108. Memorandum of Conversation1

PARTICIPANTS

  • Argentina

    • Jose Martinez de Hoz, Minister of the Economy
    • Ambassador Jorge A. Aja Espil
  • United States

    • Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
    • Thomas Thornton, Staff Member, National Security Council

SUBJECT

  • US-Argentine Relations; Grain Sales; Soviet Politics (C)

Dr. Brzezinski opened by welcoming the warming trend in US-Argentine relations but stated his great concern about Argentine grain exports to the Soviet Union. He stressed the need to take tangible actions to show the depth of Western concern and resolve. This involves sacrifices, which we are making. Dr. Brzezinski went on to discuss in some detail the strategic meaning to the West of the Soviet move into Afghanistan—affecting not only the immediate region but all of the non-communist world. The increase in Argentine grain sales diminishes the impact of Western pressure on the USSR and it is strange to see a country of Argentina’s tradition playing such a role.2 Brzezinski closed by saying that he found frictions in US-Argentine relations to be unnatural and thus wanted to address the grain problem frankly. (C)

Martinez de Hoz reassured Dr. Brzezinski of Argentina’s commitment to the West and went on to restate Argentina’s rationale on its trade with the Soviet Union. In speaking of the Argentine-Soviet grain sales agreement, Martinez said that the figures involved would be less than 1980, which is recognized as a peak year. He urged that the focus of pressure on the Soviets not be limited to grain but be extended to such things as European sales of capital goods. He urged a global comprehensive policy against Communist expansion. (C)

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Dr. Brzezinski observed that seeking a total solution often leads to no solution and noted that we are working with the Europeans to limit technology sales and tighten COCOM. He again returned to the question of Argentine grain sales noting that the growth had accelerated greatly this year and this made it harder for us to keep the other major suppliers on board. He urged Martinez to think about this problem not just in bilateral terms but in light of Argentina’s role as a member of the West. It would be a pity if Argentina were seen by history to have played the same kind of role that France played when Hitler occupied the Rheinland.3 (C)

Martinez de Hoz said that Argentina wants to take a stand but frankly doubts that grain embargos will be effective. Brzezinski promised to supply information to Argentina to demonstrate that the embargo is being effective. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski agreed that there are problems for Argentina in implementing sanctions but said that more can always be done if there is determination. Argentina is, after all, one of the world’s major countries and has a critical role to play. (C)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 5/80. Confidential. Copies were sent to Owen, Deal, and Pastor. The meeting took place in Brzezinski’s office.
  2. In a May 6 memorandum to Brzezinski, Deal wrote, “The weakness of the present embargo is due to heavy Argentine sales of grain to the USSR. Argentina will ship 5.3–6.0 million metric tons (MMT) of grain to the USSR in the current marketing year, nearly twice the highest previous year. The Argentines have just concluded a new trade agreement with the USSR which provides for yearly minimum purchases of 5MMT.” (National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 5/80)
  3. In a May 5 memorandum to Brzezinski, Thornton recommended: “Concerning grain, avoid specifics which will be dealt with by others, but point out the great symbolic as well as the material importance of grain to the campaign against Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 5, Argentina, 2/80–1/81 #1) In telegram 120048 to Madrid and Buenos Aires, May 7, the Department reported on Christopher’s meeting with Martínez de Hoz. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800225–0779)