Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region

107. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State¹

Buenos Aires, March 26, 1980, 2134Z

2604. Subject: Assessment of My Visit to Buenos Aires.

1. (S) Entire text

2. Conditions for our visit to Buenos Aires were not auspicious. While we held talks with the President of Argentina’s nuclear energy agency Castro Madero,² his deputy was in Moscow at the Soviet’s invitation. A high-level German delegation, headed by Van Well, was also here to complete negotiations for the Atucha II reactor. During our talks with Videla, Pastor, Martinez de Hoz; Galtieri and Viola we stressed the seriousness with which we view the international situation, that there will be no “lurch towards detente,” and our aim to strengthen relations with Argentina.

3. There clearly remain deep differences on major issues from non-proliferation to central American strategy. Some of the expectations of goodwill created by the Goodpaster mission³ were dissipated by the clashes at the UNHRC meeting in Geneva, which were fully reported in the Buenos Aires press. But I believe Argentina’s leaders—conscious that relations between the two countries have never been easy—are also interested in improving relations on their terms. They stressed again, as they had to Andy Goodpaster, that while they have pragmatic relations with the Soviets and the third world, they consider Argentina part of the West. They consider some forward movement on military relations and our attitude in the OAS on the IAHRC’s Human Rights report important tests of whether we share their desire for cooperation. My principal conclusions are:

A) We should continue the effort to rebuild the relationship. Argentina’s Human Rights situation has improved over the past year—more so than they are internationally being given credit for. Argentina is an important nation, with considerable influence on major US interests, and one with which we should have decent working relations.

B) Human Rights. Our policies should be based on current performance, not the grim record of the past. We should be concerned with current security practices, the current quality of judicial procedures, and the openness of the emerging political dialogue. But I question whether an accounting of the fate of the thousands of disappearances is a realistic objective at this time; we should continue to urge moves on humanitarian grounds, but without making our relations with Argentina hostage to this issue.⁴ (No major Argentine politician seeks such an accounting.)

C) Political evolution. Most of Argentina’s military leadership wishes to return Argentina to its democratic traditions—in a manner that would avoid past patterns of chronic instability. But while progressive improvement in the security of the person can be expected, the installation of an effective democratic civilian political system will be a matter of years. Too much of the country’s institutional structure has been destroyed by Peronism and its aftermath. There is no evidence that pressure and sanctions will accelerate this process.

D) Non-proliferation. There was no encouragement during my talks that Argentina will ratify Tlatelolco any time soon; on full-scope safeguards we agreed to disagree. Argentina’s nuclear program is well advanced and will move ahead under able leadership. Our central objective must be to prevent the emergence of a nuclear arms race in the hemisphere. The Argentine leadership may be on the threshold of concern over global and regional proliferation and may be interested in a dialogue on political solution. Their new cooperative arrangements with Brazil offer hope of fostering mutual restraint and confidence between these two countries and merit our support.

E) Bilateral nuclear cooperation. For the present? The Argentines do not appear interested in cooperation beyond the supply of fuel for their research reactors, to which we are committed. We should, however, maintain remaining links to their nuclear program by resolving the related safeguards issue in accordance with the requirements of US law. I think we can solve the issue on that basis.

F) Olympics and grains embargo. There is a reasonable possibility that the Argentines ultimately will withdraw from the Moscow games, and they could help swing the other Latin American countries. (We should keep them currently informed about our count of the number of prospective non-participants.) On grains, I see no justification for accusing them of having undercut the Goodpaster understanding. They have a case that we have undersold them in their traditional markets. The grain they now have available for export has been severely reduced by drought and thus they no longer have future ability to affect a major part of our embargo.⁵

G) Central America. The Argentine leadership is deeply concerned over developments in that region. They have decided to focus their support on Guatemala and Honduras, and are pessimistic about prospects in Nicaragua and El Salvador.

H) Relations with the Soviets. The Soviets continue to probe for opportunities to expand cooperation. They have become one of Argentina’s larger trading partners in recent years, cooperate with Argentina in the UN, and now probe Argentine interest in military sales and nuclear cooperation. This should be a matter of real concern to us.

4. In summary, I believe we should continue close consultations on such matters as Central America and the forth-coming IAHRC report. I also recommend that we proceed with an invitation to the army chief-of-staff, General Vaquero, sometime this summer, if developments with respect to Argentina continue favorable.⁶ There is merit in economic talks, which I understand are scheduled for later this year, and in permitting the purchase of such technical services under AID’s reimbursable development program as they might find of interest, or the program of technical cooperation worked out between USDA and the Argentine Secretariat of Agriculture. On the other hand, we have told them that we see no possibility of changing our vote in the IFI’s or lifting the prohibition on military sales and training until their Human Rights performance and image further improves. Dialogue should be continued on political approaches to global and regional proliferation problems.

Castro

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800005–0023. Secret; Niact; Immediate; Nodis. The report was written by Ambassador Gerald C. Smith, Special Presidential Assistant for Non-Proliferation Matters.
2. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 466.
3. See Documents 104 and 106.
4. In an April 1 memorandum to Derian, Flood argued that this recommendation was “particularly troubling,” and that “if we turn our backs on this issue, we will be condoning state terrorism and mass slaughter on a scale hitherto unknown in South America in peacetime.” (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chron and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 85D366, [unfoldered material])
5. In an April 3 memorandum to Bowdler, Ruser reported, “Martínez de Hoz stressed that Argentina was in effect priced out of its traditional markets, thus laying a basis for a possible decision to exceed the informal export limits. For this reason we should continue to stress the importance of these limits. While export availabilities are sharply reduced, the present limits are quite generous by historic standards.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 1–4/80)
6. In a March 28 memorandum to Tarnoff and Brig Gen. Carl Smith, Dodson wrote, “Although it was decided at the V–B–B that Ambassador Smith was to invite Vaquero to the United States, we understand that, on advice of Embassy Buenos Aires, he did not do so. He did, however, tell Foreign Minister Pastor that we would welcome a high-level visit, and intimated to Vaquero that he would be welcome as long as there were no untoward developments in US-Argentine relations.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 5, Argentina, 2/80–1/81 #1)