Office of the Historian

38. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting1

Washington, November 14, 1978, 9:30–11:00 a.m.

SUBJECT

  • MIG’s in Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

  • State

    • Ambassador David Newsom
    • George Vest

  • Defense

    • Secretary Harold Brown
    • Charles Duncan
    • Stanley Resor

  • JCS

    • General David Jones
    • Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith

  • White House

    • Zbigniew Brzezinski
    • David Aaron

  • NSC

    • Robert Pastor
    • Reginald Bartholomew

  • CIA

    • Admiral Stansfield Turner
    • Robert Bowie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. Purpose of the Meeting. To determine the kind, number, and capabilities of MIG’s currently in Cuba as well as those (MIG-25’s) which are expected to be delivered soon; to determine whether the escalation in weaponry constitutes a threat to the U.S. and a violation of the 1962 and 1970 understandings between the U.S. and the USSR;2 and to recommend a strategy for dealing with the introduction and future delivery of these weapons.

2. Evidence. Present evidence indicates that there may be 12 MIG-23’s in Cuba—one or two MIG–23 D/F have been sighted and possibly as many as 5–9 are present. We do not know whether the general attack MIG-23’s are F (normal export model) or D (30% of which are apparently used by the Soviets for nuclear missions). There was a consensus that both D and F represent a significant jump in offensive capabilities for Cuba in that both are specifically designed for air-to-ground attack. The D represents an additional issue in that its nuclear capability and previous deployment only with Soviet forces raises questions about ultimate Soviet intentions. MIG–23 B/E (of which Cubans have at least three) and MIG-25’s which the Cubans claim they expect [Page 87] to receive soon) are interceptors, designed primarily for air-to-air attack, though all of these represent a decidedly enhanced capability for Cuba over the MIG-21’s which they presently have.

3. Threat. All of the planes can be modified to carry nuclear weapons, and all can reach the U.S., though the D/F’s have the widest range (600–800 miles).

There were three hypotheses suggested as to why the MIG-23’s were deployed now: (1) natural upgrading of Cuban air force capabilities; (2) a deliberate act designed to test the 1962 and 1970 understandings; or (3) to increase the capabilities of Cuba’s air force so that they could use the weapons in Africa.

While no one thought that the reason the Soviets introduced the weapons was to deliberately thwart the understandings, there was a consensus that the introduction of offensive weapons (defined as air-to-ground attack aircraft—MIG–23 D/F) did constitute a violation of the two understandings.

4. Objective. There was a consensus that our objective should be to seek a halt on further deployment of MIG–23 D/F, and if possible to obtain their withdrawal.

5. Approach. The consensus was that we should approach the Soviets, preferably Secretary Vance to Ambassador Dobrynin, inform them we are following the recent deployment very closely, and register our concern with the introduction of MIG-23’s. (We should not make a distinction between D’s and F’s.) We should inform them that we view MIG–23 D/F’s as offensive weapons, that their deployment in Cuba constitutes a violation of the 1962 and 1970 understandings, and that their deployment will affect our relationship and could jeopardize ratification of the SALT treaty by calling into question Soviet adherence to past understandings. We would express our willingness to indicate a capacity to rationalize the presence of one or two MIG-23’s temporarily, but no more.3

6. Congressional Consultations. State will forward recommendations on who to consult in Congress and what to say. We would not consider any public statement until that time.

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7. Consultations with Latin Americans. CIA believes that most Latin Americans are likely to view this as a U.S. problem, but at some future point, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina should probably be briefed and consulted.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 8, Cuba, 8–12/78. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. Brzezinski initialed the last page.↩
  2. See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 36.↩
  3. In telegram 290640 to Moscow, November 16, the Department reported Vance’s November 14 démarche to Ambassador Dobrynin regarding the MiG aircraft in Cuba. “Questions would certainly be raised in this country,” Vance warned, “as to whether the provision of air to ground aircraft is consistent with the 1962 understanding.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850081–2616) In telegram 296057 to Moscow, November 22, the Department reported the November 19 Soviet response, “The Soviet side did not and does not undertake anything in Cuba that would contradict agreement reached in 1962. The aircraft in question belong to the same class as those which have already been there for a long time.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840139–1961)↩