71. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba to the Department of State1
8173. Subject: Likely Castro Reaction on Soviet Troop Issue. Ref: A) Havana 8038.2
1. S—Entire text.
2. I take it from Secretary’s public statement of Sept 6 that matter of Soviet unit is to be pursued with Amb Dobrynin.3 It is probably as [Page 150] well not to pursue it further with Cubans at this point. We have raised it with them, as we should have. They have not responded and are not likely to do so. Further demarches at this point would simply invite kind of defiant, stone-wall response which would be unhelpful in defusing situation.
3. Bolstered by what now has all appearances of major and resounding foreign policy victory at NAM Summit, a victory which increases his worth to and bargaining position with Soviets, Castro will be in no mood to offer explanations and certainly not to take any initiatives in direction reduction or withdrawal. Nor is he likely quietly to acquiesce to any possible Soviet decision to reduce or withdraw units. On contrary, he will use added leverage of Summit victory to prevent any backdown on their part, a la 1962. Cubans regarded Soviet response then as cowardly and still do. 1962 will be uppermost in Cuban minds as they watch Soviet management of troop issue.
4. USINT’s assessment that announcement presence of Soviet unit unlikely to influence thinking of many NAM delegates (Ref B)4 has been strengthened over past few days. Troop story drew a ho-hum, but to the extent there was any reaction, it was overwhelmingly that announcement was clumsy US effort to influence outcome of Summit. Castro’s soundings were doubtless more complete than our own but must have produced same results. He, then, will likely be operating on assumption that awareness of presence Soviet unit here will not do him any particular harm in the NAM.5
5. Given the above, Castro is likely to calculate that most of the factors in the equation are in his favor. He can therefore be expected to take a firm stand and to make it difficult for the Soviets not to do so.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 15, Cuba, 2/29/80. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis.↩
- See Document 66.↩
- Reference is presumably to Vance’s September 5 press conference. See footnote 4, Document 68.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- In telegram 8377 from Havana, September 9, the Interests Section remarked that although Castro “emerged as a major recognized leader of the NAM,” the moderates were able to deflect some of his more anti-West and anti-U.S. initiatives. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790464–1094)↩