Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region

147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bolivia¹

Washington, August 13, 1979, 2000Z

211019. Subject: Secretary’s Consultations With Bolivian Foreign Minister, August 11.

1. (S–Entire Text)

2. Summary: Bolivian Foreign Minister Fernandez met with the Secretary for approximately 20 minutes in a private meeting August 11. Fernandez said that President Guevara had sent him to Quito specifically to talk to the Secretary.² He made three points: 1) The GOB needed to face up to the problem of foreign debt, and would within fifteen days present to USG through Embassy La Paz their views on what needed to be done; he hoped then to visit Washington with the finance minister to discuss the matter further. 2) GOB hoped to have the OAS assembly approve a general resolution on the question of Bolivian access to the sea which could constitute a recommended framework within which the three countries involved could work out a solution; he promised to provide a general outline for such a resolution. 3) President Guevara earnestly requested that the Secretary personally attend the OAS general assembly meeting in La Paz in October. The Secretary replied that we would study the proposals on debt and access to the sea. He would reply this week as to whether he could attend the OAS meeting. End summary.

3. Bolivian Foreign Minister Gustavo Fernandez Saavedra requested a private meeting with Secretary Vance at the conclusion of the Andean group consultations August 11.³ The two met for approximately twenty minutes alone. The Foreign Minister thanked the Secretary for meeting with him, saying that his trip from La Paz to Quito had been made solely for the purpose of establishing an immediate contact with the Secretary and the U.S. Government. He said that President Guevara had asked him to make three main points in his meeting with the Secretary:

A) The process of democratization in Bolivia was a difficult and complex one. This process, said the Foreign Minister, had been saved by what he considered to be a miracle, which was the role played by President Guevara. The President had long been active in a political party which in turn had given birth to the two wings that had given their support respectively to Dr. Paz and Dr. Siles in the recent elections; this had made it possible for the followers of both these candidates to give their support to Dr. Guevara.⁴

Over the past three years, and for political reasons, President Banzer, Pereda, and Padilla had not acted on Bolivia’s economic problems. These problems had become so serious that they could no longer be ignored. The Foreign Minister said that he was not in a position to make a formal presentation on Bolivia’s economic problems at this time, but could say that they were a source of deep concern, particularly with regard to the burden represented by his country’s foreign indebtedness. Bolivia needs a prompt decision by the U.S. to give it assistance in this regard.

The Foreign Minister said that in about fifteen days he would have had the opportunity to gather the necessary data to make a formal presentation to the U.S. and other governments on the matter of foreign indebtedness. Their presentation would be made through the American Embassy in La Paz. He said that this problem could not be tackled by traditional means, but that a clear political decision had to be made promptly. He hoped to visit Washington, together with the finance minister, within the next few weeks, in order to further discuss the problem. President Guevara and the cabinet felt that a viable solution had to be found to the indebtedness problem within sixty days, and further felt that it was necessary to get a clear idea of the USG’s position within thirty days.

The Secretary replied that he and other members of the USG would study Bolivia’s presentation.

B) The Foreign Minister said that his government was deeply interested in the success of the OAS general assembly, scheduled to be held in La Paz later this year, and that this success depended to a large degree on the presence of the secretary of state.

The Secretary said that he would check his calendar, and reply by the middle of next week as to his attendance at the assembly.⁵

C) The Foreign Minister said that the most important item on the agenda for Bolivia was the matter of his country’s access to the sea. His government sought a consensus in the assembly that would come as close as possible to Bolivia’s interests. He said that President Guevara’s thinking on the subject was complete, and that the President hoped for approval by the assembly of something similar to the Security Council’s resolution on the Middle East. He hoped for a hemispheric consensus on a recommendation to be made to Bolivia, Peru and Chile, believing that at first none of the three countries would accept the recommended solution. It could, however, become a point of reference in guiding the actions of the inter-American system towards a solution.

The Secretary asked whether the Foreign Minister referred to security council resolution 242, which had served as a basis for further implementation actions.⁶ The Foreign Minister replied in the affirmative, adding that he had expressed the personal opinion of President Guevara and the Bolivian cabinet. It would be necessary to discuss this approach with the political parties and with the congress. Within two or three weeks, it would be possible for the Bolivian government to present its ideas clearly to the U.S. government; it was very interested in American cooperation on this issue.

The Secretary asked how Bolivia envisaged the presentation of this idea to the assembly. The Foreign Minister said that his government hoped that another Latin American country, perhaps Venezuela, might present the idea to the assembly; Bolivia would not express its opinion on the idea in public. Bolivia hoped that the recommendation would contain an expression of continental concern over Bolivia’s obtaining an outlet to the sea and that it should be as precise as possible as to the process to be followed in reaching a solution to the problem.

The Secretary inquired as to whether this idea had been expressed in President Guevara’s writings on the subject; when the Foreign Minister replied in the affirmative, the Secretary said that he was familiar with the President’s writings.

The Foreign Minister said that the President envisaged Bolivia’s access to the sea through a sovereign corridor along the border between Peru and Chile, with an international zone for the port, which would not be in the city of Arica.

4. The Secretary concluded the meeting by expressing his interest in seeing and studying the Bolivian proposal.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–80, Lot 84D241, Vance EXDIS Memcons, 1979. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Lima and Santiago. Drafted by Vaky; cleared in S/S and by Bremer; approved by Vaky.
2. In telegram 6712 from La Paz, August 7, the Embassy reported that the Bolivian Congress had elected Walter Guevara Arze to be president the previous day. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790357-0147)
3. See Document 47.
4. Guevara’s party was the Partido Revolucionario Auténtico (PRA; Authentic Revolutionary Party).
5. In telegram 211861 to La Paz, August 14, Vance confirmed his attendance at the OAS General Assembly Meeting for “two or three days.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790369-0721) See Document 150.
6. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIX: Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 542.