pleasure in having Ambassador Landau in Santiago. The Secretary in turn thanked Cubillos for Chilean cooperation and support in international policy matters.
3. Cubillos then settled in to what he described as the reason for his request to meet with the Secretary, and 25 of the 35 minutes of the meeting were spent on a presentation on the Beagle Channel dispute and tensions between Chile and Argentina. He gave the Secretary a copy of the Beagle Channel arbitration award, and laid out a map to guide the discussion. He reviewed the background of the submission of the dispute to arbitration, demonstrated on the map the areas and lines in question, and expressed Chilean shock over Argentine rejection of the award. He had accepted Argentine President Videla’s invitation to negotiate with the caveat that Chile would consider only the maritime boundary question, not the award itself covering the actual channel.
4. The Chilean position was described by Cubillos as a reasonable and normal proposal for a maritime dividing line based upon the principle of “equidistance” from the land masses bordering the mouth of the Beagle. He conceded that Chile was prepared to negotiate this and to make concessions. Argentina, he alleged, had “played” with various proposals involving the continental shelf and had discussed common areas of economic development, etc., but the Argentine position shifted constantly and Argentine claims were unclear. Cubillos maintained that Argentina had gone so far as to actually threaten war if agreement was not reached by November 2 or if Chile took the dispute to the ICJ, this latter despite the 1972 treaty in which both [Page 668] countries agreed to take disputes to the ICJ. He could not discount the use of force in the matter, and Chile would defend itself if attacked. He felt Chile had the moral right based upon the award to appeal for assistance.
5. The Secretary asked for a description of the British position and Cubillos and Barros produced copies of the exchanges between the UK and the parties in which the UK declared its role as arbitrator terminated. In response to questions Cubillos noted that the talks with Argentina continue, but he could not provide a full explanation of the Argentine position and Argentine aims. Barros suggested that the principle Argentine effort is to “save face” after having lost the arbitration award, and perhaps to protect Antarctic claims. Cubillos confirmed that the November 2 deadline is a self-imposed limit by the two parties, which is not inflexible. He had considered the possibility of a moratorium on settlement of the dispute, but had not discussed it with the Argentines. He felt that negotiation of a moratorium would be more complex and difficult than negotiation of a final resolution to the problem itself.
6. In response to the Secretary’s question, Cubillos said that neither government had appealed to the OAS for assistance in the negotiations. Chile had been “hurt”, however, by the lack of international interest and support (on question of Argentine rejection of the arbitration award). He understood that there was “bias” against Chile which held some governments back, but that the problem was critical. Chile would try to solve it through negotiations, or in the ICJ, and would not attack Argentina. It would be a matter of great regret if conflict took place. Cubillos hoped the U.S. would use a little influence, and said that concern on the part of the U.S. would help resolve the dispute. He jokingly called for “another Camp David.”
7. The Secretary promised to look into the matter. He said that the last thing we wanted was conflict in the hemisphere, and that he would discuss the matter with Assistant Secretary Vaky and other interested officers. Cubillos conceded that the November 2 deadline was flexible and that another 30 days for negotiation could be obtained.
8. Asked if the retirement of Admiral Massera in Argentina had reduced the tension to any degree, Cubillos replied that it had not. Massera out of office continued to press the issue, and his influence continued to be an important factor on the Argentine side.
9. Cubillos noted that Ambassador Landau had suggested to him that he explain to the Secretary the process of political institutionalization presently underway in Chile, and he devoted most of the remaining time in the meeting to a review of the process, including the drafting of a new constitution, the referendum planned in 1979, and the transition period over the next five or six years. He said that the new constitution [Page 669] drew heavily from French and German precedents. An evolutionary process was needed in Chile. He said that it would be too easy to press for an election now in Chile, in which Pinochet could be elected without difficulty in the fashion of a Somoza or a Stroessner. Chileans did not want this, and civilians like Cubillos joined the government precisely to help the military make the transition to democratic government again. The alternative to this evolutionary process would be regression to true military dictatorship “as in the first days after the coup,” according to Cubillos. He insisted that civilian rule at this point in Chile was impossible. In the next few months there will be public debate over the new constitution, leading to a referendum next year. Cubillos noted that Ambassador Barros would be at the Secretary’s disposal at any time to help him to better understand the political process in Chile.
10. As the meeting ended, the Secretary raised the Letelier/Moffitt assassination case with Cubillos. He reminded Cubillos that the case was of “tremendous importance” to us, with Chilean government cooperation essential to our relationship. Cubillos assured the Secretary of his own concern over the case, and noted that he did not even know General Contreras. He believed that the case must continue to be dealt with in judicial channels in which both countries must have confidence. He noted with concern our public statements such as the recent comment on the action of the Chilean Supreme Court in conducting the extradition hearing in secret,2 and expressed his concern that such statements misled and inflamed public opinion. He claimed firmly that “there is no monkey business” going on in the court, and such implications only enlarge the credibility gap. He had taken his job in an effort to reduce that gap. Upon departure he again thanked the Secretary for the meeting.
11. Both before and after the meeting, Cubillos emphasized to Steven both his high regard for Ambassador Landau and his assurance [Page 670] that a just resolution of the Letelier/Moffitt case was regarded as of greatest importance by the Chilean Government.3
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780425-0950. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information priority to Buenos Aires. Drafted by Steven; cleared by Guzman, Bushnell, and in S; approved by Vaky.↩
- A reference to a September 28 story in the Washington Post alleging that Propper was “outraged” by Borquez’s decision to conduct the extradition proceedings in secrecy. (Charles A. Krause, “U.S. Shows Unease Over Chile’s Handling of Letelier Case,” Washington Post, September 28, 1978, p. A21) In telegram 247184 to Santiago, September 28, the Department provided press guidance regarding the story: “In seeking extradition, the U.S. Government has placed its confidence in the Chilean judicial system. However, we are advised that the exclusion of Mr. Etcheberry from this proceeding is unprecedented in Chilean legal practice. We are naturally concerned that our interests be properly represented.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780396-0703) In telegram 247659 to Santiago, September 28, the Department reported: “spokesman replied to initial question on Krause article with guidance” outlined in telegram 247184. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780397-0001)↩
- In an October 10 memorandum to Carter, Vance summarized the meeting with Cubillos. Vance reported that he told Cubillos that the USG “would watch the situation closely” in the Beagle Channel dispute and “gave him a firm warning on the importance we attach to quick and satisfactory resolution of the Letelier/Moffitt murder case.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State), 10/78)↩