69. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- Synopsis of U.S. Intelligence Information on the Soviet Brigade in Cuba 1962 to 1979
1. 1962: The Soviets were estimated to have 20,000 military personnel in Cuba. As a result of the negotiations over the withdrawal of Soviet missiles, all Soviet personnel associated with the missiles were believed withdrawn. At that point we estimated a residual of between 500–2,000 signals intelligence operators and military advisers but had no hard count.
2. 1968–1972: [5 lines not declassified]
3. 1973–74: We obtained [less than 1 line not declassified] alluding to Soviet artillery exercises. These were insufficient to alter the basic view expressed above.
4. 1975: We began receiving [less than 1 line not declassified] fragmentary and ambiguous references to a “brigade.” There were no indications of the nature of this brigade, or of any connection between it and previous training exercises.
5. 1976–77: We began [1½ lines not declassified] It was suspected that these were training exercises for the 1,500–2,000 Soviet [less than 1 line not declassified] military advisory personnel then estimated to be in Cuba. (Our estimate of the number of Soviets present had changed due to the growth of the [less than 1 line not declassified] effort, 1962–1975.)
6. August 1978: As a result of [1 line not declassified] in Cuba, we raised (in the PDB) the possibility that a Soviet ground forces unit had been training in Cuba since 1977.
7. Early 1979: An intensified analytic effort was made to review all of the clues regarding Soviet military activities in Cuba. As a result, in mid-July we published the key conclusion that the Soviet brigade was not made up of elements of the Soviet Advisory Group presence but was a separate ground forces unit. We were not, however, able to determine the unit’s size, organization, or mission.2
[Page 147]8. August 1979: An intensified intelligence collection effort paid off on 9 August when a [2 lines not declassified] This permitted targeting [less than 1 line not declassified] onto that exercise area on the 17th. The results constituted the first clear evidence of training activity that could be [less than 1 line not declassified] (the exercise area is used by both the Cubans and the Soviets and their equipment is virtually identical). On 20 August, [less than 1 line not declassified] All of the Soviet equipment had been removed. What was apparently the same equipment was [less than 1 line not declassified] being prepared for restorage at the facilities where we suspect the Soviet personnel are garrisoned. This equipment had not been visible [less than 1 line not declassified] on the 17th. Analysis of this equipment and the size and configuration of the Soviet installations involved, in combination with the accumulated [less than 1 line not declassified] reporting received in August, led to a determination that the references to a Soviet brigade in Cuba were, in fact, references to a separate combat unit whose size was probably between 2,000–3,000 personnel.
9. Retrospective: We have inadequate data to determine when the unit first arrived. It is possible that a ground forces unit of some size has been in Cuba since 1962. It is also possible that it was introduced or expanded in the period 1975–77 when there was a substantial increase in Soviet support for Cuban military forces. One of the principal facilities in which it is presently housed was enlarged during that period. We have seen no other sign of facility improvements, organizational change, or extensive movement of equipment or personnel since that time.
10. Summary: Our confidence levels are:
a. [less than 1 line not declassified]—that there is a separate Soviet ground forces brigade in Cuba.
b. [less than 1 line not declassified]—that it is commanded by a colonel.
c. [less than 1 line not declassified]—that it has three infantry and one tank battalions, plus various supporting elements.
d. [less than 1 line not declassified]—that it contains 2,000–3,000 personnel with our best estimate at 2,600.
e. Finally, we have [less than 1 line not declassified] and no direct evidence on the mission of the Brigade. If it were left behind in 1962, it was most likely intended as a commitment to Castro against the possibility of a US invasion of Cuba. It is conceivable that the unit also had a function to train Cubans at that time. If it were introduced in the mid-1970s, it was probably intended to be a symbolic commitment to Castro in exchange for his commitment to adventurism in Africa. It [Page 148] is also quite possible, of course, that the Brigade’s mission shifted from the first hypothesis to the second over time.
11. All portions of this memo are TOP SECRET [codewords not declassified]
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 15, Cuba, Soviet Brigade, 9/1–18/79. Top Secret; [codewords not declassified]. There is no indication Carter read the memorandum.↩
- See Document 54.↩
- Turner signed “Stan Turner” above this typed signature.↩