75. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba to the Department of State1
8481. Subject: (S) Soviet Troops in Cuba. Ref: Havana 8435.2
1. (S—Entire text.)
2. At lunch today Jose Luis Padron indicated “top levels” of GOC were mystified by US intentions in making issue at this time of Soviet unit in Cuba. Conventional wisdom was that US aim was to influence outcome of NAM Summit. “Top levels” of GOC, however, were more astute than that. In their view, announcement created more problems for USG and Carter administration than for GOC; hence, NAM Summit link was implausible.
3. Padron continued, however, that while his principals were pretty certain what US intentions were not, they were uncertain as to what they were. Cuba would say nothing publicly, he indicated, but privately he would confirm to me that Soviet unit has been in Cuba since 1963. It incomprehensible that US intelligence community has been unaware of its presence. Over the years it has many times engaged in joint maneuvers with Cuban units. US electronic surveillance must have detected this years ago even if other intelligence sources had previously been unaware.
4. Padron indicated that unit was here principally for purpose of training. It was a line unit and Padron admitted that in years just after missile crisis, presence of Soviet unit “had made Cubans feel a little more secure.” But unit’s purpose was not combat. “Cuban armed forces do not need a few Russians to help us defend our island,” he concluded. Rather, purpose was to conduct joint training exercises with Cuban units. There was nothing provocative in its presence and as responsible US officials had noted, it violated no understandings.
5. Comment: Padron’s tone was matter of fact and at no time did he urge any particular course of action on USG. Rather, his observations were almost those of bemused observer. On other hand, there was certainly no hint of give, or that Cuban side would easily acquiesce to withdrawal of Soviet unit.