225. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State1
7075. Subject: Letelier/Moffitt Assassination: Further Cooperation Between USG and GOC on Investigation. Ref: State 235980.2
1. I have gone over carefully with Etcheberry, DCM, Polcouns and [less than 1 line not declassified] the contents of reftel. While appreciating constructive purposes underlying proposals therin, we all think it important to remind ourselves that the objectives of Orozco/Mena are not identical with ours—and, quite possibly, are diametrically opposed. At a minimum they hope to prevent extradition; they probably also want to help Contreras avoid successful prosecution in Chile. Beyond that, they have an interest in knowing all that Townley has told us about DINA’s operations (especially abroad) in order to be prepared for other eventualities. Thus we should define our compliance with the Silbert/Montero agreement in a limited manner (consistent with integrity and our interests), not expect that a more forthcoming posture will gain GOC support.
2. In our view the presentation of the extradition requests package satisfies the formal requirements to the Silbert/Montero agreement. [Page 666] We have had no further requests from the GOC since the August 2 note.3 When I discussed this subject with Orozco in mid-August he said that he was awaiting the documentation that would come with the extradition request. Accordingly, when I see Foreign Minister Cubillos September 20 to formally request extradition (I have an appointment for 10:30 am) I plan to refer to Orozco’s needs, state my expectation that he will have access to the evidence in the package, and say that if Orozco has additional information/evidence requirements to please let us know exactly what he needs.4
3. I do not plan at this time to suggest a meeting between Orozco/Mena and the justice team. Some of the potential dangers are set forth in para 4 of reftel. We are particularly concerned that such a visit might be seen or characterized as attempt to apply pressure on Chilean judicial system. The letter option in para 5 would not substantially improve the situation. According to Etcheberry, who is strongly opposed to the letter, the Supreme Court is bound to take the position that USG contacts with Orozco/Mena are none of its business and have no bearings on the extradition requests. It will neither approve nor object, but may be left with a lingering doubt that we are trying to circumvent them. The psychological impact of an Orozco/Mena meeting with the Justice team is not clear. On the one hand we see some value in demonstrating in a highly visible manner that USG/GOC cooperation continues—i.e. that we are not after the Chilean Government as such but simply those individuals who planned and carried out the Letelier/Moffitt assassinations. On the other there is some danger that the prospects for extradition will be further reduced if Chilean Supreme Court justices believe GOC officials are fully informed and actively pursuing the case—i.e. that the needs of justice can be served equally well by trial here.
4. We need not rule out definitely Orozco/Mena meeting with the Justice team. If they so request we should probably oblige. But any such meeting should be in Washington and there should be no secrecy whatsoever. On the contrary it must be given wide publicity including a statement from the GOC saying that meeting was being held at its request to underline our public stance of cooperation.5
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780382-0505. Secret; Immediate; Stadis; Exdis.↩
- See Document 224.↩
- Ibid.↩
- In telegram 7099 from Santiago, September 20, Landau reported on his meeting with Cubillos. Landau did not report making these points regarding Orozco. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780384-0311)↩
- No record of a meeting was found.↩